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Communication scholars attending to globalization increasingly look to the local as an 
articulation of how societies transform and are transformed by capital and communication 
technologies associated with globalization. This dissertation analyzes how the emergence of 
independent media in Morocco has remade the link between culture and politics in an era defined 
by economic liberalization, political transition and cultural globalization. Once the domain of the 
state and the monarchy, culture – understood as everyday, lived experience – has been re-
mediated through magazines, film and various digital media platforms and practices. This project 
engages with media industry studies and cultural politics in examining three distinct, yet 
interconnected, sites of mediation: the newsmagazine Telquel, new Moroccan cinema and 
activist blogger collective Mamfakinch. Using thematic textual analyses, in-depth interviews and 
participant observation, I track cultural and political tensions as they play across these different 
mediated sites, signaling foundational shifts in Moroccan public culture and the emergence of a 
distinct new arena of socio-cultural and political interactions. 
 Independent media use the forces of capital and technological affordances to create these 
new discursive spaces within a broader Moroccan media landscape. In doing so they act as a 
platform for a progressive counterpublic to advance a set of values associated with individual 
rights and secularism while countering the political power of the monarchy and the Islamist PJD.  
They generate interventions around language politics, alternative information infrastructures 
outside the purview of the state and new modes of publicness characterized by what I call 
flexible publics, or groups groups that coalesce around particular issues, operating outside 
institutional politics to assert claims in public and provocative ways. Ultimately, by engaging 
with the lived realities of contemporary Morocco, independent media both participate in 
Morocco’s entry into global modernity and display a fundamental ambivalence toward 
modernities caught between increasing global inequality and the neoliberal authoritarian state.  






On March 23, 1965 students took to the streets of Casablanca to protest limitations on access to 
higher education, setting off a wave of wide-ranging protests around the country that were 
violently repressed by authorities. On March 30, King Hassan II addressed the nation by saying 
“Let me tell you that there is no danger so serious for the State as that of an alleged intellectual. 
It would have been better if you were all illiterate…” (Hassan II, 1965). Universities had long 
been centers for the circulation of oppositional ideas, both before independence and after, and 
philosophy in particular became a target for authorities as Marxist-Leninist currents of thought 
became more influential in the Union Nationale des Étudiants du Maroc (UNEM). When 
universities were expanded in the 1980s, philosophy departments were replaced by Islamic 
studies in an effort to weaken the left and its challenges to traditional centers of power.  
 Fast forward to 2014 when Morocco’s National Library was overrun with people 
attending Morocco’s first edition of Philosophy Night.1 An estimated 9,000 participants, 
including philosophy clubs from local high schools, gathered over two nights in Rabat and 
Casablanca for philosophical speeches and debates inspired by similar events in major European 
cities and orchestrated in conjunction with UNESCO’s World Philosophy Day. Telquel cultural 
journalist Kenza Sefrioui, who spoke about the relationship between philosophy and art, also 
covered the event in an article titled “Thirst for thinking” (Sefrioui, 2014). Sefrioui’s article 
noted the remarkable diversity of the crowd in terms of age and social milieu and quoted 
organizer Driss Jaydane that the event is proof that “questioning is inseparable from progress and 
                                                            
1 For a short video of the Rabat event see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWDnshQzgHo 
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that youth want something else than a singular response from a closed and deadening culture” 
(Sefrioui, 2014, p. 32). And philosophy night is not alone – one can see in contemporary 
Morocco a general preoccupation with public culture and its possibilities, as evident in the 
growth of organizations2 and initiatives, as well as media and events, dedicated to culture. 
 These types of events and mediated discourses signal foundational shifts in Moroccan 
public culture and the emergence of a distinct new arena of socio-cultural and political 
interactions. Several important dynamics are bound up in the emergence of this arena: first, the 
increasing penetration of capital associated with economic liberalization and accompanied by a 
rising middle class with more meaningful choices in culture and consumption than in politics; 
second, the growth of information infrastructures both as part of and independent of the state, as 
well as the increasing democratization of cultural production due to technological affordances; 
and finally, the simultaneous weakening of the left and the rise of political Islam in a moment of 
political transition, making the cultural field particularly fraught and a site of contestation over 
the meaning of Moroccan modernity. A fledgling independent media has become ground zero for 
this new cultural dynamism, taking up debates about public culture and constructing new 





                                                            
2 Included in these organizations is Racines, an “association dedicated to culture, development and the promotion of 
cultural and creative industries and cooperation in Africa” (www.racines.ma). In November 2014 Racines hosted a 
conference on “The General State of Culture in Morocco,” where journalist, university director, cultural advocate 
and playwright Driss Ksikes responded to a heated debate about the role of mosques in cultural life by saying 
mosques have not been spaces of open debate and critical thought for a long time (Racines, 2014). The search for 
spaces open to questioning and creative collaborations led the cultural advocacy group Racines to create Artmap.ma, 
a database of cultural spaces across Morocco. Included in this database is the National Library, which hosted the 
conference in Rabat and has become a dynamic space for cultural programming since it opened in 2008. 
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Independent media and cultural politics under Mohammed VI 
This dissertation is about independent media in Morocco in the era of Mohammed VI.3 It 
explores shifts in Morocco’s media system from the perspective of media industry studies and 
cultural politics, and tracks cultural and political tensions as they play across three different 
mediated sites in relation to debates about globalization and hybridity. I show that the emergence 
of independent media in Morocco derives from 30 years of economic liberalization and has 
produced a new relationship between culture and politics, ultimately arguing that the remediation 
of everyday cultural practices through independent media can be understood to be producing 
new kinds of mediated publics that have revitalized the Moroccan public sphere. In many ways 
independent media lay the groundwork for public debate, inviting people into new forms of 
subjectivity as citizen-subjects and building content around language based in secularism and 
human rights, as well as Moroccan specificity, through which claims can be directed to domestic 
and transnational institutions.  
 Once the domain of the state and the monarchy, more recently culture has been re-
mediated through independent media such as magazines, film, and various digital media 
platforms and practices. As a result, mediated publics have emerged that link the cultural and 
political domains in novel ways with often surprising consequences. For this project I examine 
three mediated sites in different, yet interconnected, domains: print journalism, the film industry 
and an activist blogger collective. Each site mobilizes different aspects of Moroccan culture and 
transnational connections to reshape public political discourse. To analyze these phenomena, I 
use a combination of thematic textual analyses, in-depth interviews and participant observation 
                                                            
3 Mohammed VI is the current king of Morocco, who is popularly referred to as “M6.” He took over the throne in 
1999 after the death of his totalitarian father, Hassan II, and is widely popular due to his “prince of the people” 
persona and reformist agenda, although few of those reforms have resulted in any meaningful change to the 
governing authority of the monarchy. 
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to demonstrate how a generational transformation in media and communication, and the left 
more broadly, has constructed independent media as platforms for the cultural dynamism of a 
more liberal left to advance its own version of modernity and associated political projects as a 
counterpoint to those of the monarchy and increasingly the Islamists. 
 This project focuses on the reign of Morocco’s current king, Mohammed VI, beginning 
in 1999 with his ascent to power, and reforms that resulted in the opening up of civil society via 
freedom of association and media liberalization. However, I situate these relatively recent events 
within the larger context of 30 years of economic liberalization and broader histories of dissent 
in Morocco’s media. Theoretically I engage with global media scholars working at the nexus of 
cultural geographies of media production and critical cultural studies, particularly Kraidy’s 
(2005) work on hybridity, where he recaptures the concept of hybridity as part of a critical 
repertoire of global communication. In looking at localized practices and interrogating the 
strategic use of discourses about hybridity in relation to power it becomes clear that multiple 
forms of Moroccan modernity are being advanced by various actors and competing for 
legitimacy among publics. With that in mind I examine the existing literatures around modernity, 
cultural geography and mediated activism. My intervention involves integrating analyses across 
industry logics, technological platforms and cultural politics, so that it becomes clear how 
political economic shifts and technological affordances create the conditions of possibility for 
certain types of claim-making, as well as how those mediated claims are then taken up in public 
culture. Additionally, in regard to the emergent field of digital studies, I make the case that the 
artificial separating out of the digital makes little sense and that in order to really understand the 
digital it must be understood as part of intermedia relationships and convergences. Given the 
way media systems have developed around the world, I adopt a comparative, cross-platform 
   
 5 
approach in order to situate the digital in relation to other media forms. In examining these 
dynamics I attempt to theorize from the ground up, developing conceptual tools specific to the 
Moroccan case and thinking about the ways they may or may not travel in other contexts. 
 Together my three sites of analysis reveal a decisive shift from what is often described as 
“folkloric” conceptions of cultural heritage instrumentalized by the state to a more dynamic 
sense of culture as a transnational zone of encounter and contention grounded in everyday life. In 
other words, as one interviewee said, “the state likes dead culture, things it can stick in a 
museum” (Ksikes, personal communication, 2014). Fundamentally my sites of analysis 
demonstrate a decoupling of culture and politics as domains of the state and the use of culture to 
access, or put pressure on, the political realm. The entrance of capital from transnational 
corporations into Morocco’s media market and new modes of textual production and circulation 
in some ways frees media, or at least allows them more space to resist, the imperatives of the 
state. However, these dynamics also shift the agenda somewhat, in that discourses about culture 
are now being constructed in conjunction with transnational policy and development objectives, 
as well as those of a capitalist consumer culture. Ultimately this amounts to a new cultural 
politics spanning multiple scales – local, national, regional, transnational – that is heavily reliant 
on a politics of shame enacted through local media in conjunction with transnational civil 
society. In particular the independent media I examine act as a platform for a progressive 
counterpublic to emphasize the everyday culture of urban youth in order to counter the rise of 
Islamist political power and culture. While there has long been more liberty in the cultural field 
than in politics, independent media such as Telquel, the new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch 
are indicative of shifting cultural geographies and the increasing mediation of everyday life. This 
allows for the construction of discourses around controversial social issues and the deployment 
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of a dynamic popular culture that fundamentally challenges the cultural hegemony of the 
monarchy as well as the foundation on which traditional modes of political power rest.  
 The key stakeholders across these sites are the state in the form of the monarchy or 
makhzen,4 Islamist political parties and a range of progressive counterpublic voices traditionally 
affiliated with the left, but in many cases eschewing institutional political affiliations. In 
Morocco, a postcolonial politics defined by the consolidation of power in the monarchy and its 
web of influence is being transformed by the simultaneous rise of neoliberal globalization and 
political Islam, which has been coupled with widespread persecution of and disillusionment with 
the left. The dynamics of interaction between these three stakeholders and their alternatively 
complimentary and contradictory aims inform every aspect of this study because the subset of 
media addressed here are the product of a new and more liberal generation of the left – 
frequently bi-national elites or the product of a middle class educated in the French system – and 
that is responding to the rise in Islamist political power that followed the repression of their 
parents’ generation. The counterpublic voices present in Telquel, the new Moroccan cinema and 
Mamfakinch are generally progressive and largely secular, favoring individual liberties like 
freedom of conscience and a critical subjectivity that at least questions if not adopts a rather 
pejorative attitude toward popular religiosity. Here “Islamists” and “Islamism” are used to refer 
to the Justice and Development Party, or PJD, whose establishment as a legal political party in 
1996 signified the incorporation of those favoring forms of societal organization based in Islamic 
                                                            
4 Makhzen is a Moroccan Arabic word meaning “storehouse,” that was used to refer to the state in the form of a 
governing establishment revolving around the sultan and associated notables in various sectors. More recently it has 
come to stand in for an extensive system of royal privilege and clientelism associated with the contemporary 
Moroccan state. This “deep state” surrounding the monarchy is understood to be the real center of power in 
Moroccan political life despite the existence of parliament and other ostensibly democratic institutions. 
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precepts into official politics and public life.5 During the Years of Lead,6 Hassan II favored 
Islamic traditions and influence in order to counter leftist opposition, but under Mohammed VI 
the situation has reversed somewhat, with the monarch frequently supporting leftist initiatives 
while actively invoking his role as Commander of the Faithful in order to counter the rising 
influence of political Islam under the PJD. That both Islamists and the left have been public 
enemy number one of the monarchy at various points in time means there are sometimes 
interesting and often surprising intersections in their interests.7 However, the left, and elites in 
particular with their close business, education and cultural ties to former colonizer France, are 
often seen as advocating for foreign intervention or domination in their support for 
cosmopolitanism and a set of values emphasizing individual rights over community identity. 
These concerns become especially salient in light of the increasing penetration of global capital 
and cultural producers’ openness to making use of that capital in the interest of independence 
from the state. 
 This dissertation looks locally at this complex interweaving of stakeholders and interests 
characterizing Morocco’s contemporary communicative environment, focusing on the 
implications of increasingly democratic cultural production in a society that is fundamentally 
authoritarian. When I began asking about media in Morocco, the story most people told was one 
of stasis and stagnation. However, it quickly became clear that Moroccan media in the 21st 
century constituted a much more variegated space than these comments let on and taking 
                                                            
5 The PJD emerged in 1996-1998 out of earlier Islamist groups such as Chabiba Islamiya and the Unity and Reform 
Movement (MUR), encouraged by Interior Minister Driss Basri as a way to cultivate a moderate Islamism and bring 
Islamists into the realm of royal influence. Significantly, the party’s original founder in the 1960s, Abdelkrim El 
Khatib, was an important member of the nationalist movement and supported the monarchy’s role as religious 
leader. 
6 The Years of Lead refers to a period between 1965-1990 when an increasingly totalitarian Hassan II used violence 
against dissidents, particularly the left. The period was characterized by disappearances, torture, secret prisons and 
arbitrary judicial proceedings, leading to widespread paranoia and distrust of authorities. 
7 One example of these intersections is seen in the case of Mamfakinch, when Islamists and leftists both take up the 
cause of freedom of expression online. 
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seriously recent shifts in the media landscape allows us to see how Moroccan independent media 
alternatively complement and contradict the workings of power, ultimately negotiating new 
narratives and making public culture a domain of contestation over diverse societal projects. 
Many of these dynamics are by no means unique to Morocco, but are instead relevant to many 
nations of the Global South that underwent World Bank coordinated economic restructuring in 
the 1980s, opening them up to flows of capital and culture from elsewhere, as well as nations 
whose media combine strong state influence with neoliberal tendencies. 
Reterritorialization and transformations of the state 
When I refer to Morocco, I refer only marginally to the territorial nation-state, and primarily to a 
locality that is a space of flows defined by its intersectionality. For the purposes of this project 
these flows are centered on the coastal Casablanca-Rabat corridor as the centers of media and 
cultural production, as well as economic and political power. By understanding the local as an 
intersectional space of trans local flows and frictions rather than a static territorial space, we start 
to understand the ways that the nation has been reterritorialized in accordance with capital and 
new forms of the national emerging.  
 To some extent Morocco’s geographic location at the intersection of the Middle East, 
Africa and Europe has always linked it to global flows and makes the nation a unique 
ethnocultural formation described in the preamble to the 2011 constitution as “unity… forged by 
the convergence of its Arab-Islamist, Berber [amazighe] and Saharan-Hassanic [saharo-hassanie] 
components, nourished and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean 
influences [affluents]” (WLP, 2014). It is important to note that the 2011 constitution is among 
the few times this diversity has been fully acknowledged, and in many ways the denial of this 
diversity has been central to a Moroccan nationalism based in the Malekite rite of Sunni Islam 
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and its Arab heritage under the Alouite monarchy. Morocco’s history as a socio-spatial formation 
is defined by its position on the Mediterranean basin and the region’s indigenous people identify 
as Amazigh/Imazighen, or “free men,” in reference to their opposition to external control, 
whether from Rome/Byzantines, the Ottomans, Arabs or France. According to Laroui (1977) 
with the Arab invasion of the early 8th century, “It is obvious that the two generals whose 
conquests were most enduring…carried out the same policy as the earlier conquerors of the 
Maghrib, that is, to occupy the cities and leave the indigenous Berber masses under the authority 
of their chiefs” (p. 85). As a diverse space characterized by uneven degrees of outside influence 
and engagement, Morocco’s processes of Arabization and the adoption of Islam by the Amazigh 
were centuries long (and sometimes incomplete) affairs, even at the height of empire. Sultans 
issued from the Alaouite dynasty have ruled Morocco since the 17th century, claiming direct 
lineage from the Prophet Mohammed and authority through affiliations with and arbitration 
among these diverse communities.  
 In many ways colonialism8 expanded and institutionalized the array of influences and 
connections to external capital, while reinforcing societal divisions based on geography and 
ethnolinguistic identity. Colonialist historians have often divided Morocco into two domains: 
that of government administration (bled al-makhzen) and that outside its administrative authority 
(bled as-siba), a division used to justify France’s divide and conquer policies. The French 
Protectorate instituted a Berber policy aimed at “pacification” and incorporation of Amazigh into 
the state that culminated in the Berber Dahir of May 16, 1930 (Wyrtzen, 2011). The Berber 
Dahir, which very basically excluded Amazigh from the Islamic judicial system, acted as a 
                                                            
8 The Treaty of Fes in 1912 formally established Morocco as a protectorate of the French, and, to a lesser extent, the 
Spanish in the northern and southern extremities of the country. After 44 years under French administration, 
Morocco regained its independence in 1956. France continues to occupy a privileged place in Moroccan business, 
politics and cultural life, particularly for elites educated in the French system.  
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rallying cry for a nascent nationalist movement closely associated with pan-Arabism, for which 
the sultan became the symbolic center in Morocco. Under the protectorate the monarchy 
maintained its religious and cultural authority as part of a “Muslim policy” that sought to 
partition society and reinforce the institution of the monarchy while depriving it of real power 
(Rivet, 2012). The protectorate also shifted the centers of power away from inland trade routes 
associated with imperial Morocco and its traditional centers of power toward the coasts, 
particularly the port city of Casablanca and Rabat as an administrative capital.  
 Perhaps the defining logics of postcolonial political economy in Morocco are the 
continuity of colonial power structures under new nationalist administrators and the 
consolidation of power under the monarchy. However, the strategic manipulation of alliances 
through which the monarchy established these logics did not occur without opposition, as 
indicated by the country’s eleven governments between 1956 and 1966. Tumultuous post-
independence politics gave way to a state of exception declared by Hassan II in 1965 when the 
series of student protests referenced above took on a much more widespread character and were 
violently repressed. This became a formative moment for a new and more revolutionary 
generation of the left, Marxist-Leninist in nature and inspired by Mao’s cultural revolution, but 
also indicative of major ideological schisms in the Moroccan left (Rollinde, 2002). As early as 
1970, Waterbury (1970) argued that “stalemate has been and will continue to be the dominant 
trait of Moroccan politics” (p. 61). At the same time, Morocco came to be isolated diplomatically 
from Algeria over a series of border disputes, and much of the MENA region with its Cold War 
Soviet alignment, as the regime adopted a relatively liberal orientation and more measured stance 
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on Palestine9 that aligned it with the West, while enacting nationalist economic policies and 
subscribing to the Islamic umma.10 
 The consolidation of power under the monarchy facilitated its transition to becoming 
what Leveau (1976) has called “the premier private entrepreneur in Morocco” (p. 257). Morocco 
definitively integrated into the global economic order when it signed on to the World Bank’s 
Structural Adjustment Program in 1983 (Cammett, 2007; Vandendries, 1997; White, 2001). 
These neoliberal market reforms and subsequent economic liberalization led to opening markets 
and privatizing major industries, which saw certain segments of the population benefit 
enormously and others left behind, with uneven development leading to dramatic increases in 
inequality. King Hassan II’s transfer of majority foreign-owned assets to political allies in the 
1970s resulted in “thirty-six major families who controlled two-thirds of the moroccanized 
economy; suddenly, Morocco became a country with a sizeable class of multimillionaires” 
(Miller, 2012). These multimillionaires, including the monarchy, which had been expanding its 
assets, were in a prime position to profit from later economic liberalization. We see here the state 
attempt to instrumentalize neoliberalism in accordance with its interests, specifically by taking 
advantage of opportunities to extend its authority in the economic realm, giving rise to what 
Yesil (2016) has called “the authoritarian neoliberal state” marked by “state-market 
interpenetration” (p. 12-13). Here the term “neoliberal state” refers to a shift in the way power is 
orchestrated by the state in the form of the monarchy. Many of my sources discussed 
Mohammed VI’s apparent lack of interest in governing (as opposed to his father), and his 
limitation of public intervention to specific issues or major moments of crisis, as in the case of 
                                                            
9 It is important to note that despite this being the official position adopted by the Moroccan regime, Moroccans for 
the most part understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a domestic issue. 
10 Umma is the Arabic word for “community” and refers to a supranational community of common faith in Islam. 
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Moudawana11 reforms or constitutional reform in the wake of the Arab Spring. Instead, the 
monarchy has become an increasingly important player in the economy through its holdings in 
key sectors and seems to prefer to orchestrate influence through the economic realm, presenting 
itself as above politics and showing favor (or lack thereof) through the allocation of resources 
and investments. In his comparative political economy of Tunisia and Morocco, White (2001) 
argues that the Maghreb is part of a Mediterranean regional economy dominated by the EU, and 
that Morocco’s relatively late post-independence economic opening and policies have only 
increased its dependency on Europe and a few economic sectors. I want to emphasize here that I 
am not making a case for economic determination, but rather for the economy’s role in 
establishing limits and links (Williams, 1980, p. 35). Economic liberalization set in motion deep 
structural transformations in Moroccan society and its cultural geography through such 
phenomena as industrialization, urbanization and a demographic explosion from a population of 
less than 12 million in 1960 to 24 million in 1990. By focusing on the reign of Mohammed VI 
from 1999 to the present, we see how a historical moment defined by hopes for a new left and 
democratic reform opened up new spaces for media and civil society before widespread 
disillusionment with the left, the post 9/11 remilitarization of the nation and cooperation with the 
war on terror led to many reversals of freedoms instituted earlier in the current king’s reign.12  
Culture and politics 
The subsequent acceleration of capital flows and communication technologies defining 
globalization mean that contemporary cultural geography, or the study of relationships between 
                                                            
11 The Moudawana is the Moroccan family code, which deals with rights surrounding the status of women and 
children as well as issues like marriage and inheritance. After a decades-long struggle by women’s rights groups, the 
Moudawana was finally reformed with royal support from the new monarch, Mohammed VI, in 2004. Since then, 
Morocco has frequently been cited as an example of legal rights for women in the MENA region, yet many of these 
rights continue to exist solely on paper rather than in practice. 
12 For a timeline of major political moments in Moroccan history, see Appendix A. 
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cultural norms and space/place, “insists on the necessity of rethinking our sense of place in the 
context of the transformations and destabilizations wrought both by the forces of economic 
globalization and by the global media industries” (Morley, 2000, p. 5). Against the backdrop of 
top-down politics and culture emanating from the monarchy, new cultural (especially popular 
and mediated) forms have emerged and been elevated in conjunction with independent media in 
recent years. When I say culture I follow Raymond Williams’ definition of culture as the 
conjunction of everyday life experiences and symbolic systems (Williams, 1976, p. 91). The 
important thing to recognize in Morocco is that these two definitions of culture have often been 
at odds as symbolic systems advanced by the state attempt to “fix” Morocco within a static 
Arabo-Islamic conception of culture that legitimizes the monarchy as descendant from the 
Prophet Mohammed and offer a unifying narrative for a diverse society. Despite the monarchy’s 
general popularity, the failure of these homogenizing narratives to resonate with the complexities 
of contemporary life and everyday experiences of Moroccan publics means that independent 
media frequently talk about dealing in the “real,” which can be understood as a certain set of 
realities considered taboo, controversial and often subversive. Independent media’s frequent 
invocation of the real and its association with modernity recalls Berman’s (1982) claim that: 
“…for all of us, modernism is realism. This will not resolve the contradictions that pervade 
modern life; but it should help us to understand them, so that we can be clear and honest in 
facing and sorting out and working through the forces that make us what we are” (p. 14). For a 
progressive counterpublic, culture, and independent media in particular, offer a place for this 
“working through” of self and society.  
 I use the term “cultural politics” to mean very basically the relationship of culture with 
power. In other words, what is political about the cultural shifts I’m pointing to, especially in a 
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country where public access to the political field is limited? This new relationship between 
culture and power involves a shift away from official, state-sanctioned cultural forms 
instrumentalized by the monarchy for a myriad of purposes, to the emergence of larger margins 
for popular culture and mediated practices. Central to this cultural politics are dynamics of 
economic liberalization and neoliberal globalization, flows of culture and capital, and media and 
technological affordances. Through the conjunction of these forces, the cultural politics of 
independent media can be understood as a leftist challenge to both the cultural hegemony of the 
monarchy and its top-down version of modernity, and increasingly to Islamist versions of 
modernity as well. Here modernity means a rupture in social structures associated with capital 
and nationalism, but also in social imaginaries about what is possible individually, socially and 
politically. While modernity has for a long time been portrayed as a moral order and/or a linear 
development narrative, the modernity being advanced by these Moroccan independent media 
recognizes that modernity is always riddled with paradoxes and is not a binary split, but rather a 
push-pull negotiation that engages with increasingly complex forms of societal organization. It is 
a modernity that is insistently global in outlook, based on the movement of people and culture 
associated with globalization as well as the fusion of global capital with the materialities of 
everyday urban culture. This hybrid, translocal and deeply specific modernity assumes 
Enlightenment values like secularism and universal rights, but also the validity of forms of 
knowledge and ways of being in public that eschew consensus, engage with difference and hold 
that universality cannot be considered outside material realities, so that the way to the universal 
is through the specific. As a result we see an ambivalent engagement on the part of independent 
media with various pressures while trying to produce a persuasive politics that uses language, 
information infrastructures, and new modes of publicness as ways of making the informal or 
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private public and using that grounding in everyday life as a platform for a new political project 
based on the claims of citizen-subjects.  
 In a society where culture has often been seen as coterminous with religion and the 
monarchy (Entelis, 1989; Touzani, 2003), an emergent public culture can be seen as an arena 
where various forms and domains of culture – popular, folk, religious, and transnational media – 
are “encountering, interrogating and contesting each other in new and unexpected ways” 
(Appadurai & Breckenridge, 1988, p. 6). Independent media’s emphasis on cosmopolitan 
cultural forms, hybrid texts and public culture more broadly seeks to circumvent the stalemate 
that is Moroccan politics and produce spaces of public engagement outside the realm of 
institutional politics. The political alienation of the general population and the impossibility of 
orchestrating change through institutional political channels in a system where the consolidation 
of power in the makhzen, corruption and a high number of political parties effectively eliminate 
the possibility of a viable opposition, have made public culture a key site of engagement with the 
political for a new generation of independent media.  
 When I say independent media, I mean independent – non-state, non-affiliated – 
Moroccan media as distinct from the traditionally state-centric Moroccan media landscape 
founded on the French model of government, partisan and union-based publications that keeps 
media particularly close to power. I use the phrase “independent media” to signal a range of 
commercial and NGO-funded media projects not affiliated with the Moroccan state apparatus, 
while acknowledging that the dominant interpretation of the phrase in Western academic 
literature is media free from both government and commercial interests. This independent media 
is dependent on what Fahmy (2011) calls “media capitalism” (p. 15). Fahmy proposes media 
capitalism as an alternative to Anderson’s (1983) print capitalism, to describe “the 
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commodification of mass media, including print, and their function as part of a media market” 
(Fahmy, 2011, p. 16). This market includes not only print materials, but culture in all sensory 
forms, which is particularly important when considering the digital and its possibilities for 
convergence and multimedia forms. The commodification of culture through media and the 
recognition of culture as an economic good in the information society mean that there are fewer 
and fewer spaces outside the market, raising questions about how people creatively and 
practically exploit capital for their own purposes and goals in a way that doesn’t just make them 
dupes of the capitalist system. Yue (2012) refers to this phenomenon as “illiberal pragmatism,” 
or an “ambivalence between non-liberalism and neoliberalism” (p. 2). In Morocco, illiberal 
pragmatism manifests in the flows and frictions associated with an independent media 
determined to be a point of openness and engagement with the world. Independent media create 
new discursive spaces within the Moroccan media landscape while also being to some extent 
complicit with the logics of capital, which in turn gives them some critical leverage in 
constructing a cultural politics characterized by ambivalence about modernity.  
Modernity, cultural geography, and mediated activism 
This dissertation engages with three primary literatures while attempting to draw from a diverse 
range of ideas and put them into conversation with each other. The first is the literature on 
modernity, which is used to makes sense of tensions between official articulations by the state 
and those coming from an emergent independent media with its emphasis on cosmopolitan 
cultural forms and everyday urban culture. The second is cultural geography, which deals with 
transformations in the local accompanying globalization and the impact of capital on culture and 
information infrastructures, as well as the rise of regional centers of cultural production. Last is 
the much newer literature on mediated activism, which is born out of the work on contentious 
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politics and social movements, as well as that on publics and the public sphere. I use this 
literature to situate independent media associated with a progressive counterpublic in relation to 
historical trajectories of leftist opposition and dissent in Moroccan society while considering the 
role of (global) media in authoritarian states.  
Modernity 
Scholars from postcolonial countries have long questioned the universalizing narrative of 
modernity. The emergence of a “multiple modernities” or “alternative modernities” perspective 
emphasizes the diversity of daily realities and lived experiences as the European heritage of 
modernity is taken up in various ways and at various levels around the globe. Even if 
Enlightenment values – inalienable rights, democracy, instrumental reason, individual autonomy, 
etc – are central to the project of modernity, certain societies emphasize particular values over 
others, which “has loosened the internal coherence which held these terms and images together 
in a Euro-American master-narrative, and provided instead a loosely structured synopticon of 
politics, in which different nation-states, as part of their evolution, have organized their political 
cultures around different ‘keywords’ (Williams, 1976)” (Appadurai, 1990, p. 299-300). As a 
postcolonial nation Morocco has placed its emphasis on state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
aiming to present a united and stable front to the world via the monarchy and aspiring to reclaim 
even a small portion of its territory at the height of empire, most notably the Western Sahara.  
 In the MENA region, modernity has frequently been approached through the lens of 
religion (as is evident from the overwhelming number of books and articles about Islam and 
modernity), with the key question often being reduced to “Is Islam compatible with modernity?” 
In response to the rise of identity politics in the 1980s/90s, al-Azmeh (2009) takes an anti-
essentialist position in arguing against “the insistent global salience of culturalism” (p. xi), that 
   
 18 
marginalizes history and uses categories such as Islam to make causal claims (p. xii). This debate 
over a (fabricated) religion/secularism binary can be more usefully approached through 
examination of situated everyday experiences in which religion comes into play because as al-
Azmeh (2009) contends “there are as many Islams as there are situations that sustain it” (p. 1). In 
Morocco, Islam runs the gamut from radical fundamentalist ideology to mere cultural heritage. 
Notably, Islam is used as justification for both authoritarian and social justice claims, particularly 
as part of campaigns against materialism or for women’s rights. Al-Azmeh’s anti-essentialist 
approach is adopted by Sabry (2010) who argues “By making both the modern and the 
traditional subject to a double-critique, we are not really abolishing the duality problematic, but 
we are undoubtedly changing how we think it…[making] both modernity and tradition 
vulnerable, championing critical reason instead of authenticity, difference instead of sameness 
and creativity instead of orthodoxy” (p. 41). Due to marginalization in modernist narratives, 
Arab societies have tended to privilege the past over the present in order to reconcile authenticity 
and modernity, often describing the historic accomplishments of Arab societies as the building 
blocks of Western civilization. Yet anti-essentialism contends that there is no one authenticity 
and that there are multiple ways of being modern in the world. 
 Recognition of oneself as possessing individual subjectivity – or the capacity for and 
particularity of a person’s perspectives, experiences, feelings, beliefs, desires and/or power – 
among other individual subjectivities is fundamental to contemporary understandings of 
individual agency and democratic social structures. Modernity is a background understanding of 
human beings as autonomous agents among other autonomous agents (Taylor, 2004, p. 166). 
Thus according to Kolakowski (1990), modernity is not a “history of ideas,” but “a history of 
mentalities” (p. 3), similar to Williams’ (1961) “structure of feeling” that sets apart moments in 
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history as “the new generation responds in its own ways to the unique world it is inheriting (p. 
64-5). Sabry (2010) analyzes modernity as a state of mind involving what Giddens (1991) 
describes as the institutionalization of self-doubt. The modern moment is characterized by a 
profound awareness of the multiplicity of subjectivities, which are not necessarily divisible along 
the lines of Self/Other as “‘we still know ourselves to be this or that, but the knowledge is 
uncertain, for we are also this and that’” (Walzer, 1997, p. 90 cited in Silverstone, 2007, p. 17). 
The awareness of otherness in oneself and vice versa is a key contribution of the multiple 
modernities perspective.  
 If culture is a site of contestation over modernity, then the media are an increasingly 
important arena for the negotiation of culture and generating of social imaginaries. Media in a 
variety of forms are part of everyday life in most societies and thus characterize modern ways of 
life. Central to this modernity is the connectivity of the local with the global, whereby globally 
circulating texts saturate locales around the world and local cultural forms have the potential for 
global distribution. Thus Silverstone “insists on the significance of the media for our orientation 
in the world, in a world that is available to us, within reach, albeit only symbolically, in ways 
unimaginable before the electronic age” (Silverstone, 2007, p. 6). Even those who are not elite 
cosmopolitans experience the expanded horizons of everyday life through the increased 
circulation of media texts. John Tomlinson (1999) argued that it through media that most people 
experience the world because “for most people, most of the time the impact of globalization is 
felt not in travel but in staying at home.” As a result, media consumption shapes modern 
subjectivities on two levels: 1) the level of self-understanding and 2) the potentiality of 
engagement with others. Both constitute encounters with oneself and others, shaping these 
interactions and the possibilities they hold.   
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 Fundamentally, my sites of analysis are about media’s role in claims to the enactment or 
fulfillment of modernity. Independent media in Morocco attempt to reconcile claims to 
modernity without simultaneously reifying its power hierarchies, fundamentally displaying an 
ambivalence toward modernity. This ambivalence is born of independent media’s relationship 
with capital as it to some extent buys into neoliberalism as a way to impose limits on the 
authoritarian state, but also out of a transnational current in global politics whereby people are 
increasingly disillusioned by the proferred choices and feel trapped between various abhorrent 
versions of modernity. In the case of Morocco this manifests in a moment of political possibility 
associated with the Arab Spring and the inability of the left to respond in a meaningful way, 
leaving people to choose between the top-down authoritarian modernity of the monarchy and an 
Islamist modernity rooted in religious dogma. These claims to modernity make clear that 
“European thought is at once both indispensable and inadequate in helping us think through the 
experiences of political modernity in non-Western nations, and provincializing Europe becomes 
the task of exploring how this thought – which is now everyone’s heritage and which affects us 
all – may be renewed from and for the margins” (Chakrabarty, 2000, p. 16). Modernity’s 
dissemination and the different ways it has been taken up around the world has made it into 
global heritage rather than a uniquely European endowment. As al-Azmeh (2009) points out,  
“…the tropes and notions of political and social thought available today form a universal 
repertoire that is inescapable, a repertoire which, though of Western origin, has in the last 
century and a half become a universal patrimony beyond which political and social 
thought is inconceivable. This was the result of a universal acculturation which has 
filtered through modern state structures, forms of discourse and communication, 
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educational and legal systems, terms of political life and much more, which have become 
globalized, native not only to their points of origin, but worldwide” (p. 33). 
This global heritage manifests in independent media’s profound ambivalence toward discourses 
about tradition and modernity, as evident in its lack of hesitation in laying claim to the modern 
and its relation to a set of principles on which no concessions can be made, as well as its 
critiques of the notion that these principles are the primary heritage of the West.  
Cultural Geography 
Within the field of communication studies, the emerging sub-field of global communication 
seeks to understand shifts in cultural geography accompanying the increased mobility of capital, 
texts and people, as well as where that mobility breaks down. In an agenda-setting work about 
the meaning of “global” communication, Wilkins, Straubhaar & Kumar (2014) argue that “the 
meanings and relationships of the global and the local can only be constituted through their 
articulation or linking to particular places, cultures, or contexts” (p. 7). In this light Moroccan 
independent media can be considered as the product of a complex confluence of forces including 
the spread of media capitalism, growth of transnational civil society, audience access through to 
a greater variety of cultural products through digital technologies and changes in Morocco’s 
regulatory landscape. Thinking about Telquel, the new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch as 
phenomena of “global” communication illuminates their lineage within historical, often 
transnational, discourses and their interventions in public culture across multiple scales. Within 
this confluence they can be considered as hybrid texts and articulations of global modernity. 
According to Shome & Hegde (2002), looking at such hybridities through the critical lens of 
postcolonial theory “entails geopoliticizing the nation and locating it within larger (and unequal) 
histories and geographies of global power and culture” (p. 252-253). Moving across scales 
   
 22 
allows this analysis to elaborate on orchestrations of power and their relationship with culture in 
a global era. Sassen (2006) argues that an overlooked dimension of globalization is the way 
processes and transformations inside the nation participate in its disassembly as the sole order 
and authority, contending:  
“These processes take place deep inside territories and institutional domains that have 
largely been constructed in national terms in much of the world. What makes these 
processes part of globalization even though they are localized in national, indeed 
subnational, settings is that they are oriented toward global agendas and systems” (p. 3).  
The interaction of Moroccan independent media with existing circuits of culture and their 
exploitation of transnational capital and technological affordances lends support to globalization 
theories’ suggestion that the world’s increasingly interconnected media environments are both 
participants in and products of messy and complicated interactions across space. 
 Deterritorialization is often pointed to as one of the primary ways in which modernity has 
shifted understandings of space and place. Originating in Deleuze & Guattari’s (1983) discussion 
of the transition from primitive forms of territorial organization to the capitalist state, 
deterritorialization referred to a prying loose of labor power from the means of production. By 
introducing capitalism and privatization, agrarian forms of social organization were disrupted. 
According to Appadurai (1990) “Deterritorialization, in general, is one of the central forces of 
the modern world, since it brings laboring populations into the lower class sectors and spaces of 
relatively wealthy societies, while sometimes creating exaggerated and intensified senses of 
criticism or attachment to politics in the home-state” (p. 301). Morocco’s internal migrations 
from rural areas to cities were accompanied by recruitment of manual labor to industrializing 
France, escalating migratory flows and institutionalizing a diasporic experience associated with 
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Marocains resident à l’étranger (MREs, or Moroccans living abroad). Greater circulation of 
people, products and culture means that the national reputation of Arab nations “whose hitherto 
established meaning as conformity to Islamic values was now contested by an emerging, perhaps 
best understood as neoliberal, definition of national reputation as fitness for foreign investment” 
(Kraidy, 2014, p. 41). At the same time, Yudice (2003) argues that “the very managers of global 
resources have ‘discovered culture,’ at least paying lip service to notions of cultural maintenance 
and cultural investment” (p. 2). This expansion of the cultural field and its understanding as a 
form of capital among others demonstrates that deterritorialization is rarely just a prying loose, 
but rather depends on a subsequent reterritorialization or restructuring of social power. This 
reterritorialization has involved a shift away from agrarian forms of social organization toward 
industrializing cities, and then a move toward engagement with a global neoliberal knowledge 
economy in the 21st century. The uses of culture by various stakeholders throughout these 
processes clearly contradict the assertions of world economic leaders that “in the face of 
globalizing market forces there is absolutely nothing that can be done” (Massey, 1999, p. 36). 
Rather the expansion of the cultural field and its use as a resource for the fulfillment of a variety 
of complementary and contradictory goals sheds light on the shifting cultural geographies of a 
global era. 
Mediated Activism 
Kraidy (2014) argues for consideration of “contentious politics as an important force shaping the 
development of media industries” (40). Contentious politics emerge out of the convergence 
between contention, politics and collective action, and involve “interactive, collective making of 
claims that bear on other people’s interests and involve governments as claimants, objects of 
claims, or third parties” (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 23). The emergence of independent media as a 
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social and political force in Moroccan contentious politics has changed the dynamics of 
contention by publicizing democratic deficits and working with domestic and transnational civil 
society to challenge the discursive hegemony of the monarchy as the ultimate source of 
authority. In doing so independent media have created new links and limits, ultimately altering 
the ways in which Moroccan modernity and cultural geography are constituted. 
 The unique affordances of media to communicate with mass audiences means they have 
the potential to play an instrumental role in coordinating and orchestrating collective action, as 
well as take advantage of technological change to expand the repertoires available to those 
outside traditionally centralized media systems. While “the nation-state has for many years been 
the main target for protest” (Della Porta, 2004, p. 1), the boundaries are increasingly blurred 
between domestic and transnational targets, issues and actors. Keck and Sikkink (1998) look at 
transnational advocacy networks as discursive actors and arenas for contemporary political 
contention. Transnational advocacy networks include “those relevant actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and 
dense exchanges of information and services” (p. 2). These networks provide new links between 
domestic, international and global arenas of advocacy and thus change the structure of the 
relationships and roles that make up each, as seen in independent media’s engagements with 
networks oriented toward freedom of expression and human rights more broadly. “By thus 
blurring the boundaries between a state’s relations with its own nationals and the recourse both 
citizens and states have to the international system, advocacy networks are helping to transform 
the practice of national sovereignty” (Keck & Sikkink, p. 1-2). Transnational advocacy networks 
offer new targets and possibilities for claim making, however differential access means that 
protesters often still addresses “national governments regarding decisions that originated or were 
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implemented at a supranational level” (Della Porta, 2004, p. 4). Tarrow (2005) argues that 
transnational activists are “both constrained and supported by domestic networks; that in making 
this move they activate transitional processes between states and international politics; and that 
when they return home, they bring with them new forms of action, new ways of framing 
domestic issues, and perhaps new identities that may some day fuse domestic with international 
contention” (p. 2-3). In the case of Morocco, the embedding of independent media in anti-torture 
and human rights movements oriented toward freedom of expression shape their engagements 
with publics across multiple scales. 
 The fundamental and problematic assumption of the contentious politics and social 
movement literatures is that change is orchestrated exclusively through institutional channels, 
thus it neglects to look outside the political realm for repertoires and opportunities existing in 
other areas of social life. For Morocco it would be easy to say that the country has seen very little 
political and social change since independence due to the continuing power of the makhzen, but 
that would be incredibly reductive and completely dismissive of the agency orchestrated by 
ordinary people on an everyday basis. This is what Bayat (2013) calls “the quiet encroachment of 
the ordinary,” or the ways in which the urban dispossessed infringe on the powerful, and 
constitutes just one way that orchestrations of agency evolve in accordance with constraints. In 
Morocco independent media act as new spaces for debating and working out the challenges of 
modernity and making Moroccan society, especially the margins, present to those in power in 
previously impossible ways. They do this by emphasizing and mobilizing urban youth culture in 
particular, framing culture as a (more democratic) site of contention and engagement in a society 
where disillusionment with institutional politics is widespread.  
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 Each site in this dissertation takes a different approach to mediation with corresponding 
implications for the formation of publics, bringing into relief the varied and uneven ways in 
which media operate across space and deal with the material realities of their work environments 
and the publics they call into being. As a result we can see the process of mediation as one that 
multiplies “the situational interconnections that are possible between places” (Couldry & 
McCarthy, 2004, p. 8) and expands the range of relevant approaches and actors for any social 
space. One set of important actors that emerges from these sites is media elites, whose 
interventions in public culture, particularly through event-making, constitute key attempts to 
reorganize public culture around the principles of interaction and encounter, with hopes for 
societal renewal. 
A note on method 
This project began as a textual analysis of Telquel during a one-year period of time from 2010 to 
2011, over the course of the Arab Spring. My interest in Telquel began when I arrived in Rabat, 
Morocco as a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar in 2010. As a journalist by training I quickly began 
checking out newspapers as a way to learn about Moroccan media and my new surroundings, but 
was disappointed to find that they were mostly very dry, with the average story depicting a 
middle age politician and insider political wrangling involving whatever party the paper 
represented, with little coverage of Moroccan society and cultural life. Moreover, I wanted to 
practice Darija, but the Arabic papers stuck mostly to Fus’ha, or classical Arabic, and that wasn’t 
getting me far in my daily interactions with Moroccans. That Darija was relatively new to media 
in general inspired my interest in language politics, and Telquel’s engagement in these debates 
lead me to follow the magazine closely. A friend suggested the magazine to me because “their 
journalists are always being thrown in jail or hauled into court, which seems to be the mark of 
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good journalism in Morocco.” Telquel’s daring, even sensationalist, covers and aggressive 
investigative reporting quickly became a favorite of mine, especially as the magazine seemed 
truly interested in trying to understand contemporary Moroccan society – with all its complex 
issues and diversity of interests. The magazine adopts a critical tone towards power and a 
progressive position on individual rights, placing it more in the liberal camp than most 
independent daily newspapers, but can also be critiqued for its elitist, even neoliberal ideologies. 
 All of this painted a picture of the arena of public culture and the spaces available for 
dissent or alternative voices that was much more complex than what I had previously been led to 
believe. Compared to other authoritarian countries of the MENA region, Morocco under the new 
king had relatively large margins for critical speech, even if it was already ebbing when I arrived 
in 2010 with the closure of Le Journal Hebdo early in the year, followed by Al Jazeera’s 
expulsion from the country and Nichane’s demise. I began collecting issues of Telquel in earnest 
as the Arab Spring picked up steam, and followed the magazine online in the following years. As 
part of the research for this chapter I spent several weeks in Morocco’s National Archives, a 
subdivision of the National Library in Rabat, browsing and reading almost every issue published 
between 2001 and 2012. I continue to follow Telquel, but stop my analysis in 2012 in 
recognition of the major shift that occurred with the sale of the magazine that year and the 
departure of the majority of its original team. 
I considered it important that my dissertation not be limited to one organization or platform 
in an age of convergence and transmedia discourses. My two other sites of analysis evolved 
organically out of my work on Telquel, as the magazine closely covered the new Moroccan 
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cinema and developments associated with M2013 and Mamfakinch. I began studying cinema in 
earnest after another friend told me “if you want to tell real stories in Morocco, you go into 
cinema instead of journalism.” The dynamics of interaction between closely intertwined groups 
of cultural producers, industry logics and textual forms at a specific societal moment took shape 
as I expanded my analysis from Telquel to the new Moroccan cinema to Mamfakinch. This 
project is fundamentally a discourse analysis of three different mediated sites, conducted through 
textual analysis, interviews and participant observation, as well as some critical political 
economy. All of this draws on my experience living in Rabat for a one-year period between 2010 
and 2011, several shorter research trips in subsequent years, and 6 months of fieldwork in 2014 
and 2015. Following the tradition of critical cultural studies I embrace the creativity allowed by 
an interdisciplinary approach that derives systematic inquiry from a locally grounded object of 
analysis: in this case the emergent independent media of Morocco and its new cultural politics. 
 This study has two limitations revolving around broadcast media and language. In regard 
to the first, despite attempts to emphasize transmedia processes and discourses, there are two 
domains of communication that I could not effectively address in this study. My focus on 
independent non-governmental media excludes most Moroccan broadcasting, which continues to 
be highly centralized and government controlled,14 despite widespread access to satellite. Several 
studies have analyzed the reception of foreign programs, in particular women watching Latin 
American telenovelas and Turkish soap operas (Elouardaoui, 2013; Miller, 2012; etc). While 
attempts to liberalize Morocco’s television sector have only resulted in a de facto state 
                                                            
13 M20, an abbreviation for Mouvement du 20 Février, or the February 20th Movement, is an umbrella organization 
that played a key role in organizing protests and became synonymous with the Arab Spring moment in Morocco. It 
is named for the kingdom’s largest day of protests on February 20, 2011.  
14 This is not to say that there are not many interesting things happening in the audiovisual sector, especially as a 
result of the close relationship between cinema and television. 
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monopoly, radio has been much more successful with substantial growth in the number of 
stations. Yet despite one journalist’s comment about radio “holding real potential as an 
independent medium,” she continued by saying that potential is quelled by current regulations 
(Sefrioui, personal communication, December 5, 2014). Some independent radio stations, such 
as football-oriented Radio Mars, have charted new terrain, however for the most part new 
entrants in the field have followed the commercial model top-hits model. However, my choice to 
exclude broadcast media from this study is fundamentally a practical one aimed at limiting the 
scope of this study and allowing for greater depth of analysis in regard to the media addressed. 
 The second limitation has to do with language. While I speak functional Darija, it is 
generally not a written or media language, meaning that most broadcasting and newspapers are 
produced in classical Arabic, although this is changing. My classical Arabic is a work in 
progress, meaning I was not confident that I could conduct an effective analysis of Arabic-
language texts when starting this study. While this continues to be a goal of mine, especially in 
regard to independent Arabic-language media, the reality for the moment is that most 
independent media are in French and as journalist Karim Boukhari acknowledged “there are just 
some things you can say in French that you can’t say in Arabic” (Boukari, personal 
communication, December 10, 2014). French continues to be the language of business and of the 
educated elite in Morocco, so my interviews with media professionals were mostly conducted in 
French and occasionally in English.  
 I recognize that what I am offering here is a snapshot of a specific group of media within 
a broader Moroccan media landscape at a particular moment in time. In analyzing a 
contemporary world full of moving parts and pieces, perhaps capturing a snapshot of intersecting 
social forces and attempting to situate it historically is the best we can hope for. This study is not 
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about the Arab Spring, but it is marked by dynamics emerging from that moment, particularly 
crackdowns on journalists, civil society and activists that were coming into focus particularly 
clearly while I was conducting my fieldwork. In analyzing these dynamics, I focus on a subset of 
media associated with a liberal left and with strong ties to human rights associations that is 
particularly influential in relation to discourses of power, preoccupied with the possibilities of a 
new dynamism in cultural life and interested in finding ways to challenge interpretive authority 
of the monarchy. 
Outline of the dissertation 
The title of this dissertation “No Concessions” is both a direct translation of Mamfakinch, and a 
reference to the ways in which the independent media I analyze seek to channel communications 
between citizen-subjects and domains of state power, shifting the balance of authority that 
facilitates the monarchy’s cooptation of dissent. “No” refers to a rejection of both the limits of 
what traditionally constitutes authority and knowledge, as well as a left defined by its position 
vis-à-vis the monarchy, while “concessions” signals a non-negotiable stance taken on certain 
basic principles of human rights and democratic process plus a separation from previous 
generations of the left. While Moroccan independent media’s refusal to concede on certain points 
has alternatively been useful for or a thorn in the side of the powerful, what is certain is that 
independent media under M6 have used new forms of capital and technological tools/platforms 
to construct discursive spaces oriented toward a progressive counterpublic and its vision of a 
Moroccan modernity based on open engagement with the world under the framework of 
individual rights. These discursive spaces are generative in that they have produced new types of 
publics and modes of publicness that are both more flexible in nature and open to diverse types 
of authority and knowledge. This flexibility is evident in the linguistic flexibility that stems from 
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Darija’s lack of codification, in movements across platforms and practices, and in publics that 
cut across ideological and geographic boundaries. Ultimately the institutional framework of 
independent media improves the efficacy with which citizen-subjects can create content, call for 
action or assert claims, amounting to a restructuring of authority away from the state and into a 
cultural realm increasingly concerned with the practices of everyday life. 
 In Chapter 1 I examine the way that the francophone news magazine Telquel takes up 
Moroccan Arabic (Darija) and advocates for its inclusion in public life. In a context where 
culture has long acted as a political battleground, Telquel mobilizes a secular Moroccan identity 
through Darija in order to foster opposition to the monarchy’s Islamic cultural hegemony and 
increasing fundamentalist challenges, highlighting Moroccans who are challenging social norms 
and bringing the traditionally marginalized into the center of the conversation.  Its motivation in 
doing so is to shift cultural norms of speech in order to create a certain kind of modern citizen-
subject who reflects critically on that which is often considered above critical reflection, 
particularly Islam, the monarchy and discourses about all Morocco’s problems originating 
abroad. Telquel argues that modernity for Morocco means an increasingly worldly public culture 
built around the framework of universal rights and transnational circuits of people, goods and 
ideas. In advancing this version of modernity, the use of Darija acts as a starting point for 
encountering Morocco as it is, on its own terms, in all its diversity and contradictions, and in 
direct conversation with the sacred. This chapter provides an introduction to Moroccan cultural 
politics, while elaborating on the specifics of how language structures the Moroccan cultural 
field and Telquel’s vision of Darija as a mechanism for more democratic culture and citizenry. I 
do this by tracing the origins of the independent weekly press in the combination of earlier leftist 
publications and financial reporting born of economic liberalization, while interrogating the way 
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Moroccan society and culture are taken up by Telquel in order to reimagine a more liberal left 
and everyday urban culture as a path to societal renewal. 
 Chapter 2 examines new terrain where a different facet of cultural politics is illuminated 
through the industry logics of the new Moroccan cinema. As seen in Telquel, increased openness 
to and availability of global capital (particularly cultural assistance funds) and new distribution 
mechanisms dependent on technology and travel (piracy, TV, festivals, etc) have opened up new 
avenues for alternative storytelling and depictions of Moroccan life and experiences that 
challenge hegemonic narratives about society and culture through cinema. These circumstances 
coincided with Morocco’s emergence as one of few small countries with the political will to 
support audiovisual production and assemble industry structures, as well as the rise of a new 
generation of Moroccan filmmakers deeply embedded in transnational networks of education, 
funding and storytelling. Through this lens the new Moroccan cinema can be seen as 
characterized by an emergent space of funding (from France, Euromed, etc) offering alternative 
(albeit difficult) means of assembling the resources for production. It is important to emphasize 
that even those filmmakers who receive government funding through the CCM often need to 
supplement it elsewhere, opening up links to transnational imaginaries about integration into 
regional if not global cinema circles, as well as wider aspirations about audience and commercial 
viability. Thus the new Moroccan cinema can be defined by a shift in scale from taking the 
national as the assumed frame of reference to operating according to a wider regional and global 
framework, in part due to transnational influences in cultural policy and their interactions with 
globalization.  
 Chapter 3 follows up Chapter 2 in examining the new Moroccan cinema as discourse, 
focusing on the ideological interventions made possible by shifting industry logics in the 
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Moroccan cinema sector. These industry logics have created the conditions of possibility for 
certain types of critical interventions through hybrid genres/cosmopolitan cultural forms, but also 
constrained others as certain types of capital come with particular types of expectations. Many 
filmmakers of the NMC15 depend on French funding and according to Moroccan filmmaker 
Farida Benlyazid “French producers tend to favor socially or politically engaged Moroccan 
films; they’re not looking to back different kinds of movies from Morocco, and that’s becoming 
a drawback for some directors” (Keslassy, 2013). The paradox is that at exactly the point that 
Moroccan cinema starts imagining new markets and publics it becomes truly popular with 
Moroccan publics, consistently topping the domestic box office and generating local alternatives 
to global media discourses while using the universal model of Hollywood as a model. In the 
process, filmmakers moving between translocal priorities and global media imperatives become 
important mediating forces among multiple modernities. For the most part filmmakers of the new 
Moroccan cinema are rooted in the diaspora, moving through overlapping francophone and 
arabophone cultural-linguistic spaces of a the Mediterranean region while also imagining more 
transnational/international publics. These chapters (2 & 3) continue the project’s focus on 
Moroccan cultural politics under Mohammed VI through the domain of cinema, while teasing 
out the ways transnational influences in cultural policy shape the new Moroccan cinema’s 
industry logics, which in turn encourage and constrain imaginations associated with the 
discourse of Moroccan cinema. I do this by thinking historically about the social function of 
cinema in Morocco and the ways in which the industry has been invoked as a generator of 
                                                            
15 I use NMC as shorthand for “new Moroccan cinema,” which is a phrase used by the popular and trade press to 
refer to a new wave in Moroccan cinema that has emerged during the reign of Mohammed VI (1999-present). It is 
generally characterized by new funding mechanisms, improved technical quality and taking on taboo topics, often in 
the local language.   
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investment and jobs while cultivating international audiences by responding to the thematic 
preoccupations of Western media. 
 Finally, Chapter 4 uses Mamfakinch as a lens through which to analyze mediated 
activism in Morocco, focusing on issues of access, flexibility and publics. Following Telquel and 
Moroccan cinema, the collective is yet another manifestation of an emergent independent media 
in Morocco that is creating new discursive spaces across platforms, this time with a non-
commercial and explicitly activist bent. The Moroccan regime’s liberal attitude toward the 
Internet in its early days led to its construction as radically democratic and unregulated space, an 
understanding that has shifted as high profile crackdowns on individual actors, including some 
associated with Mamfakinch, have made the Internet the new frontier for Moroccan civil 
society’s longstanding struggles over human rights. Mamfakinch’s use of the digital in processes 
of content creation, campaign coordination and information curation constitutes one node in an 
alternative information infrastructure constructed around democratic conceptions of culture that 
are increasingly distant from institutional politics. This chapter grapples with the implications of 
the digital for cultural politics, illuminating how mediated activism in the digital realm builds on 
the work of other media platforms while providing new tools for the development of alternative 
information infrastructures outside the purview of the state, while also lending itself to new 
avenues for surveillance. I do this by demonstrating how the Moroccan state’s fixation on ICT 
liberalization and development as the keys to participation in a new global knowledge economy 
participate in the construction of online spaces as an unregulated terrain for freedom of 
expression, while the prosecution of individual users in the wake of the Arab Spring makes 
digital rights into a new domain of human rights struggle. 
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 Together these three sites chronicle major industry shifts that are opening up discursive 
spaces through which people are enacting a new politics. This politics is fundamentally rooted in 
the cultural realm and invites people into new forms of subjectivity as citizen-subjects forged 
across and between established institutional boundaries while advancing a form of modernity 
that lays the groundwork for public debate centered on openness to dissent and difference yet is 
also troubled by neoliberalism. In many ways it has been anchored in the increasingly mediated 
practices of urban life, particularly those of youth, in an attempt to construct publics outside of 
the official realms of politics and culture seen as out of touch with the experiential realities of 
modernity. The flipside of independent media’s structuration of encounters among citizen-
subjects for the purposes of political claim-making is the ambivalence with which its associated 
progressive counterpublic engages with modernity and its paradoxes as it tries to figure out a 
politics enabled by capital and working within the discursive spaces produced by an emergent 










Debating Darija: Telquel and Language Politics in Modern Morocco 
In 2002, less than a year after the magazine’s launch, a 
Telquel cover proclaiming in bold letters “DARIJA” and 
underneath it in a font approximating handwriting in chalk 
“National language” appeared on newsstands. The text 
appears to be written on a gridded blackboard, the image of 
which underlies the entire cover, with handwritten Darija 
phrases and verb conjugations in Arabic script interspersed 
among the headlines. Together, all of this suggests a school 
or educational environment, pointedly referencing the fact 
that Darija, although the mother tongue of most Moroccans, 
is neither taught in schools nor an official language of instruction. Smaller text in the bottom 
right corner of the cover states “Moroccan Arabic, our language of daily life, isn’t taken 
seriously. Despite being the only language that unites us” (Ksikes, 2002). By suggesting that 
Darija is not taken seriously, Telquel invokes the complex linguistic politics of Moroccan society 
whereby only speaking Darija, which is traditionally not a written language, is equated with 
illiteracy. It also positions Darija against Morocco’s official language, classical Arabic, taken 
very seriously as the sacred language of Islam and carrier of a revered literary and scientific 
tradition. Framing the issue in terms of national unity references Moroccan society’s historic 
 
Image 1: Telquel cover #34, June 2002 
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diversity and deeply contentious divisions, often glossed over by the monarchy’s hegemonic 
narrative about Moroccan society subscribing above all to the Arab-Islamic Umma,1 to the 
exclusion of other identities. However, talking about Darija in the singular also glosses over 
regional divisions and hierarchies that take center stage in discussions about standardization and 
the logistics of the language’s migration into the official realm. Making Darija a matter of 
national unity perhaps also attempts to diffuse some of the tension surrounding a very personal 
and divisive issue by interpellating “us” to think about the larger common good and societal 
inclusion. 
 The “Darija: National Language” cover story continues in the centerfold, ultimately 
encompassing eight interior pages of the magazine. The centerfold background mimics the cover 
design of a gridded blackboard, but instead of “Darija: National Language” the interior headline 
reads “Darija: Our real national language.” All text appears in white against the blackboard 
background except for the words “Darija” and “real,” written in red as part of the headline and 
made to stand out visually in correspondence with a thick red border surrounding the page. The 
contrasting color used to emphasize these two words suggests both Darija’s rightful place in 
Moroccan life via the historical significance of the color red for the nation and the existence of a 
“non-real” official language to which Telquel positions itself in opposition. The text of the article 
occupies the bottom of the page and as the article continues on the following four pages it is 
broken up by sidebars detailing attempts to codify Darija or expand its presence in the public 
realm. The longest sidebar comes at the end of the main article under the label “humor.” In an 
article titled “Ma Fhemnach!” or “I don’t understand [them]!” journalist Yassine Zizi recounts 
humorous and frustrating instances of the insistence on using classical Arabic in official settings 
                                                
1 Umma is the Arabic word for “community” and refers to a supranational community of common faith in Islam. 
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such as TV news, with a pull quote pointing to the irony that “Only the advertisers address 
people in the language they understand” (Zizi, 2002, p. 23). The final two pages of the article 
appear under a thick red header featuring the words “Debate: Can Darija be standardized?” with 
the left page devoted to commentary from a linguist and dialectician under the answer “of 
course,” while the right page takes the perspective of a sociolinguist with the answer “it’s 
unnecessary” (Ksikes, 2002). 
 The main article was written by Driss Ksikes, an original member of the Telquel team 
who began his career as a literary critic before becoming cultural editor of Telquel and 
eventually the editor-in-chief of Nichane.2 After hearing Ksikes speak as a member of the 
cultural advocacy group Racines and organizer of a conference about the general state of culture 
in Morocco, I had the opportunity to speak with him in December 2014 in his office at the HEM 
business school where he is director of the Centre for Social, Economic and Management 
Research (CESEM). Since leaving Telquel and Nichane following a major court case where the 
magazine was sued by the state for defaming Islam in 2006, Ksikes has taken on many roles 
including director of CESEM, cultural advocate with Racines, editor of the academic journal 
Economia, playwright and head of the theater company DABATEATR, as well as investigative 
journalist and author. A soft-spoken, bespectacled and unassuming man with spiky gray hair, the 
former Telquel and Nichane editor described himself as a citizen with an interest in a better life 
in Morocco, saying “when I decided to stay, it was not a question that I could stay and not be 
active. It’s not a matter of changing things on your own and maybe not today, but of doing 
something” (Ksikes, personal communication, 2014). Ksikes describes contemporary Moroccan 
media as comparable to Southern European media in the 1970s when countries such as Portugal, 
                                                
2 Appendix B, Image 7 
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Spain and Greece were emerging from dictatorships and still plagued by a clientalist system 
characterized by too much consensus of opinion, too little diversity of ownership and lack of 
tolerance for marginal expression. In this non-democratic, industrializing environment, Ksikes 
said, “the economy and business come first, so there is a belief that we don’t need harassing 
media, we need soft media selling an image of a soft society” – an image in direct contrast with 
Telquel’s portrayals of a dynamic Moroccan society critically considering its place in the world. 
 In the “Darija: National Language” cover story, Ksikes emphasizes Darija’s importance 
for the democratic reforms to which Moroccan society aspires. For him language is an issue of 
inclusivity “because there are people who don’t understand the official language, classical 
Arabic”; gender equality “A mother who doesn’t understand what the journalist or the minister 
on TV is saying is a daily reality”; and, above all, class, as when a woman speaking in a 
Casablanca court is interrupted by the judge who says “in this place you must leave aside the 
language of the village and speak correctly” (Ksikes, 2002, p. 19). We see here language become 
a structuring tension for the overlapping continuums that divide Moroccan society along the lines 
of education, class, gender, age, geography and ethnicity. Ksikes cites anthropologists, linguists, 
sociologists and political scientists in talking about Morocco’s difficulties with diglossia3 (some, 
like Moroccan linguist Moha Ennaji, say triglossia) that have resulted in two very separate and 
increasingly in friction worlds within the country: the formal and informal sectors. These sectors 
are often characterized by their literate and illiterate participants, leading some to argue that 
Darija is an educational necessity in a country with a notoriously high illiteracy rate4 and a 
                                                
3 Diglossia refers to a situation where different languages are used under different conditions, particularly as 
associated with specific linguistic hierarchies. 
4 According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, in 1990 the adult (15+) literacy rate in Morocco was 41.6 
percent. By 2015 the literacy rate was projected to increase to 62 percent, although rates remain lower among 
women, the poor and rural populations. Data retrieved from: http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Documents/UIS-
literacy-statistics-1990-2015-en.pdf  
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dysfunctional public education system where policies regarding language have been hotly 
debated and laxly enforced since independence. However, in the case of Darija, democratizing 
access to knowledge also becomes a question of redefining what constitutes knowledge by 
“valorizing our folk wisdom” (Ksikes, 2002, p. 23), a shift that would legitimize experiential 
forms of knowledge associated with popular culture as meaningful for societal participation and 
engagement with the world.   
 For Telquel, media and cultural industries constitute a key component of this linguistic 
and conceptual shift away from having to use classical Arabic to be taken seriously, which 
besides education is the other major theme of the cover story. Ksikes describes an “impasse” in 
the printed press whereby Darija is the domain of informal communications such as market 
newspapers and tabloids, and in audiovisual media where a “rapprochement” to the level of 
spoken language is confined to fictional programming. On the fifth page of the article a three-
column sidebar occupies the top half of the page under the title “Dialogues that ring hollow,” 
stating that in cinema, theater and television dialogue has always been an issue because “they 
are, as a general rule, written (and thought) in French before being retranscribed in classical 
Arabic or Darija” (Boukhari, 2002, p. 22). As one writer described, when he wants to express 
love he writes something along the lines of “Je t’aime, je te désire, j’ai envie de toi” in French, 
which translated into Darija “gives us ‘kan’bghik (I want you),’ a hybrid and banal expression 
that one can address equally well to his mistress, his mother or his dog” (Boukhari, 2002, p. 22). 
This statement points to common conceptions that Darija is a vulgar, ugly language (a sense 
derived from the frequent removal of vowels and mashing together of consonant sounds) lacking 
poetic qualities and finer shades of meaning or nuance. Additionally, “classical Arabic is often 
used [in dialogue] because of its morally correct character, but, sadly, is often irrelevant” 
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(Boukhari, 2002, p. 22). All of this points to the complex nature of translation across 
considerations of plot, meaning, authenticity, funding, and distribution, yet as Ksikes points out 
in the article “The fact is undeniable, Moroccan films increasingly speak the local language, 
vernacular, understandable by all” (Ksikes, 2002, p. 22). This vernacular turn is indicative of a 
remediation of everyday life taking place through independent media and its participation in the 
formation of a new cultural politics to which the question of language is seen as central.  
 We see in this cover story a multitude of interests and issues being articulated through the 
question of language, most notably those associated with democratic reforms and a certain set of 
social values that celebrates individuality and the marginal. For Telquel, advocacy of Darija as 
national language is advocacy for the discarding of outdated ideologies – nationalism, pan-
Arabism, Islamism – that made classical Arabic Morocco’s official language at independence 
and ultimately proved divisive for any progressive opposition. Above all, because “Darija 
continues to be perceived as a corrupt and deviated form of the sacred language” (Ksikes, 2002, 
p. 19), questioning the status of classical Arabic can be seen as questioning the legitimacy of the 
monarchy and the religious foundations on which its authority rests. Elevating the status of 
Darija can thus be seen as an attempt to produce a meaningful opposition to the status quo and 
establish secular social spaces open to genuine deliberation without taboos and new forms of 
knowledge. Darija then becomes a means of reconfiguring the relationship between the state and 
its publics that circumvents the political realm by focusing on the possibilities of public culture 
as an arena for societal renewal. In many ways this early article sets the tone for Telquel’s 
ongoing interventions in public culture around the question of language in a country of complex 
linguistic and associated cultural hierarchies.  
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Media, language politics and public culture 
This chapter interrogates the intersection of independent media, language politics and public 
culture in Morocco under Mohammed VI.5 I look at Telquel as one specific articulation of a 
postcolonial politics of hybridity in Moroccan media that is the product of a particular political 
moment in Morocco characterized by an opening in cultural life and civil society, but also an 
increased openness to the forces of global capital. In the late 1990s/early 2000s, media 
liberalization and loosening of restrictions on civil society organizations combined with 
transnational capital and a moment of political transition to produce new platforms and 
discursive spaces such as Telquel that privilege local hybridities while asserting claims based on 
universal notions about human rights (especially freedom of expression) and democratic norms. 
Drawing on semiotics, postcolonial and Marxist critiques, I analyze Telquel’s production of 
oppositional discourses by focusing on its re-reading of historical narratives, entanglement with a 
transnational politics of the left and engagement in social movements and public events. 
In doing so I engage with recent work on language politics and the social function of 
language. Fahmy (2011) examines the role of colloquial Egyptian in building an Egyptian 
national identity at the turn of the 20th century, and at colloquial popular culture as an alternative 
or bottom-up history of the nation. Interestingly, in Morocco it was not Darija that participated in 
the construction of national identity, but more so classical Arabic with its links to a unifying 
Islamic identity, and anything that can be thought of as a “colloquial turn” was reserved for the 
turn of the 21st century rather than the 20th. In Egypt this turn was related to the perceived 
inability of classical Arabic to represent the experiential realities of everyday life. According to 
                                                
5 Mohammed VI is the current king of Morocco, who is popularly referred to as “M6.” He took over the throne in 
1999 after the death of his totalitarian father, Hassan II, and is widely popular due to his “prince of the people” 
persona and reformist agenda, although few of those reforms have resulted in any meaningful change to the 
governing authority of the monarchy. 
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Fahmy (2011), “because of its lack of use in everyday normal conversation, Fusha alone is 
incapable of accurately conveying the ordinary nuances and color of daily Egyptian interactions” 
(p. 6). This need for “linguistic flexibility” was construed differently in the Maghreb, where 
French was deeply entrenched at independence and seems to have compensated for the 
limitations of Fus’ha, particularly in relation to media, with Darija occupying this space in 
everyday life. Haeri (2003) addresses this split between official language and everyday life as a 
separation between the sacred and the profane because “It has come to pass…that the [Arabic] 
language and Islam are mutually constitutive” (p. 2). Language ideologies and institutions play a 
key role in perpetuating this essential connection across Muslim societies, and in Morocco are 
deeply tied to notions of national and religious identity as well as the nation’s position on the 
margins of the MENA region. According to Suleiman (2013), one of these ideologies is the 
taken-for-granted notion that Arabic is “a language in danger and under attack from inside and 
outside” (p. 6). Ideas about Arabic as an embattled language are tightly interwoven with histories 
of the rise and fall of Islamic empire, and of colonialism and nationalist movements in the 
modern era, making language politics and possibilities for reform particularly fraught. However, 
Haeri (2003) argues that vernacularization is necessary for social transformations regarding 
where knowledge comes from and who has authority over it. That these discourses are 
increasingly intertwined with and produced through media necessitates inquiry into new domains 
of interaction and their function in relation to language and the sacred. In this way we can make 
sense of Morocco’s constant need to assert its legitimacy as part of the Arabic-Islamic 
community due to its physical and cultural distance from the Arabic-Islamic “center,” despite 
strong religious, ethnic and linguistic ties. The geopolitics of the Moroccan nation mean that the 
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version of modernity advanced by the Moroccan monarchy and the state6 justifies on-going 
governance by an authoritarian Alouite monarchy with genealogical links to the Prophet 
Mohammed. In response, Telquel fields an oppositional version of modernity concerned local 
transformations associated with globalization, civil liberties and democratic process through 
which it provides a platform for a progressive counterpublic.  
Although the role of media and communication technologies in emerging democracies 
has received much attention in the wake of 2011’s Arab Spring, few scholars have sought to 
historically contextualize and investigate the ways culture, and public culture in particular, 
becomes a site of social and political engagement in societies where access to the political field 
is limited. Much emphasis has been placed on the uses of media platforms such as Facebook and 
Twitter, or coverage by powerful transnational media corporations such as Al Jazeera or CNN, 
but we have thought less often about locally or domestically-based media as playing key roles in 
networked forms of power and dissent not confined by national boundaries. In the case of 
Morocco, the emergence of several progressive news weeklies in a short period meant 
independent media offered a platform for new types of claim-making in the arena of public 
culture, ultimately reconfiguring the relationship between culture and politics in the country. The 
key role occupied by language in these claims makes it necessary to ask what role language takes 
on in the pages of Telquel and what are its political implications? Further, how does language 
and Telquel’s engagements with the politics surrounding it feed into the magazine’s particular 
version of modernity, and what gets glossed over in the process? In order to address these 
                                                
6 In Morocco the terms monarchy and state are often used interchangeably due to the monarchy’s continued 
extensive governing authority. Alternatively the term makhzen, literally meaning “storehouse” has come to stand in 
for the extensive system of royal privilege and clientelism surrounding the monarchy that constitutes the real power 
center of the Moroccan state. 
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questions this chapter combines textual analysis of Telquel from 2001-2012,7 interviews with 
journalists and participant observation at public events in which they were active to analyze the 
news magazine’s discourse about language and culture as part of an emergent independent 
media. 
 I argue that Telquel, through its advocacy of Darija, struggles for the desacralization of 
Moroccan public culture in order to advance a certain version of modernity that embraces 
individual liberties, marginality, and the secular. The magazine challenges hypocrisy at all levels 
of society, claiming taboos and a discourse of the non-dit, or “unsaid,” are holding Moroccan 
society back from overcoming its complexes and truly addressing major social problems. In 
doing so the magazine endorses a modernist project of normative democracy and acts as a space 
of intervention aimed at pulling together multiple cultural and political spheres, or what 
Rajogopal (2010) has called “split publics” or parallel discursive arenas “wherein political 
discourse occurs through a set of structured misunderstandings” (p. 16). In a context where 
culture has long acted as a political battleground, Telquel mobilizes a secular Moroccan identity 
through Darija in order to foster opposition to the monarchy’s cultural hegemony and increasing 
fundamentalist challenges, highlighting Moroccans who are challenging social norms and 
bringing the traditionally marginalized into the center of the conversation.  Its motivation in 
doing so is to shift cultural norms of speech in order to create a certain kind of modern citizen-
subject who reflects critically on that which is often considered above critical reflection, 
particularly Islam, the monarchy and discourses about all Morocco’s problems originating 
abroad. Telquel claims that modernity for Morocco means an increasingly worldly public culture 
built around the framework of universal rights and transnational circuits of people, goods and 
                                                
7 I continue to follow Telquel, but stop my analysis in 2012 in recognition of the major shift that occurred with the 
sale of the magazine that year and the departure of the majority of its original team. 
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ideas. In advancing this version of modernity, the use of Darija acts as a starting point for 
encountering Morocco as it is, on its own terms, in all its diversity and difficulties, and in direct 
conversation with the sacred.  
 The production of a new generation of independent weekly news magazines at the 
beginning of the 21st century needs to be considered in the context of earlier leftist opposition in 
the Moroccan press, its intersection with language politics, and the establishment of culture as a 
field of contention for publicly engaged intellectuals. This chapter will first outline the specifics 
of Moroccan context as they relate to theoretical conversations involving the role of language in 
modern nation building, the emergence of split publics in postcolonial states and debates over a 
politics of hybridity. Next I historically contextualize Telquel’s dissenting discourse around 
language, examining its roots in the Moroccan press’ tradition of politically oriented papers and 
a transnational politics of the left. The following section tells the story of Telquel and its sister 
publication Nichane, focusing on their interventions around language. Lastly I examine how this 
discourse gets taken up and intersects with public culture through Telquel’s interventions in 
event-making, looking closely as the magazine’s engagement in Nayda, an urban music 
movement of the early 2000s. 
Language politics and Moroccan nationalism 
On a sunny morning in December 2014, Karim Boukhari sat next to me outside a cafe in the 
Gauthier neighborhood of central Casablanca, sipping coffee and chain-smoking.8 Boukhari, a 
medical doctor by training with close-cropped hair and an easy smile, began his journalism 
career in 1999 at Al Bayane, the newspaper of the communist Party of Progress and Socialism 
(PPS), before integrating into the independent press where he served as head of the cultural 
                                                
8 Appendix B, Image 7 
   
47  
division at La Vie Eco and news editor of Le Journal. Part of the Telquel team since its debut, 
Boukhari’s face had become familiar from the picture accompanying his editorials during his 2-
year stint as the magazine’s editor-in-chief following Benchemsi’s departure for the United 
States on the eve of the Arab Spring. Since his tenure at Telquel Boukhari has written several 
books of poetry, co-founded a Paris-Casablanca based publishing project dedicated to youth 
voices (Casa Express Editions) and directed his first short film, subsequently selected for Cannes 
in 2015. Boukhari described Telquel as “first of all a space of social progressivism, but also 
political” that occupied a difficult position between the state and society defined by a paradox 
where “if you delve deeply into political issues concerning power, people applaud you, but the 
authorities react; while if you go far into society and religion you will have no problems with the 
authorities, however you become a target for the people” (Boukhari, personal communication, 
2014). Thus we see the interest of the Moroccan monarchy in maintaining its position as the 
country’s foremost religious authority and counteracting the rising influence of Islamists who 
emerged out of the lack of opposition left by the monarchy’s repression of the left during the 
Years of Lead.9 According to Boukhari Moroccans have traditionally defined the right and the 
left in relation to support, or lack thereof, for the monarchy, but are in the process of “redefining 
the left in reference to universal considerations irrespective of culture, such as human rights, 
while the right is becoming more aligned with the defense of traditional values” (Boukhari, 
personal communication, 2014). The reorientation of the left around a system of values rather 
than fixed institutional frameworks or ideologies has made culture a key site for the production 
and proliferation of those values, with language acting as a structuring mechanism for debates 
about Moroccan modernity and its future. “If you want to understand Moroccan society, interest 
                                                
9 The Years of Lead refers to a period between 1965-1990 when an increasingly totalitarian Hassan II violently 
repressed opposition, particularly by leftist dissidents. The period was characterized by disappearances, torture, 
secret prisons and arbitrary judicial proceedings, leading to widespread paranoia and distrust of authorities. 
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yourself in language” said Boukhari, pausing to light another cigarette, “language symbolizes 
social fractures in this country and constitutes a source of conflict and debates that interest all 
people, who are really polarized” (Boukhari, personal communication, 2014).  
 Historically Morocco’s cultural and linguistic diversity stems from cross-cultural 
encounters, trade and imperial projects stemming from its particular geographical position at the 
intersection of Africa, Europe, and the Mediterranean basin. Today Morocco’s population of 
32.3 million is classified as 99 percent Arab-Amazigh with the majority Darija-speaking in daily 
life. However, issues of indigenous autonomy and rights are still contested as Tamazight10 only 
became an official language in the 2011 post-Arab Spring constitution and many remain 
unsatisfied with the lip-service they feel Tamazight is receiving from the regime while most 
debates about Darija blatantly ignore indigenous language issues. French continues to occupy a 
privileged place due to continuing close ties with the former colonizer in business, politics and 
culture, often making French a functional necessity for employment. That francophone elites 
have spoken up most loudly for Darija in Telquel and elsewhere, for many signifies an attempt to 
limit the influence of Arabic, and thus Islam, in the Morocco while perpetuating relationships 
rooted in colonial (and neocolonial) domination.  
 Anderson (1983) argues the rise of national consciousness has historically been 
dependent on an expanding vernacular print market created by capitalism, a phenomenon he calls 
“print-capitalism” (p. 40). In the Moroccan case, national consciousness arose without the 
accompaniment of a vernacular print market, however a hierarchy of “languages of power” still 
emerged so that proximity with printed language defined the legitimacy of various dialects 
(ibid.). In a 2010 editorial titled “Darija, God willing” Benchemsi quotes linguist Louis-Jean 
                                                
10 Tamazight is the language of Morocco’s indigenous Amazigh people, although it is only one of three major 
dialects spoken in different regions of Morocco and several other dialects are present in smaller pockets. 
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Calvet in making a similar point that “a language is never more than a dialect that has succeeded 
politically,” and concludes “for now, our Darija is in a political battle” (Benchemsi, 2010b). To 
some extent we are seeing the rise of the vernacular in association with print-capitalism a century 
after the emergence of nationalist impulses and the institutionalization of an Arabic-French 
hybrid media system where Darija remained a largely unwritten11 language far outside the 
“languages of power.” Ennaji (2011) argues that Darija lacks the prestige of the long literary 
tradition in Fus’ha, which links Morocco to a historical narrative of Islamic civilization and is 
sometimes perceived as a defense mechanism against the influence of Western cultural products. 
Despite this prestige, studies (Bentahila, 1983; Boukous, 1995; Ennaji, 2011; Ruiter, 2006) have 
shown Moroccans, and youth in particular, prefer French cultural products to those in classical 
Arabic. 
 Embedded in Morocco’s hybrid linguistic environment is a set of social relations 
whereby everyday communicative acts and their remediation in independent media become 
instrumental in establishing, reiterating or challenging hierarchies. In this context disputes over 
language are synonymous with disputes over collective memory, cultural norms and political 
visions. While the role of language in modern nation-building has been widely discussed 
(Anderson, 1983; Bourdieu, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1983; Smith, 1989; etc) the 
emergence of independent media as a new platform and discursive space where language is 
being used to invoke everyday cultural practices and construct public culture as a domain outside 
the authority of the monarchy, and ultimately an alternative modernity, means that the 
relationship between nationalism and language needs to be reconsidered in the light of both local 
transformations associated with globalization and the increasing intermingling of media in the 
                                                
11 Interestingly, cell phones played a role in codifying Darija in that the phones originally available in Morocco only 
had Latin characters, so a system of transliteration was developed whereby numbers and punctuation replaced 
sounds not present in the Latin alphabet. 
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discursive terrain of everyday life. When Giddens (1990) says modernity can be defined by the 
question “How shall I live?” as the realm of possibilities expands, Bourdieu in Language and 
Symbolic Power (1991) might say the question should be “How shall I speak?” For Telquel the 
answer is Darija, a language rooted in the history and lived realities of Moroccan society. 
Split publics and a politics of hybridity 
The importance of Telquel’s language politics stems from its interventions in a postcolonial 
politics of hybridity whereby disjunctures exists between the language of everyday life and 
official domains of business, politics and culture. Fundamentally these disjunctures empower the 
monarchy in its attempt to be all things to all people and the ultimate mediator while alienating 
large portions of the population from symbolic systems advanced by the state and the political 
process altogether. Sadana (2012) describes a similar disjuncture between language on the 
ground and that of literary representation in English heart, Hindi heartland, arguing that “this 
disjuncture is indicative of a larger schism in Indian society that has to do with not only language 
as it is spoken but with the disparate thought-worlds and hierarchies of language that saturate 
everyday life” (p. 4). What is significant in the case of Telquel is that in attempting to negotiate 
these disparate thought-worlds and hierarchies of language in order to establish a set of shared 
values for claim-making, the magazine finds itself engaged in the negotiation of cultural 
repertoires both increasingly extreme and increasingly at odds with each other in a post-9/11 
world.  
 Telquel largely eschews Orientalist imagery prevalent in Western media with roots in 
what Parameswaran (2002) describes as “colorful images of Turkish, Arab, Indian and Moroccan 
women performing and serving food and wine in elaborate clothing and jewelry [that] appeared 
on European tradecards and postcards” (p. 295). Many of these types of exoticized images still 
   
51  
circulate in Moroccan society via posters and postcards primarily present in highly trafficked 
tourist areas, yet are often far from the lived realities of most Moroccans, especially the urban 
youth cultures privileged by Telquel. For Telquel modernity is inherently outward looking and 
built on the production of hybrid cultural forms associated with transnational circuits of capital 
and culture and their encounters with Moroccan specificity. However, in articulating this 
modernity Telquel also sets many aspects of Islam in opposition to it, ignoring the fact that in 
Moroccan society Islam is often approached as an antidote to the problems of modernity, 
particularly U.S. imperialism and materialist consumption. In addition to positioning themselves 
in opposition to Islamists, Telquel frequently features ads for upscale real estate developments 
around Casablanca, luxury cars and the latest cell phones, while its journalists largely issue from 
a segment of society described as the “francophone elite.” Together these elements could 
characterize Telquel as a carrier of neoliberal ideologies, so that in its ambivalence toward the 
monarchy, religion and nationalism, the magazine has opted into the order of global capital, in 
accordance with which it often paints a picture of fluid mobility. While this may be true to some 
extent, global capital has also facilitated Telquel’s existence and its ability to practice a particular 
brand of critical journalism. 
The Moroccan press and histories of dissent 
Prior to Spanish and French incursions into the territory, Morocco was a primarily oral culture, 
complete with its own systems of information including public criers, religious sermons, couriers 
and travelling merchants (Baida, 1996). Following the Spanish declaration of war on Morocco in 
1859 and occupation of Tetouan, the first Latin-character press arrived and produced the weekly 
El Eco de Tetouan in 1860 (Baida, 1996; Aouchar, 1990).12 By the 1880s several newspapers 
                                                
12 Several earlier publications appeared briefly in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
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appeared in Tangier to serve the foreign communities there, each producing a publication to 
advance its own interests in regard to “the Moroccan question” and thus caught up in the politics 
between various legations (Aouchar, 1990; Baida, 1996). As an international zone, Tangier 
became an informal center of the press in pre-Protectorate (1912) Morocco, producing 14 
French-language publications (Baida, 1996).  
 All of these early papers were produced by and for the European communities in 
Morocco and were often hostile to the makhzen,13 denigrating it under the pretense of 
development (Baida, 1996). One publication, Le Reveil du Maroc, responded to armed resistance 
by locals and protests from the Sultan about French encroachment into Moroccan territory by 
stating “As for Morocco, since we must take it as it is and judge it leniently according to the 
intellectual level of their rulers, we believe it is useless to blame, with the severity this behavior 
deserves anywhere else, this intemperate approach" (Pimienta, 1900 cited in Baida, 1996, p. 65-
66). Thus the Makhzen developed an early hostility to the press even as it recognized its 
importance and attempted to establish a voice of its own. Although the first Arabic-character 
printing press was brought back from Egypt by a Moroccan judge returning from the pilgrimage 
to Mecca in 1867, it wasn’t until 1907 that the first Makhzen publication appeared in Tangier, 
Lissan ul-Maghreb (The Voice of Morocco) (Baida, 1996). As European powers, especially the 
French, institutionalized their presence in Morocco through the Act of Algeciras (1906) and the 
Treaty of Fes (1912), opposition began to appear in the press. The first attempt to regulate the 
press came shortly after the establishment of the Protectorate with  
                                                
13 Makhzen is a Moroccan Arabic word meaning “storehouse,” that was used to refer to the state in the form of a 
governing establishment revolving around the sultan and associated notables in various sectors. More recently it has 
come to stand in for an extensive system of royal privilege and clientelism associated with the contemporary 
Moroccan state. This “deep state” surrounding the monarchy is understood to be the real center of power in 
Moroccan political life despite the existence of parliament and other ostensibly democratic institutions. 
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“the Dahir (decree) of April 27, 1914, inaugurating a politics of segregation in regard to 
the Moroccan press, especially the Arabic press. That explains, in part, why nationalists 
created periodicals in French, although authorities tried to limit this practice by requiring 
that the language of publication correspond to the nationality of the newspaper’s owner” 
(Aouchar, 1990, p. 18).  
Moroccan newspapers learned early to strategically maneuver around these rules in a complex 
back and forth game between colonial authorities and the papers. 
 Above all, the history of the Moroccan press – and here I mean publications produced by 
Moroccans – is the history of Moroccan political parties under the French (and to a lesser extent, 
Spanish) colonial administration, particularly their prohibition and repression. Until 1937 
Moroccans were legally forbidden from forming political parties or producing periodicals, and 
even after this time legislation constantly changed in conjunction with the political whims of 
French and Spanish authorities (Aouchar, 1990). Following the French model of a partisan press, 
early Moroccan newspapers took on a militant orientation toward advancing the rights and 
interests of Moroccans and later the nationalist movement. Aouchar (1990) argues that this 
militant orientation was so central that the Moroccan press during the colonial era was primarily 
an “opinion press” rather than an “information press” aimed at making a case for Morocco’s 
existence as an independent nation (p. 127).  
 In many ways this history is intertwined with that of a transnational left, as leftist French 
and Spanish intellectuals and Moroccans studying in Europe collaborated on projects such as the 
revue Maghreb, which was founded in Paris in 1933 and banned in Morocco the following year 
(Aouchar, 1990; Baida, 1996). The influence of this leftist branch of the nationalist movement 
only increased after WWII when workers’ and union issues became a preoccupation for 
   
54  
Moroccan papers, especially those of an industrializing Casablanca (Aouchar, 1990). An early 
split emerges between French and Arab language newspapers, as political parties often produced 
each, with the Arabic papers emphasizing culture and religion, while the French ones were in 
dialogue with colonial authorities about issues of rights and governance (Aouchar, 1990). Thus 
French became a language of opposition for the Moroccan press and we see many of these 
characteristics of the early Moroccan press – its constant negotiations with authority, militant 
orientation, and transnational ties – continue in its postcolonial manifestations. 
Radical (feminist) revues 
After independence, Morocco’s partisan press continued to act as political tools for their 
respective parties, albeit with opposition re-oriented toward the Makhzen’s renewed authority. 
Nationalist party Istiqlal’s partnership with the monarchy in the struggle for independence 
became competition as the monarchy appointed a coalition government composed of Istiqlal and 
several other parties, and began building a support system of rural notables rather than among 
Istiqlal’s urban base (Willis, 2012). Mohammed V supported and became the figurehead for 
Moroccan nationalism, adopting the role of arbiter among competing interests, including Istiqlal, 
and unifying figure for a diverse population, ensuring the monarchy’s centrality in postcolonial 
Moroccan political life.  
 Both Lamalif and Souffles were radical revues born out of a tumultuous 1965 for 
Moroccan politics that included widespread student protests and violent repression, Hassan II’s 
dismissal of parliament and declaration of a state of exception, and the 
disappearance/assassination of leftist icon Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris. Press seizures and 
suspensions were frequent, as was harassment and intimidation of journalists, to the extent that 
the leftist press had been effectively eliminated. In this environment Mohamed Loghlam and 
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Zakya Daoud14 started the monthly revue Lamalif in March 1966, with Daoud serving as editor-
in-chief until the publication was banned in 1988. For them Lam-alif, the two letters forming the 
word “no” in Arabic,  
“It was taking a stand, a ‘No’ openly declared to everything that didn’t answer to the 
expectations of the people and didn’t solve the difficulties of the country, a putting up for 
debate and proposal…We wanted to remain optimists…Because the original idea for 
Lamalif was that everything was not lost, that enthusiasm didn’t have to die, that the left 
didn’t have to admit defeat” (Daoud, 2007, p. 154-155).  
Daoud had long been a labor advocate, working for the USFP-associated Moroccan Workers’ 
Union (UMT) publication L’Avant-Garde, writing a women’s page that Skalli (2006) claims was 
the organizational basis for the Progressive Union of Moroccan Women (in which Daoud also 
participated), which “might be considered the first Moroccan feminist organization with 
proletarian roots” (p. 60).  
 The literary and cultural revue Souffles was also born out of this political climate, 
however it positioned itself as part of the radical left, to the extent that it “became the platform 
for a nascent Marxist-Leninist movement” (Sefrioui, 2014, p. 13). First published in March 1966, 
writers and militants Abellatif Laâbi and Mostafa Nissabouri co-founded the review, which 
brought together politically engaged cultural producers before being banned in 1972 following 
the arrest of key organizers, including Laâbi.15 With national culture as its key concern, Souffles 
intervened in debates about its decolonization and the political potential of creativity born out of 
a “common discontent toward the parties of the traditional left” (Sefrioui, 2014, p. 17). Souffles 
                                                
14 Pen name of Jaqueline Loghlam née David, a French journalist and labor advocate who met Mohamed Loghlam 
at journalism school in Paris, later marrying him and becoming a naturalized Moroccan citizen. 
15 Interestingly, both Daoud and Laâbi were part of what were referred to at the time as “mixed marriages”: Laâbi 
and his wife Jocelyne, a French woman from Lyon whose family moved to Meknes when she was a child, met at 
university in Rabat and both became French teachers. 
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sought to broaden the horizons of struggle outside the realm of an institutional politics dominated 
by a regime increasingly populist and anti-intellectual in its attempts to undermine leftist 
opposition.16 
 Both Lamalif and Souffles engaged in a certain militancy despite their different positions 
on the leftist spectrum. Daoud’s feminist orientation carried over to Lamalif, which often took 
anti-patriarchal positions in advocating for what Daoud (2007) called “…a socialism that was no 
longer in fashion, but above all for universalism, humanism, support for the Third World and 
autonomous development…” (p. 165). Souffles, on the other hand, increasingly saw “Marxism-
Leninism, marked by Maoism, as necessary in contesting ancient structures” (Sefrioui, 2014, p. 
52), as indicated by Souffles contributors’ founding of two revolutionary student groups in 1970, 
Ila Amam and 23 mars. Their ideological advocacy immersed both reviews in international 
intellectual currents, while maintaining claims to Moroccan specificity. As part of socialist 
circles Daoud traveled to the USSR and Cuba, participating in conferences and reporting on her 
experiences. For her, “[Lamalif] was a space open to the world and the flow of ideas connecting 
Morocco to what was happening elsewhere” (Daoud, 2007, p. 216). Meanwhile Souffles debated 
international issues such as decolonization, Marxism-Leninism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and American civil rights, leading Sefrioui (2014) to conclude “there are few publications that 
have given so much importance to international news and or have sought to hear in it a 
Moroccan voice” (p. 18). The choice of French as language of publication, both facilitated 
dialogue with the French state about decolonization and links to other socialists movements in 
the francophone Global South, in addition to providing a distance from tradition as inscribed in 
the order the publications sought to challenge. 
                                                
16 La revue Souffles 1966-1973: espoirs de révolution culturelle au Maroc is a 2013 book published by Kenza 
Sefrioui, who is also a journalist and cultural critic for Telquel. Another Telquel contributor, Omar Radi, commented 
in an interview that he sees Telquel as a less radical, more populist version of Souffles. 
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 These reviews paved the way for feminist publications of the 1980s, when a burgeoning 
Moroccan women’s movement produced Thamania Mars (“March 8,” after International 
Women’s Day, 1983),17 Nissa’ al Maghreb (“Moroccan women,” 1986), and Kalima (“word” or 
act of speaking, 1986-1989) (Skalli, 2006, p. 62-64). All three were monthlies produced by 
activists or organizations with a history of engagement with leftist politics and sought to 
privilege women’s experiences while acting as vehicles for education and mobilization. While 
Thamania Mars and Nissa’ al Maghreb depended on sales and subscriptions for revenue, Kalima 
accepted advertising, a choice that partially explains why the former were arabophone and the 
latter francophone (Skalli, 2006). 
 Above all this era is indicative of a new type of journalism emerging in opposition to the 
dominant partisan press, but no less politically-engaged. Its opposition to the re-traditionalization 
of Moroccan society taking place under Hassan II and his regime’s increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies established these leftist publications as targets of harassment, censorship and seizures 
spanning the Years of Lead.18 The majority – Lamalif, Souffles, Kalima – were forced out of 
operation, but they nevertheless established culture as a field of contention and media as the 
domain of publicly engaged intellectuals. Their legacy of daring opposition established a 
precedent for the political consciousness of a new generation of journalists coming of age during 
economic liberalization and the end of Hassan II’s reign. 
Rise of the progressive weeklies 
Only three days after the 1997 legislative elections from which the socialists emerged victorious, 
journalists Ali Amar and Aboubakr Jamaï started Le Journal with several of the young 
                                                
17 Thamania Mars was the first feminist Arab-language monthly, independent financially as well as editorially. 
18 The Years of Lead refers to a period between 1965-1990 when an increasingly totalitarian Hassan II used 
violence against dissidents, particularly the left. The period was characterized by disappearances, torture, secret 
prisons and arbitrary judicial proceedings, eventually leading to a genre in Moroccan literature known as la 
littérature carcerale, or incarceration literature. 
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journalists and intellectuals that Jean-Louis Servan-Schreiber had assembled at the finance-
oriented La Vie Économique, including Amar, Ali Lmrabet, and Ahmed Réda Benchemsi. 
Vermeren (2001) argues that Le Journal “rapidly became the symbol of regime liberalization and 
political alternance”19 due to its investigative reporting and an editorial policy endorsing 
economic liberalism and democracy (p. 137). Even if Le Journal endured censorship and bans – 
notably in December 2000 after suggesting then-prime minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi 
participated in the attempted coup d’état at Hassan II’s Skhirat palace in 1972, after which it 
reappeared under the name Le Journal hebdomadaire – it operated with remarkable freedom and 
paradoxically participated in improving the regime’s international image. Le Journal began a 
new era in Moroccan journalism and was followed by several other weekly news magazines, 
notably Lmrabet’s Demain in 2000 and Benchemsi’s Telquel in 2001.  
 Above all these progressive weekly news magazines were characterized by a new 
generation of elite male journalists and intellectuals largely educated abroad who came to 
journalism through finance or financial journalism at a time when Morocco was in the throes of 
economic liberalization, opening journalism to commercialization as well as deeper social 
analysis through an economic lens. For the most part these journalists practice what is widely 
referred to as “engaged journalism,” which one later Journal employee described as a 
commitment to discussing “what everyone else doesn’t want to publish and what public opinion 
needs to know. In a more democratic country this might just be called journalism, but in 
Morocco it’s ‘le journalisme engagé’” (Radi, personal communication, 2014). Orlando (2009) 
                                                
19 L’Alternance, literally “alternating” or a change in power, refers to a period at the end of Hassan II’s reign when 
he integrated opposition parties, notably those of the left, into the government. In 1996 Hassan II amended the 
constitution to expand the power of the prime minister and parliament, after which opposition parties agreed to 
participate in the November 14, 1997 legislative elections, from which the socialists emerged victorious amid 
widespread decline of nationalist party Istiqlal. For more on l’alternance see Amri (2002) “L’Alternance au Maroc 
expliquée à mon fils.” For more information on the partisan daily press during the alternance era, see Appendix C. 
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points out that this engagement is specifically linked to France and the French language as “The 
word engagé’s true meaning was cultivated during the first half of the twentieth century, during a 
time in French history when public intellectuals in particular were held responsible for 
commenting on and contextualizing the sociopolitical and historical events taking place in 
France” (p. 22). Thus this new generation of journalists returning to Morocco from largely 
French universities in the late 1990s built on the legacy of Morocco’s earlier politically-engaged 
press and used their transnational support networks to push for a political opening in parallel to 
the economic one and transforming Morocco’s media landscape in the process. 
A magnifying glass on Moroccan society 
On October 29, 2001 a new francophone weekly news magazine appeared on Moroccan 
newsstands. “TELQUEL IS BORN!” proclaimed its inside cover, outlining a vision for a news 
magazine that took Moroccan society as its object, claiming “…what interests us above all is 
society, Moroccans. You who, like us, live in a complex country, full of contradictions, 
changing, in search of itself…but also a country that creates, innovates, invents, outdoes itself” 
(Telquel est né!, 2001, p. 4). Telquel presents a vision of Moroccan society that goes beyond 
Islam, the makhzen and football - that is energetically dynamic and catholic in its tastes. In 
covering this society Telquel adopted the motto “don’t judge, understand,” making the letter “q” 
in its name resemble a magnifying glass signifying the magazine’s close scrutiny of society and 
investigative reporting (Telquel est né!, 2001, p. 4). According to founder Ahmed Réda 
Benchemsi, “before I started Telquel there were two Moroccos according to press coverage: the 
first was the Morocco of the party papers and the second was the Morocco of the more recent 
independent weeklies such as Le Journal Hebdo and Demain. Those independent weeklies were 
in permanent protest against Morocco not being Sweden, constantly shouting questions about 
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why things weren’t perfect. There was a need for showing reality, even if we took a position for 
democracy, human rights, etc.” (Benchemsi, personal communication, 2015). That reality 
involved a leftist opposition increasingly in disarray, rising Islamists and a young monarch 
managing a society rife with inequalities born of uneven development. In an environment of 
optimism about newfound freedoms of association and the press, Benchemsi assembled 15 
shareholders with capital of 2.5 million dirhams (app. $250,000), printing their names in the first 
issue and describing them as mostly “businessmen active in civil society, all practicing a citizen-
oriented entrepreneurship” (Qui paye?, 2001, p. 5). The group eventually consolidated into 3 
major shareholders – Servan-Schreiber, Mernissi and Benchemsi – under the name Presse Direct. 
At the end of 2010 Benchemsi sold his 20 percent stake in the company for 6 million dirhams 
and left for the US, leaving Karim Boukhari as editor-in-chief. According to Boukhari, “the 
strength of Telquel was that it was directed by strong independent investors” (Boukhari, 2014). 
Boukhari left the magazine in 2013, several months prior to Presse Direct’s purchase by two 
major sympathizers and supporters of the Arab Spring M20 movement, Karim Tazi and Khalid 
El Hariry. Several months later Tazi bowed out, citing different visions for Telquel’s future, and 
the company’s current incarnation, Telquel Média SA, was born.20 
 The recent tumultuous period for Telquel’s ownership coincided with increasing financial 
pressure and frequent changes in editorial leadership. Under Benchemsi and Boukhari, both part 
of the original Telquel team, Telquel maintained a relatively cohesive editorial line. Following 
Boukhari’s departure, however, the magazine had two directors in two years (Fahd Iraqi and 
Abdellah Tourabi) who oversaw a marked change in direction described by Boukhari as “less 
importance to the people, more emphasis on macro-economy and less decoding of the 
                                                
20 Appendix B, Image 8 
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relationship of Moroccans to family, religion, society, power” (Boukhari, personal 
communication, 2014). Despite these difficulties Telquel remains the most-read francophone 
magazine in Morocco with a circulation of 32,332 in 2011, although the actual audience is 
impossible to estimate because the high cost of printed materials in Morocco means most 
publications are widely shared and have a high rate of “pass-on” readership. Over time Telquel’s 
price has risen from the original 8 dirhams to 20 dirhams today, or about $2 USD, while most 
newspapers cost between 2-5 dirhams. The Casablanca-based publication appears on newsstands 
and by subscription every Friday, yet makes its content available for free online a week after 
publication in print and is available in print in France. As an expensive French-language 
magazine focusing on society and political, it is obviously oriented toward and accessible mostly 
to elites, although the popularity of French mission schools in the Rabat-Casablanca corridor 
means French is a language accessible to the rising urban middle-class and the decision to make 
content available for free online indicates aspirations to a broader audience. 
 As part of Morocco’s francophone elite, it made sense that Benchemsi’s magazine would 
be francophone because this elite is frequently bi-national and French opens the magazine to the 
diaspora, plus facilitates advertising from major Western corporations, allowing more economic 
autonomy to do boundary-pushing journalism. It also participates in the tradition of French as a 
language of dissent that is more suitable for taking on taboo issues. Frustrated by the level of 
censorship from his previous editors Benchemsi “wanted to make strategic calculation for 
pushing the envelope, but in reality I censored myself very little” (Benchemsi, personal 
communication, 2015). Telquel quickly distinguished itself via its irreverent exposés on 
Islamists, Moroccans’ sex lives and the hashish industry, just a few cover stories from the 
magazine’s first year. In many ways Telquel constitutes a difficult balancing act between a 
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religious conservatism in society reinforced by events such as 9/11, the war in Iraq and policy 
toward Palestine among other issues, and a makhzen seeking to moderate this religious influence 
while maintaining its position as the sole legitimate religious (and political) authority of the 
country. The Moroccan regime’s contradictory and highly varied relationship with Telquel and 
other progressive weeklies stemmed from the fact that this new media environment served 
government interests in providing a vocal opposition to Islamists and improving the regime’s 
human rights reputation, presenting an image of a society that values individual liberties and is 
open to critique.  
The Nichane Affair 
Telquel announced the appearance of Nichane in September 2006, asking “Why should we be 
free in French and less free in Arabic?” (Ksikes, 2006). Taking for a starting point the 
preconception that Arabic could not be a language of dissent and challenger of taboos due to 
classical Arabic’s affiliations with religion and power, for Nichane “The principle is simple: 
nothing is sacred except liberty…Because an Arabic reader, regardless of his social status, 
deserves to have his intelligence respected as much as a member of the francophone elite” 
(Ksikes, 2006). For Benchemsi “Nichane shows that we could do what we did with Telquel, but 
not for an elite. It was much more popular than Telquel ever was, but because it was in Arabic 
the backlash was immediate” (Benchemsi, personal communication, 2015). Within months 
Nichane was banned and its director Driss Ksikes on trial for a issue dedicated to popular jokes 
(noukat) titled “Jokes: How Moroccans laugh at religion, sex and politics” (Nichane, December 
2006). Telquel immediately launched a campaign in defense of Nichane, publishing explanatory 
statements, updates on the trial and letters of support from journalists, human rights 
organizations and individual readers from Casablanca, Paris and Quebec among others over 
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several weeks. Morocco’s public minister charged 
Ksikes and his co-author with "undermining Islam, 
the respect due to his Majesty the King and 
morality” (Benchemsi, 2007a), with the prosecution 
demanding what Benchemsi described as the 
equivalent of the “journalistic death penalty” 
(Benchemsi, 2007b). Telquel argued repeatedly that 
Nichane’s intent was only to “report on popular 
humor in circulation in the country – without 
endorsing it and with only the intention to do a 
journalistic analysis of social types” (Benchemsi, 
2007a). On January 15, 2007 the court sentenced Ksikes and journalist Sanaa El Aji to three 
years in prison on reprieve and a fine of 80,000 dirhams each, while Nichane received a 2-month 
ban beginning with the verdict (Benchemsi, 2007). Telquel decided not to appeal the verdict, 
citing fear of rekindling public hysteria, but vowing that “Many social practices that are 
‘Islamically incorrect’ exist…And we will continue to report on them because this is our job. 
Like it or not” (Benchemsi, 2007c). Although the verdict led to the departure of a founding 
member of the Telquel team and Nichane’s director, Driss Ksikes, the group continued to defend 
its right to public dissent as a fundamental element of any society with a pretense toward 
democracy. 
 Several years later Telquel and Nichane were both involved in another high-profile 
conflict with Moroccan authorities regarding an opinion poll assessing the first ten years of 
Mohammed VI’s reign. Telquel published a series of four provocative cover  
 
Image 2: Nichane cover, December 2006 
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stories about the multiple roles occupied by the king in the weeks leading up to poll results 
assessing his first ten years on the throne: “Le roi cool” (#380), “Le chef absolue” (#381), “Le 
businessman” (#382) and “Le premier imam” (#383). The final installment in the series “The 
people judge their king” (#384-5) never made it onto newsstands because 100,000 copies of 
Telquel and Nichane were seized at the printer and ordered destroyed by the minister of the 
interior. As part of taking Moroccan society as its object, Telquel participated in numerous polls 
aimed at attempting to understand said society. However, opinion polls about the monarchy took 
this a step too far reported French newspaper Le Monde, Telquel’s partner in conducting the poll. 
For Benchemsi, collaboration with partners such as Le Monde and the development of 
international networks offered an important insurance policy in an authoritarian political context 
so that “…in the survey conducted with Le Monde, you have someone to mobilize and publicize 
the case for you in the case of a government crackdown” (Benchemsi, personal communication, 
2015). On August 4, three days after the seizure of Telquel and Nichane, Le Monde’s front page 
carried a picture of the banned Telquel issue and the headline “Morocco: The Forbidden Poll” 
(Beaugé, 2009), publishing the poll’s results and leading Moroccan authorities to ban the edition. 
Support for Telquel and Nichane poured in from media and press organizations around the 
world, with Reporters Without Borders calling the seizures “archaic and illegal” (#386).21 The 
poll also inspired a campaign by early Moroccan internet users, including one of Mamfakinch’s 
founders, who labeled themselves as “the 9 percent” in response to the king’s 91 percent 
approval rating. 
 In the following weeks Telquel published a replacement issue (#386) without the poll 
results and with a daring banner across the cover declaring “Number after censure,” claiming the 
                                                
21 Appendix B, Image 9 
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poll provided a plebiscite for M6 and, if anything, revealed a profound confidence imbued in the 
body of the king by the people, and conversely, a complete lack of confidence in other 
institutions. Half of Moroccans described the monarchy’s governing as “democratic,” leading Le 
Monde to ask “Was the fear so great under Hassan II that it’s enough for his son to loosen the 
vice a little on freedom of expression, for the people to consider him, even prematurely, 
democratic?” (Beaugé, 2009). According to Morocco’s minister of the interior “it is the very 
concept of a poll on the monarchy that is totally unacceptable in Morocco,” with the government 
spokesman echoing discourse from the Years of Lead with the statement “the monarchy cannot 
be put into the equation” (Les raisons de la censure, 2009, p. 9). This led Telquel to call for the 
reconciliation of law with lived reality stating “If this is the case, it is necessary to pass a law 
forbidding polls to regulate what the people have the right to say or not – and in this case, to stop 
claiming that we are in a democracy or in the process of democratizing. And above all, we 
should own that” (Les raisons de la censure, 2009, p. 9). Calls for Moroccans to “s’assumer” – to 
own their reality, to some extent take responsibility for it, and above all to see the humor in its 
paradoxes – are frequent in Telquel and usually accompanied by suggestions that acknowledging 
these realities will allow Moroccans as a society to both celebrate strengths and acknowledge 
weaknesses while using them as a starting point for building an alternative modernity. 
 2009 and 2010 constituted the culmination of a state strategy of judicial harassment and 
fines against the press that began in 2003. In a year-end summary of major stories Telquel named 
2009 as “the year where defamation cases have been used to punish newspapers,” citing fines 
levied against newspapers Al Ahdath, Al Jarida Al Oula, and Al Massae, the seizures of Telquel 
and Nichane, interrogation of journalists for reporting on the king’s health, the interdiction of 
arabophone daily Akhbar al Youm, the incarceration of Al Michaâl’s director, and multiple other 
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prison sentences (often under reprieve) and fines levied against journalists, including a 5.9 
million dirham fine against monthly Economie & Entreprises that led its property to be auctioned 
off (Journalistes taisez-vous!, 2009). For journalist and Telquel contributor Omar Radi this 
marked the height of economic censorship of the Moroccan press, which depends heavily on 
advertising in an environment where the reading public remains small, with approximately 
300,000 copies sold on any given day (Radi, personal communication, 2014). Downward trends 
in the press continued in 2010, with the progenitor of Morocco’s independent press, Le Journal, 
forcibly shut down by authorities due to its debts, Nichane succumbing to an advertising boycott, 
and Al Jazeera’s Moroccan office closed under political pressure for its coverage of the Western 
Sahara. Telquel featured Le Journal’s demise on its cover, with an editorial from Benchemsi 
claiming “there is no doubt that what precipitated the end of Le Journal was its editorial line – 
especially the editorials of its founder Aboubakr Jamaï…that never departed from their fierce 
opposition to Morocco’s current slide toward autocracy and/or oligarchy” (Benchemsi, 2010a). 
Accompanying this opposition was an advertising boycott by public and private companies, 
which Jamaï claimed led to an 80 percent loss in advertising revenue, putting the magazine in 
dire financial straits that led to its demise (Hamdani, 2010). Nichane was subjected to a similar 
boycott in 2010, led by royal holding company ONA22 and its affiliates. According to 
Benchemsi, Telquel was able to endure the boycott because its large proportion of foreign 
advertisers made it less susceptible to local political pressure, while Nichane was completely 
reliant on local advertisers” (Benchemsi, personal communication, 2015).  
 For Telquel Nichane’s demise constituted the height of this dark period for the 
independent press in Morocco. “Adieu Nichane” announced an October 2010 Telquel cover with 
                                                
22 Omnium Nord Africain, or ONA, was a private Moroccan holding company controlled by the royal family. In 
2010 it merged with Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI) and dropped the ONA title, although it is still 
controlled by the royal family. 
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a center spread entitled “A Beautiful Adventure” with a note below explaining “Nichane no 
longer exists. Reflection on the eventful, passionate and ultimately tragic history of the first 
arabophone weekly news magazine in the kingdom” (Benchemsi, 2010c, p. 18). Constituting one 
of the most outspoken examples of Telquel’s position on language, the article explains and 
defends the short life of Nichane and the role of an 
independent press in general, claiming “Since its 
beginning Nichane lined up unsettling subjects…and also 
controversies. Isn’t the role of the press to make people 
think, even in anger?” (Benchemsi, 2010c, p. 19). From 
the beginning Nichane was subject to seizures for 
everything from jokes about Islam to “disrespectful” 
editorials about the king written in Darija. “How dare we 
question the sovereign in what is considered a ‘vulgar 
language?’ The ‘prosecution of Darija’ had been opened, 
the first act of what would become a national debate: what role should be given to Moroccans’ 
maternal language relative to classical Arabic, their official language?” (Benchemsi, 2010c). 
Telquel discusses how, despite the magazine’s popularity Nichane was not able to survive the 
“financial asphyxiation” of an advertising boycott, leading to the disappearance of “one of 
Morocco’s – and the Arab world’s – very few secular and modernist voices” (Benchemsi, 2010c, 
p. 23). Together Telquel and Nichane succeeded in widening the realm of debate about 
Moroccan society, advancing claims around language in order to set the agenda around debates 
and taboos that Telquel would tackle alone in the coming years.  
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Nayda, event-making and public culture 
 
Telquel founder Ahmed Réda Benchemsi and I exchanged emails several times in my years 
studying Telquel. Ironically, I was finally able to chat with him via Skype in April 2015 when I 
was in Morocco doing fieldwork, as he now lives in the Maryland suburbs of Washington D.C. 
In our conversation he described Telquel as born out of his frustrations with self-censorship at Le 
Journal Hebdo, which he left in search of more autonomy. His inspiration for Telquel dates back 
to reading Kalima during high school in the 1980s and admiring “that they developed a 
progressive group of writers and published daring cover stories about social trends and women’s 
rights…of course there were no politics because there weren’t politics at that time under Hassan 
II” (Benchemsi, personal communication, 2015). By taking society as its object Telquel explored 
the divides between the francophone elite reading the magazine and the rest of the population 
often living in abysmal conditions. When questioned about Telquel’s populist and sometimes 
sensationalist reputation, Benchemsi shot back “Do you only want to read about things that 
pertain to you?” Even if Telquel’s core audience is the francophone elite, it is important to 
consider the ways that Telquel intervened in conversations both by addressing the highest 
echelons of power and the mere presence of its daring covers on corner news stands for all to 
see. As Benchemsi explained “It became clear from the sales that people were interested in 
reading these things and it went beyond elites to become a real phenomène de société. In the 
process Telquel went from ‘Morocco as it is’ to something more – an aggressive stance on 
political issues addressing social hypocrisy (alcohol consumption, middle and lower classes in 
bars, sex outside marriage, etc), which is definitely not just an elite thing” (Benchemsi, personal 
communication, 2015). Talking freely, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon in a Morocco 
still marked by paranoia born from years of political repression, making civil society a very 
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small world. “We drink in the same bars, smoke the same pot” said Benchemsi, “and these 
incestuous circles lead to cross collaboration” (Benchemsi, personal communication, 2015). This 
is clear from the list of contributors to Free Arabs, Benchemsi’s new project, which includes 
many current and former Telquel staffers as well as other well-known journalists and activists. 
Even if Benchemsi is no longer at Telquel, he doesn’t seem to be done with it as a project just 
yet, as he described Free Arabs as “Telquel’s editorial line and ambitions at the scale of the Arab 
World” (Benchemsi, personal communication, 2015). 
 Telquel’s interventions are not confined to the pages of the magazine, but rather 
constitute an ongoing interaction with public life. From its early days the magazine took a 
particularly keen interest in the Moroccan urban music scene, especially a new generation of 
young musicians challenging social norms. In 2002 Telquel published an 8-page spread about the 
Moroccan music industry (or lack thereof) entitled “Piracy: The Music Mafia” and in 2003 the 
magazine took up the cause of heavy metal rockers accused of Satanism, calling it “Our Cultural 
9/11” and “The Inquisition at Home” (Ksikes, 2003), while publishing court proceedings, a 
petition and urging the public to act in defense of the young musicians. These issues are only the 
beginning of Telquel’s extensive engagement with Morocco’s underground music scene and 
support for young musicians. Above all Telquel’s coverage of musicians, musical subcultures 
and industry issues indicates enormous barriers to entry for young musicians that include lack of 
infrastructure, sponsorship, distribution networks, and, ultimately, an industry out of touch with 
Morocco’s music scene and [young] publics (Bensalmia, 2005; Maréchaud, 2005). In many ways 
Telquel embraces urban youth culture as key to shifting mentalities toward authority and 
challenging taboos, but also because the magazine is able to intervene much more directly in the 
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field of culture than in politics, while creating platforms for claim-making by a new type of 
citizen-subject.  
 Telquel participated in attempts to construct an alternative infrastructure and alternative 
politics around a festival named “The Boulevard of Young Musicians,” or L’Boulevard, a 
volunteer event founded in 1999 by Mohammed Merhari (also known as Momo) and Hicham 
Bahou. Originally located at the Foire des Oeuvres Laïque (managed by Merhari and also where 
the “satanic” rockers played) under the name Trampoline of Young Musicians, the festival 
moved to a major stadium (COC) in 2003 as it exploded in popularity (Zaïdi, 2005). The festival 
was built on the backs of non-profit and secular associations and staffed entirely by volunteers. 
The organizers insist on the festival’s non-commercial nature, emphasizing that they are able to 
pay groups only a small portion of their normal fees (often funded by international sponsors), 
instead relying on bands’ commitment to “artistic engagement and cultural activism” (Zaïdi, 
2005). As part of their appearance in the festival headliners’ contracts also require them to host 
workshops and meet with young musicians in order to foster skills development, networking and 
exchanges. Telquel covered the urban music scene involved with the festival closely and in the 
lead-up to the 2005 edition of the festival published a series of profiles of “leading bands of the 
new Moroccan scene” (Hamdani, 2005). Among the groups was Hoba Hoba Spirit, an 
unapologetically political band fusing rock, reggae and gnawa music with lyrics largely in 
Darija, who that summer produced an album and hit song titled “Blad Schizo”23 which became a 
society-wide refrain standing in for the paradoxes of Moroccan modernity and later its own 
section in Telquel. Lead singer Réda Allali subsequently became a columnist for Telquel, 
                                                
23 Blad schizo, or “schizophrenic country” is a reference to widespread perceptions of and discourse about Morocco 
having a split personality, often associated with separate linguistic realms, postcolonial hybridities and uneven 
development associated with globalization. In Telquel, schizophrenia is interpreted as both rooted in social 
hypocrisy and a source of local specificity and humor, and “blad schizo” has since become its own section in the 
magazine. For an early Telquel cover on this phenomenon see Appendix B, Image 10. 
   
71  
publishing under the fictitious and particularly schizophrenic persona of Zakaria Boualem, 
described as a “Moroccan with paranoid tendencies” who offers cheeky but insightful 
commentary on everything from football to current affairs from Telquel’s pages.24  
 The emergence of groups such as Hoba Hoba Spirit is closely tied to increased artistic 
freedoms, technological change and new forms of public culture in the era of Mohammed VI, 
particularly for globally circulating genres such as rock and rap. Events such as L’Boulevard 
gave these hybrid musical subcultures the opportunity to engage with publics while highlighting 
youth perspectives and voices on a changing Morocco. In the wake of the 2006 edition of 
L’Boulevard Telquel printed a cover photo of five animated young men in mid-jump against a 
background of crowded metal risers and a blue sky. In the sky above their heads hangs the word 
“NAYDA!” in large orange letters, over which 
several Darija phrases appear in colorful blocks. 
Veritably bursting with energy, the five figures wear 
giant grins along with T-shirts, jeans and athletic 
shoes. The closest figure to the camera is a black man 
wearing tribal print pants with a striped t-shirt. In 
mid-jump his long dreads fly above his head and he 
has both fists extended between his bent knees in a 
kind of acrobatic leap. Grouped around him are 
several other men of what appear to be varying 
ethnicities and directly underneath him a text box with the words “L’Boulevard Syndrome: 
Portrait of a Hypercreative Youth” (Maréchaud, 2006). This creativity and its generative 
                                                
24 For the illustration accompanying Boualem’s Telquel column, see Appendix B, Image 11. 
 
Image 4: Telquel cover #229, June 2006 
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possibilities emerges at the nexus of cosmopolitan forms and local culture, rooted in the 
everyday language and life experiences of an urban youth increasingly entrenched in global 
flows (and frictions) of capital and culture. 
 Telquel used the word Nayda, meaning “let’s go” in Darija, to name a youth movement 
associated with L’Boulevard emphasizing an energetic urban culture, engagement with 
contemporary realities and Darija as a generative space. In the introduction to an extensive and 
multi-part cover story titled “Darija Generation!” Nayda is described as “the magic word of a 
generation that draws on its maternal language, but also on its penchant for creating mechanisms 
to regenerate another Morocco. Less stuffy, more real” (Maréchaud, 2006). The simultaneous 
emergence of a younger generation and Moroccan Arabic into public culture suggests official 
languages and cultures advanced by those in power failed to resonate with the realities of urban 
youth intent on creating their own platforms for pleasure and participation. Dominique Caubet, a 
French linguist and Darija scholar, penned part of the cover article in which she disputes the 
characterization of Darija as “street language” and argues that like every language it has a 
literary level and that the young musicians of L’Boulevard are just the latest in a long line of 
poets in Darija, well-known as ‘the language of zajal, of the melhoun, d’El Mejdoub, the 
proverbs, the stories, the enigmas, and more recently the Ghiwane” (Caubet, 2006). Referencing 
this long creative tradition in the local dialect informs Telquel’s constructions an alternative 
Moroccan modernity rooted in histories of the popular and not confined to the official accounts 
of authorities. 
 The main cover story follows Caubet’s commentary and is accompanied by an inset 
photo of a crowded concert audience with their hands raised in horns, a sign of rebellion 
associated with rock culture. The photo centers on a young woman raised above everyone else, 
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apparently on someone’s shoulders, wearing a low-cut black tank top with multiple necklaces 
and black bracelets. She has her mouth open in mid-scream while her arm is raised along with 
the other concert-goers, saluting the stage. The story describes how the 8th edition of 
L’Boulevard in 2006 hosted a roundtable titled “Darija, contemporary creative language” that 
included musicians (Don Bigg), filmmakers (Ali Essafi) and authors (Youssouff Amine Elalamy) 
and emphasized a creative ecosystem whereby creative energy and inspiration flows across 
mediums and networks. At the roundtable filmmaker Essafi, a participant in the L’Boulevard’s 
musical documentary festival, described L’Boulevard as “the only event that has opened up a 
path between the old Arabicized intellectual majority and the wealthy and Westernized class rife 
with identity complexes” (Maréchaud & Bensalmia, 2006). Telquel, as indicated by this 
extensive cover story, plus editorials and other coverage, is deeply invested in this path as a 
rebuttal to those who would dismiss the magazine as merely an expression of the nation’s 
francophone elite. In addition to supporting the L’Boulevard, Telquel participated in music 
production by co-producing an album by Moroccan rappers H-Kayne that was released in 
parallel with the festival. Other Moroccan media, notably state television stations RTM and 2M, 
maintained a “flagrant silence” on the festival, while some younger independent radio stations 
sought collaborations with the L’Boulevard leading Telquel to argue for “the need for a radio to 
mirror the Moroccan youth, stop Lebanon-ization and promote new music…motivations 
consistent with and promising for a small revolution for these new artists until now largely 
snubbed by the media” (Maréchaud & Bensalmia, 2006). In invoking Darija, Telquel participates 
in and advocates for a coming together of symbolic systems and everyday life as part of a new 
cultural dynamism that sets aside the sacred in favor of questioning and critique.  
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 Throughout this article parler vrai, or “real talk” appears as a refrain to describe the 
musicians of L’Boulevard, Nayda and a generation more direct in its dissent from Moroccan 
public culture and politics. The realities of everyday life are framed as a key source of creativity 
for “a curious generation, open to infinite musical genres where individual influences and 
personal tastes go from one extreme to the other, from raï to heavy metal, from ragga to jazz” 
(Maréchaud & Bensalmia, 2006). For this generation parler vrai involves speaking to the 
experiences of urban youth in a liberalizing authoritarian society marked by the paranoia of the 
past and uneven development, and a response to the divorce of classical Arabic from 
contemporary social concerns. Largely ignored by international music labels and commercial 
interests, musicians face production and distribution problems, but also the artistic freedom to 
experiment, address contemporary issues in the local language and launch creative attempts 
(such as L’Boulevard) toward an alternative cultural infrastructure. Several films such as 
Boulevard Generation document this musical counterculture “where music is embedded with 
associative life, politics and generational concerns. In short, the transcript of a reality that we 
don’t see on any screen today” (Maréchaud & Bensalmia, 2006). Through Telquel’s participation 
in, sponsorship and coverage of Morocco’s young musicians, L’Boulevard and Nayda the 
magazine worked to generate conversations about and through language, as a way to access the 
experiential realities of everyday life largely absent from a media confined to official narratives 
and fixed ideological frameworks. In providing a platform for marginal perspectives Telquel 
produces new types of publics previously excluded from official domains of politics, culture and 
even employment, and a cultural politics based on a set of values associated with human rights 
and orchestrated in conjunction with transnational civil society. 25 
                                                
25 For more detailed analysis of the specific politics of Nayda and Morocco’s festival culture under Mohammed VI, 
see Appendix D.  




In the case of Telquel we see processes of economic liberalization and the reterritorialization of 
the nation in accordance with capital produce the conditions of possibility for independent media 
to challenge societal taboos and traditional forms of authority, fundamentally shifting the 
relationship between culture and politics while simultaneously blurring the lines between them. 
The exclusion of publics from politics in an authoritarian political context means that new forms 
of capital and consumption, as well as access to the tools of cultural production, have made 
public culture a dynamic site of contention over political visions and societal projects.  
Against this backdrop, Telquel’s move to reclaim Darija can be seen as a move toward 
the desacralization of public culture, although it is far from clear what form that desacralization 
will take. What is getting worked out in Telquel is not the setting aside of religion, the monarchy 
and tradition for something else (i.e. French articulations of Enlightenment values – although the 
inalienable rights of the individual do play a key role in Telquel’s interventions), rather my 
analysis suggests that language and hybridity are forming a “structuring tension” between the 
modernity of the monarchy that sets itself aside as sacred and a rather ambivalent notion of 
modernity that wants to draw on both indigenous and external influences, yet is not necessarily 
trying to upset the established order. Although not necessarily aiming to change the social 
hierarchy, by taking Moroccan society as its object my analysis suggests that Telquel does want 
construct a narrative of Morocco where creativity, candor and non-conformity are valued – 
effectively making that hierarchy more open and less dependent on clientelism and nepotism 
while increasing transparency and the rule of law. In advancing Darija and a version of hybridity 
that privileges a progressive counterpublic often ambivalent about the role of religion and capital 
in their lives, Telquel engages public culture as an ongoing site of struggle over Morocco’s 
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relationship with global modernity, trying to understand Moroccan society and in the process 
bringing alternative voices into the arena of public culture, where they become part of an 
increasingly dynamic conversation about the nature of Moroccan modernity.  
Telquel does this by re-reading history and challenging official narratives, often in 
provocative and inflammatory ways. Covers such as “And if we re-read the Coran?” (2005, 
#158) and “The unsuspected history of eroticism in the land of Islam” (2010, #445) demonstrate 
the extent to which Telquel challenges conventional understandings of the relationship between 
the sacred and authority, and culture and politics more generally. While the monarchy’s version 
of modernity involves policies adapted from the colonial administration whereby the sultan 
remained the cultural authority of the country alongside a modern bureaucratic administration, in 
effect embracing advances in science, infrastructure and the economy while setting aside forms 
of authority rooted in religion and culture. Meanwhile Telquel’s version of modernity takes the 
acceptance of scientific tools for granted while using society as an entry point to think about 
culture as it exists in and emanates from everyday life – a type of culture with which a monarchy 
concerned with presenting itself as primordial is perpetually out of step – as an avenue to address 
the challenges of a specifically Moroccan modernity outside the domain of an institutional 
politics dominated by the monarchy. Darija constitutes a key mechanism around which Telquel 
organizes its advocacy for an alternative cultural politics and perhaps the most unequivocal  
demonstration of the real difficulties posed by the monarchy’s version of modernity for 
Moroccan publics. 
Ultimately Telquel offers a progressive space willing to try new and daring things and 
open debates even if the outcomes are not guaranteed in a society still often defined by 
conservative social mores. This is seen in efforts such as Telquel’s consent to carry a fact-
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checking column called L’Arbitre, or “the referee,” on its website in 2014, a column developed 
after the U.S. State Department brought Washington Post fact-checking columnist Glen Kessler 
as part of its speaker series. Kessler conducted a workshop with the pro-democracy NGO 
Capdema, which afterwards shopped around the idea of a fact-checking column to various media 
outlets with Telquel being the only taker. By taking Moroccan society and youth in particular 
seriously, the magazine becomes the voice for a secular counterculture challenging the role of 
religion in public life and its use by the powerful as a force for repression and stagnation. This 
divorce between political power and cultural life – underway since economic liberalization – has 
brought renewed dynamism to cultural life and produces public culture as a site of struggle over 
increasing openness and availability of a variety of ideas, commodities and lifestyle. Telquel’s 
participation in this struggle and attempts to desacralize public culture through Darija are not 
necessarily about eradicating religion, but rather opening up frank discussions about its function 
in society. By re-mediating culture as rooted in everyday life and the practices of urban youth 
Telquel reshapes Moroccan publics in relation to capital and invites readers into a particular 
relationship with events of the world. In an authoritarian political context known for the 
exclusion of the general population from the political field, Telquel uses Darija to intervene in 
public culture and stand in for a set of social values associated with human rights and democratic 
norms. In doing so the magazine opens up discursive space outside the domains of established 
authority for the articulation of an alternative modernity to act as a platform for a new cultural 






Producing Public Intellectuals: Shifting Scales and Social Critique  
in the New Moroccan Cinema 
On a sunny morning in October 2014 I entered the newly renovated Cinéma Renaissance on 
Rabat’s Avenue Mohammed V for the Café du Film, or “Film Cafe”. Framed as a meeting space 
for aid funds and Moroccan filmmakers, the program described it as an exchange among “24 
foreign experts, filmmakers and audiovisual professionals from countries of the South 
Mediterranean and Europe” around themes of financing, co-production and platforms for 
professionalization “whose training programs are open to professionals and young Moroccan 
talent.” Director Nadine Müseler of the Goethe-Institut organized the event in cooperation with 
Fondation HIBA1 and the Institut français, as well as many other cultural institutes and several 
Moroccan film schools. Paul Sinéty, deputy advisor of cooperation and cultural action for the 
French embassy, talked as part of the introduction about cinema as a “generator of employment,” 
emphasizing that “all the embassies – France, the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, 
Tunisia, Egypt, etc – are associated with this initiative.” Arnaud Simons, the press and cultural 
affairs officer for the Netherlands embassy, also spoke briefly about cinema as “an important 
encounter between citizens and the youth” and lauded the dynamism of the Moroccan cinema 
sector.  
                                                            
1 Fondation HIBA, or the HIBA Foundation, is a non-profit association for the promotion of the arts created in 2006 
by royal decree. For more information see: http://www.fondationhiba.ma/content/presentation  
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 One major component of this Café du Film was the discussion of the first data-driven 
report about the Moroccan audiovisual market published the previous year (2013) by Euromed 
Audiovisual III in cooperation with the European Audiovisual Observatory. Euromed 
Audiovisual III constituted the third phase of an EU project conducted between 2000-2014 to 
increase the availability of data, transparency and cooperation among audiovisual sectors of the 
south Mediterranean, largely with Europe. Ioana Frédérique Westhoff, Euromed’s expert for 
institutional development and capacity building, discussed “Morocco’s statistical reality” as 
shown in the first report on the Moroccan industry. According to the report, Morocco is in a 
unique and difficult situation in that it is seeing a significant increase in production, yet still 
struggles with distribution, profitability and lack of funding from the private sector (Ali, 2012). 
Despite these difficulties, Westhoff acknowledged that “there is a political will to have a cinema 
industry in Morocco” and that Euromed’s role is to “supply the means to access certain funds, in 
addition to acting as a source of funding itself.” Euromed also offers tools for cinema 
professionals such as country-specific summaries of audiovisual legislation and examples of 
contracts oriented toward international co-productions on their website, and Westhoff 
encouraged Moroccan filmmakers to know their rights and familiarize themselves with the 
practical side of film production. From her perspective “…Morocco is the only country in the 
MENA region that has started putting in place the tools worthy of an international cinema 
industry.” 
 Those tools have largely been put in place over the last two decades as a “new Moroccan 
cinema” has emerged.2 During this time a new generation of filmmakers whose work is 
                                                            
2 “New Moroccan cinema,” is a phrase used by popular and trade press to refer to a new wave in Moroccan cinema 
that has emerged during the reign of Mohammed VI (1999-present). It is generally characterized by new funding 
mechanisms, improved technical quality and taking on taboo topics, often in the local language.   
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characterized by a confluence of transnational networks, new funding models and boundary-
pushing content has provoked debates that go to the heart of sharp divides in Moroccan publics 
and distinct visions of Moroccan modernity. Coming of age in an era of economic liberalization 
and political transition, these filmmakers are less marked by the political repression of the Years 
of Lead3 and often operate between Morocco and Europe, defying national classifications and 
expanding aspirations about the audience for Moroccan cinema and its role in an increasingly 
transnational cinema landscape. Their increased autonomy, coupled with reduced censorship, has 
allowed them the flexibility to challenge traditional approaches and understandings of “Third 
World cinema” while shedding light on the dynamics of a highly stratified society, including 
lives lived on the margins of global capitalism. These filmmakers are largely associated with a 
progressive counterpublic and their emergence in the wake of a particular political moment 
defined by the rise of Islamism has led to open battles with Islamists and social conservatives 
more broadly over who and what cinema is for, as well as the difficulties of openly addressing 
controversial social realities in a global era. 
 I open this chapter by recounting the Café du Film because this event highlights 
exceptionally well several key dynamics at play in Moroccan cinema, specifically: “culture” as a 
an international development priority and object of EU policy in particular, the tension in 
Morocco between global Hollywood and Moroccan cinema, the extensive interventions of the 
Moroccan government dedicated to establishing a cinema sector, and last but not least, the 
transnational trajectories of Moroccan filmmakers, who are increasingly embedded in networks 
of education, financing and storytelling not confined by national borders. All of this adds up to a 
dynamic discourse around Moroccan cinema across multiple scales, making cinema a site of 
                                                            
3 The Years of Lead refers to a period between 1965-1990 when an increasingly totalitarian Hassan II used violence 
against dissidents, particularly the left. The period was characterized by disappearances, torture, secret prisons and 
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contestation over flows of capital, frictions associated with cultural influence, and Moroccan 
modernity writ large. Together, the institutional developments that have shaped the new 
Moroccan cinema as an industry and the discourse of Moroccan cinema that takes art as a space 
of social critique are indicative of the ways in which cultural elites, nation-states, regional 
politics and global markets intersect in competition for currency on the world stage. 
Shifting scales 
This chapter maps the contours of the new Moroccan cinema, focusing on transnational 
influences in cultural policy and their impact on industry logics, while the subsequent chapter 
will examine the ideological interventions made possible by these logics. As in the case of 
Telquel, increased openness to and availability of global capital (particularly cultural assistance 
funds) and new distribution mechanisms dependent on technology and travel (piracy, TV, 
festivals, etc) have opened up new avenues for alternative storytelling and depictions of 
Moroccan life and experiences that challenge hegemonic narratives about society and culture 
through cinema. These circumstances coincided with Morocco’s emergence as one of few small 
countries with the political will to support audiovisual production and assemble industry 
structures, as well as the rise of a new generation of Moroccan filmmakers. The political will to 
have cinema in Morocco accompanies an increased emphasis on culture as a mechanism of 
development and discourses about the value of diversity as part of the international agenda, the 
institutions associated with which seem increasingly aware that money and military force only 
go so far in the aftermath of the Iraq War, ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and the rise of ISIL. 
Morocco’s efforts to set itself apart as much as possible from conflicts and instability in the 
MENA region are the product of its economic overture and a new king widely reported to be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
arbitrary judicial proceedings, leading to widespread paranoia and distrust of authorities. 
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cinephile who seems intent on fostering both economic development and a more favorable 
reputation regarding dissent through the cinema industry.  
 While cinema has traditionally been studied within the framework of the nation-state, the 
consolidation of cultural production accompanying globalization and the transnational networks 
within which Moroccan cinema is embedded demand that we interrogate how industry logics 
have changed and what sort of discourses and ideologies they are producing. The nation-state is 
still clearly an important player in the Moroccan context, yet it also seems to increasingly be just 
one among a myriad of stakeholders and potential sets of resources associated with the new 
Moroccan cinema. Govil (2009) suggests that cinema is a means of legitimizing the state in that 
it functions to strengthen symbolic attachments while simultaneously attempting to attract 
capitalist economic development, and therefore strengthening the state’s role in the economy (p. 
136). While this is certainly the case in Morocco, these dynamics now exist in parallel with 
alternative means of financing and distribution that have given filmmakers more freedom from 
the political imperatives of the state. The Moroccan government has shown a certain willingness 
to open up the cinema sector to more modernist visions of a society acknowledging its problems 
and notably hasn’t withheld filming permits or (usually) censored films despite heated debate. In 
fact, increased resources for the CCM have been a source of legitimacy for the Moroccan state at 
a time when authoritarian forms of government and Islamic states in particular have been under 
close scrutiny by the global community. 
 But in addition to the Moroccan state we can also talk about an emergent space of 
funding, training and circulation that sits alongside statist structures and uses the “universal” 
model of Hollywood as a reference. The establishment of the first film studio in Morocco in 
1983 allowed foreign studios to take advantage of lower labor and living costs and over time 
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made Morocco a site of Hollywood outsourcing as well as a regional cinema center with the 
tools and technical expertise to construct an emerging industry of its own. Thus Moroccan 
cinema can be seen as part of what Sassen (2006) argues is an overlooked dimension of 
globalization, namely the way processes and transformations inside the nation participate in its 
disassembly as the sole order and authority. Through this lens the new Moroccan cinema can be 
seen as characterized by an emergent space of funding from other audiovisual sectors like 
television, cultural aid funds, diasporic capital and festivals offering alternative (albeit difficult) 
means of assembling the resources for production. It is important to emphasize that even those 
filmmakers who receive government funding through the CCM often need to supplement it 
elsewhere, opening up links to transnational imaginaries about integration into regional if not 
global cinema circles, as well as wider aspirations about audience and commercial viability.  
 The new Moroccan cinema is defined by a shift in scale from taking the national as the 
assumed frame of reference to operating according to a wider regional and global framework, in 
part due to transnational influences in cultural policy and their interactions with globalization. 
Morocco’s colonial history with France and France’s tradition of subsidizing cinema have 
contributed to the development of Moroccan filmmakers, as well as their visions about markets 
and messages. Significantly, the growth in Moroccan cinema has come at a time when Morocco 
is opening up economically and seeking to integrate more fully into the EU community. The 
Euromed Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Procedure, is a 1995 agreement between EU 
countries and those bordering the Mediterranean (including Morocco) to create a free trade zone 
in exchange for development aid from the EU Investment Bank. The agreement emphasizes 
peace and stability as part of a “European politics of neighbors,” and also contains a cultural 
component. Euromed Audiovisual is one manifestation of this politics in the form of a three-
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phase project, of which the third phase was an 11 million euro effort dedicated to the 
development of cinema sectors of South Mediterranean countries over four years (2011-2014), 
notably focusing on the encouragement of co-productions. These agreements and initiatives are 
fundamental components for the construction of what Kraidy (2014) has called a 
“deterritorialized industry whose production, distribution and consumption operate across 
cultural, national and sub-regional boundaries” (p. 37). Because many cultural assistance funds 
such as France’s Aid to World Cinemas include co-production requirements and specifications 
about where the money can be spent, they are specifically structured toward forging relationships 
that support the development of cinema industries in the global South, but also the integration of 
their well-being with that of audiovisual industries in Europe.  
While these collaborations are growing, few Moroccan producers are benefitting from 
new Gulf funds, despite the increased presence of their films at festivals such as the Dubai 
International Film Festival (DIFF). Arab media developers have traditionally viewed the 
Maghreb as an undesirable market due to lack of buying power and low education rates (Kraidy, 
2013). These connections and disjunctures are examples of what Punathembekar (2013) calls 
looking at media as “scale-making projects” that allow mapping of “the complex connections 
across multiple spatial scales that define the imaginations and practices of media professionals” 
(p. 67). Indications abound that filmmakers of the new Moroccan cinema are both living their 
lives and imagining their audience transnationally, taking advantage of what Curtin (2009) calls 
“trajectories of creative migration” to intervene in issues across borders (p. 113). These 
trajectories result in a clustering of creative talent by a workforce that is self-consciously 
motivated by aesthetic innovation as well as market considerations and attempts to take 
advantage of “mutual learning effects” and “the largest pool of employment opportunities” (ibid., 
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p. 113). These trajectories are one mechanism through which filmmakers have become more 
tightly interconnected with industry structures across the Mediterranean, and today it is 
important to note that rather than a singular “migration,” these migrations are multiple and 
constitute a frequent back and forth as filmmakers attempt to take advantage of opportunities in 
Morocco and transnationally.  
Working at the intersections of industry studies, critical political economy and discourse 
analysis, I look at the “new Moroccan cinema” as a social phenomenon composed of shifting 
organizational logics and genre conventions with ideological implications. In doing so I draw on 
industry and production studies coming out of the US and other contexts over the last couple 
years from scholars such as John Caldwell (2008), Michael Curtin (2009), Nitlin Govil (2009), 
Aswin Punathambekar (2013), Joseph Straubhaar (2015) and others. In doing so I employ 
elements of what Caldwell (2008) calls “an integrated cultural-industrial analysis,” which 
emphasizes different registers or modes of analysis within a critical cultural framework (p. 4). I 
employ textual analysis of media discourse surrounding filmmakers and films of the new 
Moroccan cinema, interviews with filmmakers and institutional actors, reports produced by 
government and civil society and participant observation at funding workshops, cultural 
symposia and film festivals, in order to analyze discourse across various registers. The lens of 
cultural-industrial analysis and its emphasis on multiple registers brings into focus how the new 
Moroccan cinema is constructed in the nexus of transnational cultural industries, national 
interests, individual filmmaker priorities and audience tastes. I want to make it clear that I am not 
doing cinema studies, but rather looking at cinema as another site of cultural production and an 
increasingly transnational “independent”4 media landscape in post-economic liberalization 
                                                            
4 I consider films of the new Moroccan cinema as independent because they are both made outside the major film 
studio system and because they are increasingly made without Moroccan state intervention. 
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Morocco. Much has been written about the texts of the new Moroccan cinema from a more 
literary studies approach that emphasizes their internal narratives, and while I will conduct close 
readings of a few films in the subsequent chapter, it is with an eye on their relationship to 
organizational aspects and the public conversations they ignite.  
I focus on a specific strand of Moroccan cinema associated with 5 filmmakers – Nabil 
Ayouch, Laïla Marrakchi, Leila Kilani, Nour-Eddine Lakhmari and Narjiss Nejjar – who have 
been discussed in conjunction with a new Moroccan cinema and to a greater or lesser extent 
challenged the status quo, achieved a certain success at the box office and with critics on the 
festival circuit, and taken part in various cultural initiatives and/or activist projects. In analyzing 
this new space within the broader field of Moroccan cinema, I look at the production practices 
and specific film culture of this small group of filmmakers in asking “what defines the new 
Moroccan cinema in terms of industry logics and as a discursive formation? What work are these 
logics and discourses doing and for whom?” Ultimately I work to make sense of the paradox by 
which Moroccan cinema achieve popularity in local markets at precisely the moment it starts 
imagining itself as an industry and in terms of audiences, transnationally.  
In order to answer these questions I begin by introducing the new Moroccan cinema as a 
phenomenon then situate it in historical perspective, considering what sets Moroccan cinema of 
the new millennium apart from its earlier colonial and postcolonial manifestations. Next I 
consider the Moroccan Cinema Center (CCM) as an institution and its ongoing role in the 
Moroccan cinema industry before exploring the shifting industry logics of the new Moroccan 
cinema move beyond the nation-state. In order to do this I conduct a discourse analysis of 
debates around the NMC in the popular and trade press from 2004-2014, a period that roughly 
aligns with Noureddine Saïl’s tenure as head of the CCM. Looking at the new Moroccan cinema 
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through the lens of its industry logics and, in the subsequent chapter, ideological implications 
illuminates several trends in regard to how Moroccan cinema is produced and used by various 
stakeholders.  
Morocco’s film industry makes an important case study of the role of media and culture 
in transitional societies in the process of debating different versions of modernity and encounters 
with globalization. Morocco has long hosted international shoots and more recently emerged as 
one of a few small countries with the political will to restructure its film industry in the midst of 
increased consolidation of film production and distribution at the global level.  The rise of a new 
generation of Moroccan filmmakers ensconced in transnational networks of policy, funding and 
storytelling highlights some of the powerful tensions at play in a world of global media flows, 
transnational policy imperatives, and technological change. By interrogating the industry logics 
of this cinema and its subsequent discursive interventions, this analysis contributes to 
understandings of how the increasing penetration of capital is shaping production structures 
locally as well the processes through which alternative storytelling and depictions of Moroccan 
life challenge hegemonic narratives about society and culture. 
A “New” Moroccan Cinema 
In the summer of 2010 the francophone Moroccan news magazine Telquel published a cover 
article about the “new Moroccan cinema” which discusses how this cinema reproduces the 
everyday reality of Morocco in the Moroccan language (Boukhari, 2010, n/a). Described as “do-
it-yourself” these films include many major hits such as Casanegra, Marock, and Sur la planche 
that reject “dialogues sanitized into pure classical Arabic,” and embrace the idea of “film as a 
mirror of society” (ibid., n/a). Although representations are never mere reflections, the inclusion 
of Darija, or Moroccan Arabic, and more candid portrayals of taboo themes such as sexuality are 
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noteworthy in a media environment dominated by classical Arabic and conservative social 
mores. The article talks specifically about films made without CCM funding and based on “a 
new economic model” described as a “DIY” and “bricolage,” but also about policy decisions to 
expand CCM support for productions (including more some that would previously have never 
received state funding) and a hands-off approach to censorship. Ultimately Telquel lauds the new 
Moroccan cinema for being “Freer, better equipped, cinema is breaking taboos and engaging all 
of society’s debates…[it is] a nascent but already fascinating phenomenon at the intersection of 
culture and politics” (Boukhari, 2010, #427). Despite, or more likely because of its more daring 
tone, Moroccan cinema has been a cause célèbre for Mohammed VI,5 who has made resources 
for production a priority and championed cinema as both a tool for economic development and 
proof of Morocco’s newfound openness.  
 This Telquel article is but one example of many discussions about changes in Moroccan 
cinema that have taken place in recent years. Armes (2005) talks about Nabil Ayouch as the 
beginning of a new generation of Moroccan filmmakers, and on the advent of Casanegra’s 
release in France, Jeune Afrique published an article titled “Taboo Breakers” that qualifies the 
new Moroccan cinema as a “trend/societal phenomenon” based on excavating the realities and 
issues of everyday life (Slimani, 2009). It describes films such as Casanegra and Marock by 
saying “Surrounded by a hint of scandal, these films are the work of a new generation of 
directors, more uninhibited and modern than their predecessors, which has earned them the 
reputation of ‘taboo breakers’” (ibid.). Remarkable for its box office success despite tackling 
issues often considered off limits, the new cinema involves a new proximity to the realities of 
                                                            
5 Mohammed VI is the current king of Morocco, who is popularly referred to as “M6.” He took over the throne in 
1999 after the death of his totalitarian father, Hassan II, and is widely popular due to his “prince of the people” 
persona and reformist agenda, although few of those reforms have resulted in any meaningful change to the 
governing authority of the monarchy. 
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everyday life. Another article in RFI titled “The new breath of Moroccan cinema” described the 
influx of young filmmakers in Morocco by saying, “This generation says things in a more direct 
manner, less symbolically, with an energy and a new touch of subversion” (Maréchaud, 2007). 
These tendencies reach new heights in the Arab Spring moment, when an article in Jeune Afrique 
discusses the first film of Nabil Ayouch’s journalist-turned-filmmaker brother, Hicham, as “an 
ode to liberty and the right to live as one understands, at the risk of offending, and what it can 
cost you” (Rochebrune, 2011). Above all this cinema is characterized by tensions between 
individuals and the collective in Moroccan society, emphasizing stories about defying social 
norms and their place within universal themes such as adolescence, tradition, inequality, and 
love.  
 While celebrated in Telquel, Jeune Afrique, and circles concerned with artistic liberty and 
freedom of speech, the new cinema has been a source of tension for social conservatives and the 
Islamic Justice and Development Party (PJD) in particular. In 2013 Au Fait Maroc published an 
article titled “The New Moroccan Cinema and the Justice and Development Party (PJD),” 
describing the disapproval of the now-ruling Islamist party in regard to recent developments in 
Moroccan cinema:  
For several years, Moroccan cinema has technically and artistically improved a great 
deal, all while addressing social subjects that disturb religious conservatives…In the eyes 
of Mohammed Laghrouss, journalist and PJD member, all the modern Moroccan 
filmmakers such as Nour-Eddine Lakhmari, Nabil Ayouch, Lahcen Zinoun or 
Abdelkader Lagtaâ are only westernized Moroccans who have forgotten their own 
civilization and hide the nonsense of their films behind risqué scenes. (Sedatri, 2013, n/a) 
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In a culture that emphasizes family viewing, the new Moroccan cinema’s frank portrayals of sex 
and other taboo topics are considered by many to be highly offensive. It is no accident that most 
of these films come from Casablanca and that many of the realities they purport to address relate 
to an urban modernity in many ways divorced from the realities of rural and semi-rural Morocco. 
While some films such as Narjiss Nejjar’s L’Amante du Rif (2011) do take on particularly what it 
means to be a woman in rural Morocco, it does so from the perspective of daring women and the 
risks they face in defying community codes. In the new Moroccan cinema’s concern not to 
further folkloric representations it perhaps stops short of acknowledging the full complexity of 
Moroccan society across diverse geographic and social spaces. Yet through highly mediatized 
debates, this cinema does intervene in Moroccan public culture across these spaces, provoking 
debate and pushing publics across borders to reimagine a more cosmopolitan Morocco embedded 
in universal issues, while not losing sight of the political. 
Moroccan cinema in historical perspective 
Any discussions of a “new” Moroccan cinema must be situated within the larger historical 
context of cinema in the country. As part of France’s “civilizing mission,” cinema in Morocco 
began as colonial propaganda aimed at promoting patriotism (Jaïdi, 2001). The desire to increase 
film production and combat pan-Arab nationalism emanating from Egypt resulted in French 
colonists building up cinema infrastructure and creating the CCM in 1944 as a government-run 
entity charged with producing, regulating and promoting cinema in Morocco (Armes, 2005; 
Carter, 2008; Dwyer, 2004). These developments were largely oriented toward and financed by 
the colonial administration. According to Armes (2005), “all North African film production 
activity in the period before independence was financed by foreign capital, used foreign players, 
and was destined for foreign audience” (p. 6). The creation of this cinematic sphere separate 
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from Moroccan society evolved into an industry oriented toward well-financed foreign 
productions with domestic filmmakers often struggling alongside, and, to some extent, explains 
the sensitivity to perceptions of outside influence in the cinema sector.  
The development of infrastructure and connections with foreign studios that make 
Morocco a popular filming location for many major Hollywood films even today (think 
Gladiator, Black Hawk Down, Babel, etc.) leads Moroccan filmmaker Muhammed Abderrahman 
Tazi to draw a sharp distinction between “making films in Morocco” and “Moroccan 
filmmaking,” often seen as a manifestation of the complex relationship between the global and 
the local (Dwyer, 2004, p. 18). The first Moroccan feature films appeared in the early 1970s and 
with them visions of a contested society eclipsed earlier. Jaïdi (1994) asserts “Hamid Bennani’s 
Wechma (1970) and Souheil ben Barka’s A Thousand and One Hands (1972) presented 
themselves as works of fiction that developed a muted questioning of Moroccan society” (p. 
107). Thus a historical precedent exists in Morocco for couching social and political critique in 
cinema, but these critiques were often limited in scope or shut down entirely during the Years of 
Lead when persecution of the left and public fear were the norm. While earlier cohorts of 
Moroccan filmmakers such as that of Bennani, Tazi, Ahmed Bouanani, Mohamed Sekkat, Latif 
Lahlou, and Moumen Smihi, who studied in Paris at IDHEC6 in the 1960s, were perhaps more 
revolutionary from an ideological standpoint, their work met a myriad of obstacles including 
surveillance and censorship. For example, Bouanani’s first feature film Mémoire 14 (1971) 
became a short after it was cut by censors (Khalfallah, 2011) and he was forbidden from working 
as a director for several years after being branded a communist (Akalay, 2010). Overall, 
                                                            
6 IDHEC stands for the Institut des hautes études cinématographique, which is the French state film school in Paris. 
It is now known as La Femis, an acronym for Fondation Européenne pour les Métiers de l’Image et du Son. 
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Morocco in the 1970s was not an encouraging environment for this politically engaged and 
enterprising group of filmmakers. 
The 1980s saw the introduction of state aid as a form of film financing, which Dwyer 
(2004) describes as “the core of each film’s budget” (p. 155). Lack of commercial distribution 
for Moroccan films and buying power on the part the public led to the establishment of a Support 
Fund in 1981, which after restructuring into the Aid Fund in 1988 to include changes in 
selectivity, amounts awarded and the timing of their disbursement, remained largely in place 
until 2006. During this time some filmmakers started to look at co-production as an additional 
funding mechanism for expenses not covered by the state, especially from foreign TV stations 
willing to put money up for production in return for distribution rights (Dwyer, 2004). However, 
co-production remained a rarity and production rates low, averaging only 5 feature films a year 
from 1990-1999 (Ali, 2012), even if some of those films, such as Tazi’s Looking for my Wife’s 
Husband (1993), are now considered Moroccan cinema classics.   
While funding for Moroccan cinema generally increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
it was not until the early 2000s that major shifts in the resources dedicated to culture built on an 
upswing in production accompanying economic liberalization and a new generation of 
filmmakers coming of age post-Years of Lead. From 2001 to 2011 feature film production 
increased from 4 to 25 per year (Ali, 2012; Dale, 2012), production aid multiplied six fold 
between 2001 and 2012, and in 2006 the CCM adopted a system of “advance on receipts” based 
on the French model requiring repayment to the fund out of the film’s earnings (Ali, 2012). Co-
producing films also became part of public television mandates in 2005-2006 (ibid.). Within this 
time Moroccan films also began consistently topping the box office with one or two Moroccan 
films out-selling the next best by almost double – this despite having significantly smaller 
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budgets than most foreign productions (CCM, 2008-2012). Together, these changes are 
indicative of significant shifts in Moroccan cinema, both from the standpoint of production and 
its place in society.  
State-sponsored cinema 
After hearing all the praise for the CCM at the Café du Film, I was excited to visit the institution 
that by most accounts sets the Moroccan cinema industry apart from other countries of the 
region. Established in 1944 by the colonial administration, the CCM acts as the arm of the state 
in Morocco’s cinema sector. Located on the outskirts of Rabat in an industrial district between 
the upscale Souissi and Hay Riad neighborhoods, the dated-looking complex appeared fairly 
deserted when I arrived except for the security guard who pointed me in the direction of 
Mohamed Sabiri, head of the CCM’s technical division. A thin and politely reticent middle-aged 
technician, Sabiri had a lot to say about the strong points of Moroccan cinema, pointing out that 
“the presence of a film processing laboratory is key, the digitization of theaters, a treasure trove 
of archived films, a dynamic festival scene and an increase in the production of Moroccan films 
to about 25 a year.” The CCM’s laboratory is equipped for 35mm and digital films, and there’s 
also a sound studio authorized for Dolby stereo. As a technician Sabiri views Morocco as an 
anomaly in Africa because it has a laboratory and an industry, which he says only South Africa 
and Morocco have. In terms of the industry, “over the last decade Moroccan cinema has seen the 
level of films improve, with more films produced and support for foreign filming in the country,” 
all of which Sabiri said are encouraging for the prospects of the industry and make him proud of 
Morocco’s position in the region. 
 As indicated by the support for foreign filming, the CCM works with both domestic and 
foreign productions and issues the authorizations required to shoot in Morocco. For Moroccan 
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filmmakers, there are specific formulas put in place by Noureddine Saïl7 that they have to follow 
to get their “Professional Identity Card” so they can work legally in the cinema sector in 
Morocco. Directors have to make at least three shorts and complete a dossier, while technicians 
have to submit proof of internships or work experience to certify that they have proper on-the-
job training. Funding for the CCM comes from the state through the Minister of Communication, 
but Sabiri described the institution as “having an autonomous budget, which is how it maintains 
the equilibrium between being an organization of the state and preserving artistic integrity.” He 
estimated about 150 employees, but noted that those working for the CCM don’t make the 
decisions about who gets financing for their films. Those decisions are made at the ministry level 
by three commissions in charge of distributing production aid, aid to events and aid for digitizing 
theaters, and filmmakers can apply for two types of aid: pre-production and post-production. 
Sabiri assured me that the commissions are composed of “ten autonomous men, so that no one 
can influence their decisions,” however, the comments made at the Café du Film about the 
“hyper-bureaucratic” nature of the cinema industry in Morocco and funding decisions made by 
panels with no filmmakers on them started to make a lot of sense.8 
 If the CCM didn’t exist Sabiri seemed convinced that there wouldn’t be cinema in 
Morocco, saying “without aid funds, people wouldn’t produce films because there aren’t really 
private investors in the cinema sector because of the high risks and low returns.” At the level of 
the public, he sees quality as the real issue “because the public won’t just accept anything, it 
demands quality,” while at the cultural level cinema is important for collective identity and 
                                                            
7 At the time of my visit the CCM was between directors, as Saïl had retired amid rumors about being forced out 
and his replacement hadn’t yet been named. Saïl played a key role in shaping Moroccan cinema and the audiovisual 
sector more broadly, having served as head of 2M before taking over the CCM. Saïl has since been replaced by 
Sarim Fassi Fihri. 
8 For more on the work of funding committees, see Omar Akalay (2003) Au Service du Cinéma Marocain. 
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“without cinema and other cultural sectors there wouldn’t be identity.” Sabiri cited the CCM’s 
support for film festivals and Moroccan film weeks as key to public engagement with Moroccan 
cinema in that they offer spaces of encounter for professionals and publics. 
 After our meeting, Sabiri took me to see Abdellatif Laassadi, the assistant to the director 
general (formerly Noureddine Saïl). In contrast to Sabiri’s neat and sparse office, Laassadi’s 
office featured stacks of papers piled high on practically every surface. The rotund bureaucrat 
spoke demonstratively from behind his desk, expounding on a much more pessimistic 
perspective of Moroccan cinema than that recounted by Sabiri. Laassadi’s main point was that 
cinema in Morocco is subsidized by the state, which he sees as a weakness of the industry when 
coupled with lack of other investors. Even the CCM, he said, has a limited budget of $700,000 
per year. According to Laassadi, Moroccan cinema doesn’t work on the international market 
because it’s concerned with 1) local themes, 2) in local dialogue and 3) relates to local society. 
Thus he considers it a cinema “for internal consumption” except for some films distributed to 
former colonizer countries that have large communities of immigrants such as France. Laassadi 
was convinced that Moroccan films are “interested in small issues and a reflection of society, 
rather than fiction in any universal sense.” This allegation that Moroccan films aren’t fiction in a 
universal sense was interesting because it directly contradicts the filmmaker discourse coming 
out of the new Moroccan cinema that makes universality one of its key objectives and contends 
that it is telling universal stories through a local lens. Yet distribution abroad does still constitute 
a major obstacle for Moroccan cinema, and even if a film finds distributors Laassadi said it is 
often still plagued by issues of language and themes associated with auteur cinema that make it 
unprofitable. Throughout our discussion Laassadi consistently compared Moroccan cinema to 
Hollywood, and in this case he drew a distinction between the screenwriters’ guild in America 
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and the fact that in Morocco the director is also the scriptwriter because these are mostly auteur 
films where the directors write their own screenplays. 
 Laassadi backed up his negative assessment of Moroccan cinema with the fact that 
Moroccan films have never entered into the official competition at Cannes or other major film 
festivals. Films such as Marock and Sur la planche have only been in small parallel competitions 
and those are specifically films that are French co-productions, which he said do a lot better 
comparatively. Laassadi had many more positive things to say about co-productions, which he 
described as “beneficial for all production because co-producers bring 1) resources/money, 2) 
expertise and good technicians and 3) these films are automatically distributed and released 
abroad.” Ultimately, however, he said “we can’t talk about an industry in the infrastructural 
sense of the word, this is a small output,” and drew a distinction between culture and a 
commercial industry, with Moroccan cinema falling in the former. He said piracy is one of the 
major challenges for such an industry because you can walk into the medina and buy any film 
you want, even the new ones. The push to renovate the few remaining Moroccan theaters has 
been an effort to reconstruct cinema-going as an event, which Laassadi said depends on “cafés, 
restaurants and, above all, parking” in order to be successful. In terms of what goes in the 
theaters, for him “movies are money” and Moroccan cinema simply can’t compete against the 
budgets of Hollywood blockbusters. 
CCM Initiatives 
Each year the CCM releases a “bilan” or annual report on the state of Morocco’s cinema 
industry. In general the reports give details about what films received support of various kinds, 
how they did at the box office and in festivals, distribution and theater numbers, licenses issued 
to cinema professionals, allocations of funding for festivals in Morocco, what foreign films 
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received shooting permits and overall box office numbers and revenues for the country. The 
reports are a major move toward systematic data collection and transparency in terms of what is 
going on in the industry, if not in how decisions are made, and allow for some assessment of 
industry trends over time. Looking at CCM reports for 2004 through 2015, six significant trends 
stand out: 1) the exponential increases in production, 2) Moroccan films’ improved performance 
at the box office, 3) Hollywood’s consistent domination of box office revenues, 4) the dire 
situation of distribution in the country, 5) the increasing visibility of Moroccan cinema at home 
and abroad and 6) the ongoing drive to make Morocco a premier destination for foreign shoots.9  
 Widely lauded in cinema circles as the architect of the new Moroccan cinema, Saïl’s 
major accomplishment during his tenure at the CCM was taking feature film production from 4 
in 2001 to 20 in 2014 by exponentially increasing production aid from 10,380,000 MAD in 2001 
to 62,580,000 MAD in 2015, moving to a French-modeled system of “advance on receipts” and 
making development of original programming part of the public television mandate. Within this 
time Moroccan films also began consistently topping the box office, despite having significantly 
smaller budgets than most foreign productions. In 2004 the average budget was $250,000; by 
2015 it increased to $325,000, but overall budgets vary highly by production (CCM, 2015; 
Cinéma marocain, 2005). For example, Ayouch’s second feature film Whatever Lola Wants had 
a budget of $12 million USD and his Horses of God cost $3.8 million USD, both incredibly well 
funded by Moroccan standards.  
 Given that precarious financing is part and parcel of the new Moroccan cinema, it is 
difficult to overstate the major accomplishment that is Moroccan films consistently topping the 
box office against Hollywood blockbusters. Generally one or two Moroccan films out-sell the 
                                                            
9 All statistics taken from CCM annual reports unless otherwise noted. 
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next best by 2-3 times, as in the case of 2012’s top two films Road to Kaboul and Un Marocain à 
Paris, which sold 230,519 and 90,901 tickets respectively (2.5x) while earning 7,759,659 MAD 
to 2,589,354 MAD (3x). As a result Morocco has been able to claim second place at the box 
office by nationality since 2008, consistently hovering between 20-30 percent of box office 
revenues. This improvement occurred primarily at the expense of France, Egypt and India, 
whose shares of the Moroccan market declined while the USA hovered steadily around 50 
percent. The USA consistently accounts for half of cinema revenues in Morocco – even if 
Moroccan films have consistently topped the box office, the USA still earns more in total 
because of the sheer number of films produced and generally higher ticket prices. In recent years 
about 9 of the 30 top films are Moroccan and 15 are American; in terms of percentage of ticket 
revenues Morocco had revenue from 45 films while the USA had revenue from 118, leaving the 
USA with 47 percent of revenues. 
 Even with improvements in production, actually getting the films to audiences continues 
to be a (if not THE) major obstacle for the new Moroccan cinema. As CCM director Saïl was 
unable to stem the tide of theater closures so that in a country that had 151 theaters in 2004, only 
59 remained for a population of 31 million in 2014. Megarama, Morocco’s major distributor and 
first multiplex, opened in Casablanca in 2002 and today owns 14 screens in Casablanca, 9 in 
Marrakech and 3 in Fes that accounted for 47-69 percent of the exhibition market between 2008 
and 2015. Owned by French theater mogul Jean-Pierre Lemoine, Megarama provided an 
alternative to “les cinémas du quartier,” or local neighborhood cinemas, largely in disrepair, 
lagging in digitization and relying on cheap Bollywood or local films and frequented mostly by 
male audiences. Despite Megarama’s dominance, ticket sales have been in free fall for years, 
declining from 6,794,345 in 2004 to 1,643,647 in 2014.  
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Globalization, transnational influences in cultural policy and Moroccan cinema 
Many scholars have shown that cinema cannot be considered exclusively within the confines of 
the nation, in the Moroccan case and more generally (Curtin, 2009; Dwyer, 2008; Edwards, 
2008; Galt, 2010; Higbee & Lim, 2010; Khalil, 2008; Naficy, 1999). In deploying this 
framework, my research indicates that escalations in trajectories of creative migration (Curtin, 
2009) have expanded transnational industry logics to emphasize a politics of co-production and 
engagement with multiple publics, which in turn has changed the ideological composition of the 
cinema itself. I argue that a key dimension of the new Moroccan cinema is its situation within 
transnational flows of people, capital, and media that have shifted from a nation-centric space to 
something more regional in terms of distribution and global in terms of financing. While these 
dynamics have always characterized Moroccan cinema to some extent, their conjunction with a 
transnational cultural politics emanating from the EU, media liberalization in Morocco, and new 
opportunities to engage with publics (revolving primarily around audience access to technology) 
has constructed cinema as a site of contestation over distinct political projects – raising questions 
about the intersections of culture and politics in an increasingly mediated global era. 
Additionally, Mohammed VI’s ascent to the throne, the opening up of civil society, and 
appointment of Noureddine Saïl as head of the CCM ushered in a new era of dynamic debates 
around cinema, characterized by increased resources, reduced censorship, and recognition of 
cinema as a political priority.  
 Yudice (2003) argues that the dominant framework for understanding culture in the 
contemporary world is expediency, which has led to the interpenetration of culture and economy 
and produced cultural economy as the new frontier for economic development. As a result of 
globalization and the evisceration of the social from the state, difference has transformed into a 
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resource to be deployed by myriad of actors including communities, civil society, states and 
supranational organizations as part of a new international division of cultural labor. Yudice goes 
beyond mere instrumentalization or commodification of culture in using the term “expedient,” 
which carries connotations of being ethically or morally problematic, suggesting that the 
hegemony of the maquiladora model in film, festivals and other cultural production constitutes 
“an expropriation of cultural and mental labor” (p. 19) for consumption, often resulting in further 
neoliberal penetration and exploitation of the communities they purport to empower. Through 
this lens, the interest of European producers in Moroccan cinema can be viewed as the extraction 
of cheap content for exploitation in more profitable markets (low budget films that may be 
sleeper hits), so we see films like Ayouch’s Much Loved become the fourth most profitable film 
of 2015 in France because it had a small, self-financed budget and received enormous (free) 
publicity due to being banned in Morocco (Much Loved, 2016). But it’s not just the content of 
the film (in this case a story about prostitution) that yields such results, but also the position of 
the filmmakers (and filmmakers of the new Moroccan cinema more broadly) as 
French/Moroccan citizens operating across fields and their ability to align their interests and 
those of others to advance agendas and shift discourse. As Yudice (2003) argues “… 
“…cultural expression by itself is not enough. It helps to engage in a struggle when you 
have a good knowledge of the complex machinations involved in seeing an agenda 
through a rang of multiscale, intermediary instances populated with the others’ similar, 
overlapping, or differing agendas” (p. 2-3) 
In other words, it is precisely the familiarity of Moroccan filmmakers with the media 
narratives/discourse emanating from both the West and Morocco and their interstitial positioning 
that allows them to negotiate interests and work across the nexus of transnational policy agendas, 
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national reputations, industry infrastructures and local stories. These factors, combined with 
Morocco’s movement toward further integration into the E.U. economic community, plus 
relatively small domestic publics numerically, mean that there are both political and economic 
imperatives for filmmakers to move across scales. 
 Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) also focus on the shifting boundaries between culture 
and economics, a shift they attribute to the commercialization of media and communication 
industries beginning in the 1980s. For them, the increasing interest of policy makers in cultural 
industries centers on culture as a new and corrective form of capital capable of mitigating rising 
inequality and regenerating post-industrial economies in an era of globalization. Accompanying 
the recognition that military intervention alone can’t solve American problems abroad, the wide 
reach of (especially commercial) culture becomes newly functional. Hesmondhalgh and Pratt 
(2005) point to a core assumption underpinning cultural policy that “culture is 'good for the 
soul,’ and that exposure to 'culture' has a 'civilising effect” (10). Similarly, Yudice reminds us 
that “…it is argued – if not really believed – that (gender- and race-sensitive) investment in 
culture will strengthen the fiber of civil society, which in turn serves as the ideal host for political 
and economic development” (p. 2). Arguments that culture in the form of creative industries 
provides space for expression and valorizes local ways of life leading to stability, improvement 
in quality of life, and greater empathy or social understanding, provide instrumental rationales 
for cultural investment, making culture like any other resource.  
 More recently, Schlesinger (2016) specifies “creative economy” as a distinctive and 
dominant form of discourse that approaches culture (practice and industries) as an object for the 
exploitation of intellectual property domestically and internationally. He locates this discourse’s 
point of origin in the cultural politics of the UK’s New Labour in the late 1990s and their global 
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circulation “through policy spaces and institutions, and moreover, [this discourse has] become 
increasingly embedded in academic research and teaching internationally” (ibid., p. 4). This 
discourse approaches culture as a competitive marketplace with opportunities for exploitation 
and export. In theorizing the shift from “an established arts-based policy model” to a creative 
industries model, Volkerling (2001) points out the lack of corrective to cultural imperialism in 
the creative industries approach. Basically, under the creative industries model, cultural policy, 
which was conceived as a defense mechanism for Europe, Canada and others against American 
cultural domination, becomes another tool for fostering a competitive marketplace for culture 
wherein as the sports adage says, the best defense is a good offense. In 2004, Nabil Ayouch led 
advocacy efforts by the Coalition for Moroccan Cultural Diversity to have “culture” exempted 
from a free trade agreement being negotiated between Morocco and the United States 
(L’exception culturelle marocaine en danger, 2004; Michel, 2004). According to Ayouch “There 
is a grave danger in being inactive when the American philosophy is to consider culture like any 
good or service…” (Michel, 2004). Indeed, the word “industry” suggests a primarily economic 
valuation and the replacement of “culture” with “creative” replaces connotations of history and 
heritage that connect to identity, way of life and local production with connotations of spatial 
marketing or branding. This has been accompanied by an emphasis on “measuring” the effects of 
creative industries through indicators like contribution to GDP and potential for employment 
growth, as well as their contribution to the growth of flexible skills necessary for participation in 
the information economy (Volkerling, 2001, p. 444-445). This can be seen across multiple 
levels: in Euromed’s reports and initiatives, the Moroccan government’s support for cinema, the 
CCM’s annual bilan, in NGOs such as Racines using economic logic to push the Moroccan 
government to enact a comprehensive cultural policy (EGC, 2014), and in the opening of the 
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prestigious ESAV film school in Marrakech in 2006. Often we see state agendas around culture 
in tension with the oppositional impulses of individual artists or communities, although the 
points at which these agendas intersect and overlap is of particular interest to this project.  
 Ultimately transnational influences in cultural policy, and the creative industries model in 
particular, can be traced back to debates about high versus low culture, questions about popular 
culture’s commercial nature and what cultural forms should be privileged in public life. The 
Frankfurt School articulated such concerns about cultural homogenization associated with the 
proliferation of “low culture” and the rise of mechanical reproduction that continue to be 
resonate today. Appadurai & Breckenridge (1988) propose the rubric of public culture as a way 
out of these debates and into more meaningful and nuanced analysis of culture in an era of 
globalization. In doing so they look at both “cosmopolitan cultural forms” and what specific 
societies bring to them, as well as how various forms shape each other as part of a public culture 
(p. 6). The key idea here is that expansion of the cultural domain to makes it a site of 
contestation among a diversity of interests and ideologies. While globalization and transnational 
influences in cultural policy might make Moroccan cinema more susceptible to the forces of 
capital, it also opens up global resources that allow for challenges to the cultural hegemony of 
the state, even as the state seeks to cement its role as the primary economic force in the country 
and support cinema for its own purposes. In many ways the new Moroccan cinema has made 
room for alternative imaginaries and logics that don’t strictly conform to commercial mandates. 
That said, the precarious nature of film as “passion projects” amidst the decline of the public 




The Logic of Co-production 
That Moroccan cinema has been able to secure the resources that it has (in the midst of a global 
recession and regional upheaval) and produced the types of films it has (locally popular, prized at 
international festivals) even with those limited resources, makes the formal and informal 
mechanisms by which the industry operates worthy of further examination. The relative success 
of cinema in a national context devoid of a comprehensive cultural politics has been the subject 
of much discussion in the press with articles such as Telquel’s “The miracle (or nearly) of 
Moroccan cinema” (Boukhari, 2006). 
 The extent to which the agendas of various parties intersect and overlap is perhaps best 
indicated by co-production, which is the defining logic of the new Moroccan cinema. Co-
production involves collaboration, generally between parties rooted in different national 
contexts, that allows the cost of production to be shared through a variety of means. At the Café 
du Film, Catherine Buresi, head of Euromed’s working group on funding, emphasized the 
importance of information and transparency for industry development and the lack of both in 
regard to co-productions. In the case of Morocco co-production mostly means projects bringing 
together Moroccan and European producers – of the 309 coproductions in the region between 
2006-2013, only 20 were South-South collaborations. France and then Germany are the most 
frequent partners for Moroccan filmmakers, yet according to Buresi “it is clear that the European 
market is not open to Moroccan films because for the moment Moroccan projects have very little 
presence [there].” Accessing markets/audiences abroad continues to be a struggle for Moroccan 
cinema, although as the CCM’s Laassadi pointed out, co-productions do much better on this 
front than strictly Moroccan productions.   
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 Taylor (1995) argues that “the tension inherent in the cultural industries is exacerbated by 
international co-productions” (p. 412) like those supported by Aid to World Cinemas. The idea 
of producing culture for capital gain becomes especially fraught when in order to support local 
production money is accepted from industries rooted elsewhere and the product has to conform 
to some extent with the norms of that industry. Co-productions are especially attractive for 
producers from small countries that lack the resources for cultural production and have difficulty 
competing with a deluge of foreign (usually American) cultural products, but according to Taylor 
(1995) that also means “Commercial co-productions involving peripheral countries (Canada, 
Israel, Mexico, Spain, Italy) tend to follow the same formulae as the centre (U.S.), whose market 
they seek to enter” (p. 411). This is allegation is premised on the idea that specificity doesn’t 
travel and that coproductions constitute a form of cultural homogenization whereby filmmakers 
are forced to conform to [or want to be a part of] a globally dominant Hollywood industry. Yet it 
is also important to consider that cosmopolitan cultural forms can and inevitably will be adapted 
according to context and if filmmakers of the new Moroccan cinema have to some extent 
adopted the universal model of Hollywood, they have often done so with the objective of 
positioning themselves as an alternative to Hollywood based on creative funding for small 
budgets and stories deeply rooted in local realities. The hybrid, translocal and deeply specific 
industry logics and texts of Moroccan filmmakers suggest that universality cannot be considered 
outside of material realities and that the way to the universal is through the specific. 
Additionally, it is important to consider that Moroccan cinema has generally not been seen as a 
commercially-profitable venture for investors and has for the most part been exempt from harsh 
commercial pressures to the extent that we see filmmakers making their living in television or 
commercials rather than in film. Additionally, because the Moroccan case is so closely tied to 
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France and its policy of cultural exceptionalism, commercial imperatives are mitigated somewhat 
by understandings of “la septième art” as a high cultural form.  
 Similar to Taylor (1995), Strover (1994) argues that transnational corporations (TNCs) do 
not represent particular national interests and that their very transnational nature constitutes a 
flattening of cultural specificity, especially as part of commercial media systems. In one way, 
Strover’s argument about national interests resonates with the Moroccan case because there are 
fierce debates about what constitutes “Moroccan cinema” and especially whether members of the 
diaspora or Moroccans living abroad (MREs) should be included in that category. But as 
previously discussed, for the most part Moroccan cinema has always been transnational and that 
informs understandings of Moroccan cinema such as that articulated by Tazi that Moroccan 
cinema is films made by Moroccans, especially those that engage with Moroccan society and its 
issues. On the other hand, Strover’s argument that TNCs and co-productions constitute a 
flattening of cultural specificity does not take into consideration the uneven nature of 
globalization and negotiation of stakeholders and interests involved in the production process. 
Yudice’s argument about the maquiladora model is particularly relevant here in that we see co-
production acting a mechanism for the extraction of cheap content based on local, auteur 
cinemas, especially those coming out of former colonies that can further linguistic, cultural and 
industry affiliations, but at the same time we also see other agendas at play than that of capital. 
Technological advances have led to greater cinematic quality, accessibility of subtitling, and 
alternative distribution mechanisms, all of which make local content [more] globally accessible 
than in the early days of Moroccan co-productions in the 1980s and 90s. So when a Moroccan 
producer like Marrakchi collaborates with a French multinational such as Pathé, the company 
gets the rights to distribute and air a largely-francophone production, the French government 
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caters to a minority audience and gets to count the film toward domestic production numbers, the 
Moroccan government gets a more liberal vision of society that paints it as tolerant and fit for 
investment, the production team gets work and Marrakchi gets funding, access to the European 
audiences, and freedom to represent controversial realities while replicating certain genre 
conventions. 
 Both Taylor (1995) and Strover (1994) contend that co-production constitutes a kind of 
flattening, or loss of cultural specificity, yet the new Moroccan cinema indicates co-production 
more closely resembles a process of hybridization [or perhaps glocalization] in which diverse 
interests are negotiated and aligned in any particular project. According to Baltruschat (2002) 
this convergence of interests in international coproductions “reflects the continuing integration of 
cultural and economic activities on a global scale” (p. 1). The increasing penetration of global 
capital and neoliberal ideologies born of post-1980s processes of economic liberalization more 
recently involve cultural industries as a result of media liberalization under Mohammed VI. As 
Morocco seeks to integrate more fully into the European economic community, filmmakers of 
the new Moroccan cinema have increasingly turned to Europe as an emergent space of funding, 
and France in particular as one of the most prolific co-producers in the world. The continuing 
cultural influence of France in Morocco is both taken for granted and a point of contention, the 
irony being that for all France’s cultural nationalism and defense against foreign cultural 
influence it does not hesitate to impose its culture on others. Shared (voluntary/involuntary) 
history and migration are key to what Baltruschat (2002) calls “natural coproductions” - although 
I find this terminology slightly problematic in that it masks the convergence of interests and 
power dynamics involved in the co-production process. Because of their roots in the movement 
of people and texts, Baltruschat (2002) contends that “Co-productions have the potential to 
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explore globalization processes such as the diversification and hybridization of cultures” (p. 5) 
while producing culturally specific programming for local markets, although she argues that the 
co-productions’ critical potential is limited by their commercial orientation. While the suggestion 
that co-productions create culturally specific programming for local markets while advancing 
some degree of content convergence through format transfers and genre conventions resonates 
with the new Moroccan cinema, the suggestion they lack critical edge deserves a more nuanced 
discussion about how critiques are strategically negotiated. The difficult balance between 
cultural and commercial aspirations in the new Moroccan cinema is indicated by the diverse 
mechanisms through which filmmakers assemble funding and production structures oriented 
toward co-production: television, cultural aid funds, diasporic capital and festivals. 
Television 
In addition to the CCM’s increases in aid funds in the form of advance on receipts, Moroccan 
television has played a key role in financing the cinema sector, fostering a certain co-evolution 
and creative ecosystem. Despite audiovisual liberalization state broadcaster SNRT and the more 
commercial 2M operate under a sort of de facto state monopoly in the absence of private 
investors (footnote about 2M initially being private and state holding majority stake from 1996, 
its connections to royal holdings, and emergence of Médi1). The 2005 and 2006 mandates for the 
two major channels require them to get 30 percent of their programming from external actors 
(Allali, 2007) and to co-produce a certain number of films each year (20 for SNRT, 10-15 for 
2M) (Boukhari, 2006; Hopewell, 2006), effectively upping their investment in local production 
companies and content. One of the architects of the new Moroccan television and its relationship 
to cinema is the joint CEO of SNRT and 2M, Fayçal Laraïchi, who was appointed to the position 
several months after Mohammed VI came to power and charged with revitalizing a domestic 
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broadcasting sector long subordinate to foreign offerings. He is since credited with emphasizing 
homegrown fiction, outsourcing production to independent producers and preserving the major 
channels’ audience share at 45-50 percent in the face of satellite competition (Dale, 2011). The 
partnership between TV and cinema is modeled on the French, British and Italian systems where 
“television has for a long time been the largest producer of cinema/films (check)” (Boukhari, 
2006). CCM head Saïl actually got his start in TV as programming director of TVM (predecessor 
of SNRT) and worked for France’s Canal + before returning to Morocco in 2000 as director of 
2M and then being appointed to the CCM in 2003. Like Laraïchi, Saïl is credited with positive 
change in Moroccan broadcasting, changes oriented toward local production and an emphasis on 
téléfilms that effectively made TV and cinema part of an interdependent media system and 
represents a significant restructuring of the audiovisual landscape (Dale, 2012). Unfortunately, 
post-Arab Spring television became a point of tension between the palace and Morocco’s new 
Islamic government, a situation that brought SNRT and 2M’s investment in cinema almost to a 
standstill over the last several years (Alami, 2013). 
 One major early example of this collaboration between cinema and television is Nabil 
Ayouch’s Film Industry - Made in Morocco project whereby his production company, 
Ali’N’Productions, signed a contract with SNRT/Al Oula with financial support from the 
Ministry of Communication to produce 30 genre films destined for the small screen. Although 
limited in scope (each film had a budget of $160,000 USD and 12-18 days for filming), the 
project represented a branching out of Moroccan cinema from its auteur tradition to more 
commercial offerings meant to “prime the pump for a true film industry modeled on Indian and 
Egyptian cinemas” (Hubinet, 2007). In the end Film Industry produced 42 films between 2006-
2010, jump-starting production and offering opportunities for new talent – among them Hicham 
 110 
Lasri, Talal Selhami and Ayouch’s brother, Hicham. According to Ayouch “This project allowed 
us to train 200 technicians in all domains, cinematographers, prop masters, choreographers and 
other trades where skills are scarce in Morocco” (Ziraoui, 2011). Only four films produced by 
Film Industry were released in theaters, but Ali’N’Prod was able to send 5 million MAD in 
initial profits to SNRT from “sponsorships, brand partnerships, video on demand services and 
DVD/VCD sales”, while also selling the rights to their catalog to four satellite packages (ibid.). 
When Marock appeared at Cannes in 2005 it was accompanied by discussion about Morocco’s 
representation at the festival being “the logical consequence of a particularly coherent 
complementary organization of film and television, and especially policy implementation of 
effective measures that other countries in the region have yet to take” (Tebib, 2005).  
Cultural aid funds 
The emergence of state broadcasters as co-producers implicated in a broader audiovisual 
landscape and the cinema industry in particular, only serves to highlight the extent to which a 
politics of co-production has been adopted as the organizing principle of the new Moroccan 
cinema. For feature films, however, it’s generally not TV, but European producers that are 
sought to forge North-South partnerships. This is because postwar European countries, 
particularly France, have long subsidized culture and more recently adopted an EU cultural 
politics emphasizing culture as a key axis for development and security. Euromed Audiovisuel is 
one manifestation of this politics in the form of a three-phase project, of which the third phase 
was an 11 million euro effort dedicated to the development of cinema sectors of South 
Mediterranean countries over four years (2011-2014), notably focusing on the encouragement of 
co-productions. According to Euromed’s Valerio Caruso, “The fundamental idea of [of Euromed 
Audiovisual] is the fact that the audiovisual is not only a cultural vector, but also an important 
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economic sector likely to create revenue and jobs” (Caruso, personal communication, 2014). 
Given Morocco’s relatively low per capita incomes and high unemployment, as well as its 
authoritarian government and the increasing influence of Islamism, European nations have many 
incentives for improving the situation in Morocco, through culture and otherwise. 
 One Moroccan filmmaker to have benefited from these funds is Leila Kilani, whose 
roundabout path to filmmaking started with diplomas in economics and history and passed 
through journalism and before arriving at documentary filmmaking. After her second 
documentary, the CCM officially barred documentaries from funding, as Kilani said “They 
closed the door. They said: ‘Documentary is not cinema’” (Quilty, 2009). Kilani’s next film was 
her first foray into fiction, and received CCM funding. With a 1 million euro budget, the 
Moroccan-French-German co-production Sur la planche reported no fewer than sixteen investors 
from seven countries in the Euromed Coproduction Census (Rosant, 2012). The largest 
percentage of funding (25 percent) came from the CCM, and apart from 4 percent and 1 percent 
coming from film initiatives in UAE and the U.S. respectively, the remainder was financed by 
European capital. Notably the film received a 130,000 euro grant from the French South Cinema 
Fund10 (12 percent of the total budget), a good example of the types of major film funds that 
have become central to not just the funding of the new Moroccan cinema, but their publicity and 
access to distribution mechanisms. South Cinema Fund was an initiative of the French 
government’s CNC to support filmmakers from the Global South making films in those regions, 
which was replaced in 2011 by Aid to World Cinema, a program that emphasizes co-production 
as a way to foster cultural diversity. France is by far the largest source of aid funds for Moroccan 
filmmakers and Aid to World Cinemas is co-managed by the French National Cinema Center 
                                                            
10 Transl: Fonds sud cinéma 
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(CNC) and the Institut français, the cultural diplomacy arm of the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Development. CNC describes the program as “aid given to a production 
company in France as part of a co-production with a foreign production company” and requires 
that a minimum of 50 percent of the aid given is spent in France and a minimum of 25 percent in 
the country of the other production company (Aide aux cinémas du monde, 2015). Thus the 
funds benefit both the French audiovisual sector and, to a lesser extent, industry development in 
other countries. Even with aid from the South Cinema Fund, Kilani’s precarious hodgepodge of 
funding for Sur la planche meant that at one point she was forced to stop filming due to food 
poisoning and lack of funds, with expensive scenes still to come, but according to Kilani “during 
these times you just have to say that there are Chinese people making great films in their 
kitchens!” (Péron, 2012). That great films can be made with few resources is a refrain repeated 
frequently by Moroccan filmmakers.  
Private investors and diasporic capital 
By far the smallest category of support for Moroccan cinema is that of private investors, which 
for the most part means diasporic capital. Investors have been so few that filmmaker Noureddine 
Lakhmari’s collaboration with tech entrepreneur Redouane Bayed on Timlif Productions was 
particularly noteworthy for the Moroccan press. “Who says that culture and business don’t go 
together?” asked Telquel about Timlif, while an article from Jeune Afrique affirms “Good news: 
in Morocco culture has become profitable” (Bennani, 2011; Slimani, 2010). Timlif’s first feature 
film was Lakhmari’s Zero, a follow-up to his 2008 blockbuster Casanegra. Lakhmari told 
Variety “This is the first time there’s major private sector investment in Moroccan cinema, 
which has enabled us to focus on scripts” (Dale, 2010). What seems particularly novel about 
Timlif is that contrary to most injections of funds received by Moroccan cinema, this non-
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governmental variety has a different type of ideology attached. According to Bayed “There is no 
logic of patronage or of cultural activism in this project…This is a great economic project around 
cinema, which to develop, needs this industrial dimension” (Bennani, 2011). Given that capitalist 
economics is dependent on the existence of a market, and given the small size of Morocco’s 
domestic market plus declining number of theaters, it is no surprise that private investments are 
generally limited to a specific subset of Moroccan filmmakers operating and imagining their 
publics transnationally. Even if Moroccan filmmakers want their films to do well in Morocco, 
there is a general sense that Moroccan publics alone are not enough.  
 In fact, the creation of Timlif Productions is the result of collaborations between 
Lakhmari and another private investor, Ali Kettani. Kettani made his fortune as a trader for 
Société Générale in France and then in New York before returning to Morocco, starting a 
consulting firm and purchasing Laraïchi’s shares in Sigma Production. That all of these players 
are so interconnected demonstrates just how small the world of audiovisual production is in 
Morocco (and how much smaller still the realm of private investing) and more broadly the extent 
of diaspora return upon Mohammed VI’s rise to power, including Saïl, Kettani, Ayouch, 
Lakhmari, etc. Kettani worked with Lakhmari on his first téléfilm (El Kadia, for 2M) and went 
on to invest 13 MDH in Casanegra (Le trader devenu producteur de cinema, 2009). Kettani was 
also able to bring in new investors by entering into partnership with Atcom in 2008, a division of 
the holding company owned by Morocco’s wealthiest businessman, Othman Benjelloun, which 
bought 51 percent of Sigma. According to Kettani “This alliance is timely because we intend to 
finalize many projects including an animated film for 30 million euros. We are in a very capital 
intensive industry…True, for Casa Negra, we had a co-producer and the participation of the 
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Moroccan Cinematographic Centre (CCM) and 2M, but the funds to be mobilized for production 
can be phenomenal” (ibid.). 
Film festivals 
 The rapid decline of theaters in particular is frequently named as the number one challenge 
facing Moroccan cinema, a dynamic that is seemingly due to a perfect storm of technological 
change (more access to internet, ease of piracy, competition from satellite), poor business 
practices and shifting urban geographies associated with leisure. One avenue that provides a 
platform for films and increases public engagement with cinema amid closing theaters is the film 
festival, which is part of a broader festival culture that has erupted in Morocco under M6. In 
2008, 36 film festivals took place around Morocco, and the CCM devoted 23 million MAD of its 
budget to funding these festivals (Midech, 2008); by 2014 there were 54 festivals and the CCM 
had formed a commission devoted entirely to supporting festivals to the tune of 27 MDH (CCM, 
2014). According to the CCM “These events allow the public to view films that might not 
necessarily appear in theaters, they give media an opportunity to talk about them, and create a 
meeting between cinema professionals” (Tagemouti, 2010, p. 114). Although often receiving at 
least some support from the CCM, Moroccan film festivals are put on by a variety of 
municipalities, civil society associations and educational institutions. In 2005 Zagora, a rural 
town in southeast Morocco, decided to organize its own Trans Saharan Film Festival in order to 
benefit from the industry that made its neighbor Ouarzazate famous. “With this festival, we want 
to give a boost to tourism. Cinema is becoming a separate industry, a mechanism for the cultural, 
social and economic development of a city. Why should we not also profit from it?” asked the 
director of the festival, who is also the head of the provincial tourism council (Midech, 2006). 
Film festivals also serve to draw attention to the lack of theaters in towns like Zagora, where the 
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screenings take place outside, and offer forums for the public to engage with cinema and with the 
issues and themes they highlight, such as “Moroccan cinema, memory and citizenship” in the 
case of Zagora in 2006 – a theme chosen to coincide with the release of the government IER 
report on, among other things, the penal colonies Zagora was known for during the Years of 
Lead (Midech, 2006). In any case, film festivals are one part of “what industry professionals 
refer to as ‘an ecosystem’ favorable to cinema” (Midech, 2008) and are indicative of industry 
shifts accompanying the new Moroccan cinema as it attempts to find sustainable methods of 
distribution and exhibition.  
 Aside from domestic festivals, the international circuit also has a role to play. One 
characteristic of the new Moroccan cinema is its increasing visibility transnationally, and all the 
films discussed here made extensive rounds on the film festival circuit. Nabil Ayouch is 
probably the most internationally well-known filmmaker of the new Moroccan cinema, due in 
large part to the success of his films at major cinema events around the world. International 
festivals in particular have emerged as key sites for workshops, publicity and especially 
networking that are central to the new Moroccan cinema’s (and many cinemas of the Global 
South) ambitions to access global markets. In 2006 Ayouch was chosen to participate in the 
Rome Film Festival’s New Cinema Network’s co-production meeting involving “40 invited 
international producers, buyers, sellers and funders and will be designed so that to encourage the 
24 selected filmmakers' work and to facilitate the launching, the budgeting and the marketing of 
their projects,” in addition being one of three African filmmakers selected to receive a $35,000 
USD award from the Unidea-Unicredit Foundation (Trois films africains, 2006). As film 
festivals seek ways capitalize on their gatherings to foster creative community and new work, 
structured networking, knowledge-transfer and funding opportunities seem to be a growing 
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phenomenon. According to co-curator of the Rome Film Festival, Giorgio Gosetti “…a project 
such as New Cinema Network is not only useful but a necessary part of a film festival in the 
modern era” (New Cinema Network, 2007). Indeed the Rome event adds to a long list of such 
events already in existence at festivals such as Cannes, Rotterdam, Berlin, Hong Kong, Toronto, 
etc. Of course film festivals also offer publicity and awards, plus an opportunity for audiences 
that might not normally see a particular film. That was the case for Ayouch when his Horses of 
God played at Marrakech, where American filmmaker Jonathan Demme became a fan and ended 
up presenting the film in America, which the Hollywood Reporter pointed out is a rather new 
phenomenon whereby known members of the film community effectively endorse a 
documentary or foreign language film from a filmmaker with little name recognition in the 
American market (Dale, 2015; Feinberg, 2013). Moroccan cinema is in a moment of emergence 
on the international market, but it lacks both distributors and marketing clout so international 
film festivals have become increasingly important venues for finding co-production partners and 
showcasing current projects, while many filmmakers are looking at video-on-demand (VOD) 
services as the future of film distribution. 
From industry logics to politics 
For all intensive purposes Moroccan filmmaking has pretty much always passed by France over 
the course of its 50+ year history, but the logic of co-production instituted as policy with 
accompanying industry structures built around it that attempt to match capital and creativity 
while managing risk, this is relatively new. The scope and scale of these efforts by both 
institutions and private entities has grown enormously in recent years, as indicated by the fact 
that most co-production markets began in the first decade of the 21st century. In 2003, prior to 
Saïl’s arrival at the CCM, Screen International reported “With an historical lack of state support, 
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and a disinterested local financial community, Moroccan producers are increasingly looking to 
attract international co-production partners - particularly from France” (Forde, 2003). Attempts 
to attract capital and co-production partners are just one manifestation of the increasingly 
transnational nature of film production and the precarious state of independent cinema. For 
Moroccan filmmakers, however, this logic of co-production builds on already existing dynamics, 
including trajectories of creative migration and Paris’ status as a francophone media capital, 
while also affording a greater degree of autonomy to push boundaries through cinema. It is also 
part of an emerging alternative business model based on finding a balance between auteur and 
popular cinemas as technology and VOD platforms allow audiences around the world to seek out 
more varied content. According to Variety “While Hollywood centers its business model around 
blockbusters at the expense of mid-budget adult-skewing films, Europe’s biggest movie 
companies have been taking up the slack, with hefty rewards” (Keslassy, 2012). The production 
company Stone Angels, which took on Ayouch’s Horses of God, as one of its first projects, was 
founded on and shows Moroccan cinema’s compatibility with, this growing sector. However, 
critical voices have raised concerns about the types of films that work in this new model and 
their implications for representation of Moroccans and Islam at a particularly difficult 
geopolitical moment. Nadir Bouhmouch, a young San Diego-trained Moroccan filmmaker 
associated with the Guerrilla Cinema collective posted on Facebook “10 steps to success for 
filmmakers from the Muslim world: 1. Get money from France 2. Make a film about terrorism 3. 
Get money from France 4. Make a film about oppressed Muslim women 5. Get money from 
France 6. Make a film about terrorism 7. Get money from France 8. Make a film about oppressed 
Muslim women 9. Get money from France 10. Make a film about terrorism” (Bouhmouch, 
2014). Bouhmouch’s insinuation (facetious or not) serves as a reminder that this set of co-
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production mechanisms is not just an alternate set of funding structures sitting alongside the 
state, but also a set of ideological projects, sometimes competing, sometimes in sync, but always 
with implications for the types of films that constitute the new Moroccan cinema.  
Back at the Café du Film, Ananda Scepka, head of the Open Doors Co-production Lab 
operated in conjunction with the Locarno International Film Festival in Switzerland, presented 
the program as an opportunity for networking and funding dedicated to a different region each 
year, with 2015 focused on countries of the Maghreb. According to Scepka the co-production lab 
and associated funds are key to supporting independent filmmaking because, “Films are 
nowadays rarely funded by one sole source of financing, as funds diminish globally, at least for 
independent films. Co-production remains the most viable way of financing films, and it raises 
the potential for distribution of the film once finished in the various countries implicated in the 
coproduction” (Scepka, personal communication, 2014). Open Doors participants are eligible to 
have their projects funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation’s (SDC)11 
Visions Sud Est, open to filmmakers from Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
Alice Thomann, head of the SDC’s Culture and Development team, explained via email that 
culture is a development priority for the Swiss government because the  
“SDC recognizes the crucial role that arts and culture play in any society namely for 
social participation, inclusion and cohesion, as well as for nurturing creativity and 
innovation. It observes the particular driving force that the cultural sector and artists, as 
part of civil society, can represent to advance objectives and processes such as 
democratization, good governance and the respect for human rights” (Thomann, personal 
communication, 2014).  
                                                            
11 The SDC is a Swiss fund for production aid that is part of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, or FDFA. 
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In many ways, the small group of filmmakers who constitute the new Moroccan cinema sees 
themselves and their films as advancing these objectives. As cultural elites and part of a 
progressive counterpublic, filmmakers like Ayouch, Marrakchi, Lakhmari, Kilani and Nejjar are 
shifting industry logics in accordance with the increasing penetration of capital while trying to 
make use of that capital in advancing their own interests and goals. To the extent that they have 
negotiated successfully among an increasing array of stakeholders and interests involved in local 
production and global market imperatives they have been able to establish an alternative industry 





















Hybrid Genres, Discursive Interventions and Film Cultures of the  
New Moroccan Cinema 
Laïla Marrakchi’s 2013 feature Rock the Casbah is a comedic family drama about an industrial 
magnate who dies suddenly, leaving behind simmering tensions that boil over when his family 
reunites for the traditional 3-day Moroccan gnaza (funeral) at their villa in Tangiers. One of the 
most telling scenes from the film is also the most banal, when the three sisters make a 
supermarket run on the second day of the funeral. As they meander the aisles their conversation 
jumps from the injustice of patriarchal inheritance laws to pedophilia to sexual assault to sexual 
pleasure to their dead sister’s pregnancy by the maid’s son to alcohol and drugs to one sister’s 
desire to sleep with her plastic surgeon before it’s finally shut down by a cashier scolding that 
“this is a supermarket, not the hammam!” Whether the sisters have always talked this way or 
their father’s death has caused the women to shed a sort of veil of propriety, their irreverent and 
often profane banter accompanied by repeated admonishments throughout the film that these are 
not things we talk about, paints a picture of a society at odds with itself.  
“I like subversion, shocking, evolving,” said Marrakchi in an interview from Paris, 
describing the controversy over her first film Marock as “one of the best experiences of my life” 
(Marrakchi, personal communication, 2016). In many ways it seems as if Marock constituted a 
turning point in terms of what was possible in and for Moroccan cinema; the film set records at 
the domestic box office, made an appearance at Cannes, was debated in parliament and received 
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a stamp of approval from the censorship board despite its controversial nature. Like Marock, 
Rock the Casbah is a deeply personal film and includes provocative scenes such as the one 
previously described. For Marrakchi these constitute a “prise de parole” against a system where 
the forbidden is lived clandestinely, in which a father’s affair with the maid could produce an 
illegitimate son who later becomes the lover of his legitimate daughter who becomes pregnant 
with an incestuous child, is sent away to Europe and commits suicide when she discovers the 
truth, all as a result of patriarchal impunity and silence for the sake of propriety. Marrakchi’s 
major frustration with the discourse around Moroccan cinema is the expectation that it should 
always shine a positive light on the country. From her perspective there is “a certain form of 
hypocrisy to not say everything, to not show everything, as if we are as artists the minister of 
tourism…we are not there for that. Artists are there for dreaming, for showing different things, 
for showing all the different faces of Moroccan society” (Marrakchi, personal communication, 
2016). In Marrakchi’s first two films this has involved putting the realities of class divisions and 
cultural complexities on full display. 
 The new Moroccan cinema1 with which Marrakchi is associated has been hotly debated 
and evoked many critiques from its detractors: that neither the films nor the filmmakers are 
Moroccan, that Zionists have funded the films to denigrate Morocco and Islam, and that the 
taboo behaviors represented are only Western imports being impressed upon a society ultimately 
interested in morality. Yet among supporters they are lauded as victories for freedom of speech, 
celebrations of Morocco in all its diversity, and markers of newfound openness to political and 
                                                            
1 “New Moroccan cinema” is a phrase used by the popular and trade press to refer to a new wave in Moroccan 
cinema that has emerged during the reign of Mohammed VI. It is the product of a generation of filmmakers who are 
largely part of a bi-national elite and came of age in a post-Years of Lead Morocco in the process of economic and 
political opening. Their films are generally characterized by new funding mechanisms, improved technical quality 
and taking on taboo topics, often in the local language.   
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social critique. What is interesting is not just the shifting industry logics outlined in the previous 
chapter, but also the fact that they seem to have produced a certain genre of text. These films 
tend to be described as “docu-fiction” or a hybrid genre between documentary and fiction that 
has many characteristics similar to neo-realist cinema, they try to tell universal stories through a 
local lens and above all they engage with taboo topics and comment on controversial social 
issues. As a result these films have incited debate not just among the arts community, but also 
among publics and in politics. One of the key considerations of this genre is that it is often 
oriented toward transnational discourses about issues such as terrorism, migration and inequality, 
so that in the wake of the November 2015 Paris bombings we see Nabil Ayouch making public 
declarations about his dedication to exploring the roots of terrorism through film (Dale, 2015a). 
In offering an alternative to Western media accounts and portrayals, the new Moroccan cinema 
often takes on the status quo both locally and transnationally, shifting the scale of not just its 
industrial logics, but also its social interventions. 
Hybrid genres and ideological interventions 
This chapter analyzes the new Moroccan cinema as discourse, focusing on the ideological 
interventions made possible by the shifting industry logics discussed in the previous chapter. 
These industry logics have created the conditions of possibility for certain types of critical 
interventions through the production of hybrid texts, but also constrained others, as certain types 
of capital come with particular types of expectations. Many filmmakers of the NMC depend on 
French funding and according to Moroccan filmmaker Farida Benlyazid “French producers tend 
to favor socially or politically engaged Moroccan films; they’re not looking to back different 
kinds of movies from Morocco, and that’s becoming a drawback for some directors” (Keslassy, 
2013). As previously mentioned, the paradox is that at exactly the point that Moroccan cinema 
 123 
starts imagining new markets and publics it becomes truly popular with Moroccan publics, 
consistently topping the domestic box office and generating local alternatives to global media 
discourses while using the universal model of Hollywood as a model. In the process, filmmakers 
moving between translocal priorities and global media imperatives become important mediating 
forces among multiple modernities while articulating claims across multiple scales.  
 This chapter analyzes the role of cultural elites in media production, the ideological 
interventions of texts as they circulate and a specific film culture’s engagements in the arena of 
public culture. The global circulation of texts and Hollywood films in particular is perhaps the 
quintessential cosmopolitan cultural form as outlined by Appadurai & Breckenridge (1988) – 
imbued with local specificities and in competition with other cultural forms. For the most part 
filmmakers of the new Moroccan cinema are rooted in the diaspora, moving through overlapping 
francophone and arabophone cultural-linguistic spaces of a the Mediterranean region while also 
imagining publics transnationally. The irony is that as texts and elites move increasingly fluidly 
across borders, people are often subject to increasing frictions and restrictions associated with the 
militarization of the Mediterranean and “fortress Europe.” Thus we see texts butting up against 
disjunctures and uneven experiences of globalization in often unpredictable ways. This is 
especially the case for Moroccan filmmakers, for whom the numeric limitations of the Moroccan 
market as a small, geographically and cultural dispersed nation with high illiteracy rates, fewer 
and fewer theaters and poor buying power mean that in order to achieve a certain degree of 
independence from state capital, the imagining of transnational publics becomes imperative. 
However, the cultural geographies associated with these imaginings are especially fraught for a 
small nation whose audiovisual industries have a distinct colonial past, and to some extent, 
present. That said, the process of film production in a small nation like Morocco is perhaps a 
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much more representative experience of cultural production in a global era than anomalous 
industries like Hollywood or Bollywood. As there are fewer and fewer spaces available outside 
the logics of neoliberal capital, it becomes important to consider how cultural producers like 
filmmakers of the NMC creatively appropriate or work within capital in pursuit of personal and 
professional goals. In the process we see the intersection of an authoritarian neoliberal state and a 
specific counterculture committed to individual artistic liberty and open engagement with the 
world that is supported to the extent that its goals intersect with state priorities, particularly in 
challenging Islamists and social conservatives. 
 While I do use two films – Laïla Marrakchi’s Rock the Casbah and Nabil Ayouch’s 
Horses of God - as empirical entry points and examples of the ideological interventions being 
discussed in this chapter, my analytical intention is to focus less on the texts themselves than the 
ways these texts get taken up in discourse, their relation to publics and interventions in public 
culture. Here I am looking at a specific segment of Moroccan cinema [NMC] as another form of 
independent media that has served as a site of contestation over societal projects and the nature 
of Moroccan modernity under Mohammed VI. With this in mind I focus on how the new 
Moroccan cinema operates discursively at the nexus of international political agendas, state 
authority, cultural elites/intellectuals and public culture, as well as its relationship to everyday 
life and shifting urban geographies associated with leisure. In order to do this, I ask not “who is 
going” in the sociological sense, but how are films and publics being imagined and mobilized by 
filmmakers, and in what ways are these imaginations constrained? Additionally, how do 
filmmakers of the NMC position themselves and their films ideologically in terms of 
interventions in public culture? Through these questions I attempt to link the material realities of 
cultural production and their discursive construction as part of public culture.  
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 I contend that NMC constitutes a new discursive space within a broader Moroccan 
cinema and a specific film culture associated with a small group of filmmakers that aims to open 
up debates about Moroccan modernity through cinema. The subject positions of these 
filmmakers between states have increased their autonomy, opening up possibilities for social 
critique and commentary on issues previously off limits that are closely related to the 
transnational ethos of this cinema. In the process cinema has become a transnational space for a 
sort of mediated activism, driven in large measure by filmmakers acting as public intellectuals 
and seeking to challenge Morocco’s traditionally state-centric media discourses as well as the 
rise of political Islam, while also trying to integrate social and political norms with those of 
global civil society in a way that is inclusive of, yet not specific to, Morocco. The profound 
ambivalence displayed by the NMC is one way in which it challenges hegemonic discourses 
about modernity coming from both Morocco and the West. Debates over the new Moroccan 
cinema are positioned squarely at the center of popular culture and politics in Morocco. In 
advocating for an outward-looking understanding of culture that is engaged with the world and 
rooted in the precepts of liberalism, these filmmakers envision cinema as a space of engagement, 
dialogue and debate that is constructed in opposition to Islamist and broader populist tendencies 
toward cultural enclosure and isolationism from the corrupting influences of external (Western) 
cultural norms and capital. It is unclear whether pushing the boundaries of socially acceptable 
storytelling might lead to more progressive politics or just be seen as patronizing, however, it is 
indicative of tensions between local public culture and global media imperatives becoming one 
of the structuring dynamics of cultural production in small nations. As global products 
increasingly want to be seen as local, so the profound locality of speaking “from” somewhere in 
Moroccan cinema comes to be seen as an asset transnationally.  
 126 
 I begin this chapter by thinking about the historical relationship between global politics 
and textual publics, and the role of elite cultural producers in relation to publics. I then conduct 
close readings of industry-created paratexts like film covers and trailers not because marketing 
materials are so heavily invested in, as Gray (2010) points out is the case with Hollywood 
blockbusters, but because in Moroccan cinema where marketing budgets are often small, covers 
and trailers constitute some of the few opportunities for filmmakers to frame their films for 
publics [through processes of selection and editing], cuing them on “what to watch, what not to 
watch, and how to watch” (Gray, 2010, p. 3), as well as giving some sense of how filmmakers 
see their own films fitting into larger discourses. In many ways paratexts are often more 
mainstream and widely accessible than the films they represent, and occupy public space in ways 
a 2-hour feature film cannot. Thus we can think of paratexts as “ as generative of meanings and 
engagement, as are the films and television shows that they orbit and establish” (p. 22), which is 
reinforced in the Moroccan context by refrains about people critiquing films without actually 
having seen them. In choosing Rock the Casbah and Horses of God as the focal points for this 
chapter, I opted for filmmakers who have achieved a certain level of success with local and 
trasnational publics, as well as on the festival circuit. Marrakchi and Ayouch are among the 
Moroccan filmmakers most embedded in transnational circuits of capital and capable of securing 
co-production partners. They are also filmmakers who have been both held up as examples for 
Moroccan cinema and denied funding from state agencies at various points in their careers. After 
the close readings, I move on to the discourse surrounding the NMC, which I analyze through 
Moroccan, foreign and trade press publications surrounding NMC as a phenomenon as well as 
Rock the Casbah and Horses of God specifically.  
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Global politics and textual publics 
Cinema in Morocco has long been embroiled in geopolitical conflicts over spheres of influence 
and ideological affiliations. As Martin (2011) points out, cinema in all three countries of the 
Maghreb originated as a political battleground (p. 4). While most films made in Morocco during 
the colonial era were foreign productions for foreigners, the French did try to establish Maghrebi 
cinema in the years before independence to counteract the influence of Egyptian cinema and its 
pan-Arab ethos (Benali, 1998). From the 1940s-1960s, Egyptian film dominated Moroccan 
cinemas and as one study of Casablanca stated: 
“Cinema for the majority of urban spectators is Egyptian film. Its success is based on several 
factors. There is, first of all, the prestige of the Orient, which, under the Protectorate, had a 
political character: applauding its products, this was an act of opposition” (Adam, 1968, p. 
519).  
Yet a diplomatic rupture between Morocco and Egypt over Egypt’s support for Algeria in the 
1963 Guerre des Sables2 reduced the relationship of Moroccan publics with Egyptian cinema. 
Jaïdi (1992) recounts how “in October 1963, police went to movie theaters to notify owners 
about a provisional suspension of Egyptian films” (p. 58). Indian cinema (films hindous or films 
indo-pakistanais), for which the screening rights were relatively cheap, and karate films from 
China and America became increasingly popular, while European films, particularly those from 
France, continued to be widely available. Eventually Egyptian dramas, which were considered a 
more feminized cultural form, became the property of television with the rise of satellite and 
(limited) liberalization of the TV market in Morocco. This conformed to gendered norms of 
cultural consumption as Egyptian films came to be preferred by women, who were widely 
                                                            
2 La Guerre des Sables, or the War of the Sands, was a 1963 border conflict between Morocco and Algeria. A 
ceasefire was negotiated after a year, but the border between the two countries remains closed.  
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discouraged from going to the cinema in the first place and more likely to be solely Arabic 
speakers, while Indian and Chinese films reinforced cinemas as largely homosocial masculine 
spaces. Increasingly, the growth in availability of American cinema reflected the rise of 
Hollywood blockbusters, but also Moroccan political alliances during the Cold War era. I 
consider these texts in studying Moroccan cinema because in an era of meager Moroccan 
production where even those Moroccan films that were produced reached few publics, these 
were the texts that populated the lives of Moroccan cinema publics.  
 The master narrative of Moroccan nationalism post-independence came ready-made with 
the monarchy solidly at its center. Thus the monarchy had a vested interest in discouraging 
oppositional culture such as the highly politicized postcolonial literary scene detailed in 
Khatibi’s (1968) Le Roman maghrebin. The leftist intellectual current of the 1960s and 70s that 
produced such publications as Souffles and Lamalif was considered subversive and associated 
with the banning of philosophy at universities and discouragement of literary culture more 
broadly during the Years of Lead.3 Interestingly, former CCM head Saïl began his career as a 
philosophy professor in Tangier, where he taught his successor Sarim Fassi Fihri. He has also 
written novels that have been turned into films, so to some extent literary and cinematic 
producers are an intertwined group of cultural elites, but at the level of their publics there are 
stark differences.  
 The accessibility of print culture in Morocco has been hampered by lack of investment in 
education, persistently high illiteracy rates, the cost of printing and books, and the linguistic and 
social stratification associated with split publics, among other factors. Theoretically, cinema 
                                                            
3 The Years of Lead refers to a period between 1965-1990 when an increasingly totalitarian Hassan II used violence 
against dissidents, particularly the left. The period was characterized by disappearances, torture, secret prisons and 
arbitrary judicial proceedings, leading to widespread paranoia and distrust of authorities. 
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being an audiovisual medium means that a major barrier to engagement (literacy) has been 
eliminated and that we are automatically talking about more expansive publics than could ever 
be imagined by any Moroccan publication. According to Marrakchi, the popularity of cinema 
contributes to its controversial nature: “…cinema is complicated because in literature one sees 
Abdellah Taïa, who is gay, write incredible books about homosexuality, etcetera. The 
relationship with the image is much more difficult, this is to say books, those are ok because very 
few people read, but images, those unsettle people. The cinema remains something very popular” 
(Marrakchi, personal communication, 2016). This popularity, however, is constrained by 
location and resources. Those in rural Morocco relied primarily on cinema caravans organized by 
the state, while urban publics had access to a greater variety of commercial offerings (Carter, 
2009, p. 79). Jaïdi’s (1992) study of cinema-going in Casablanca, identified average spectators as 
“young male students from diverse socio-cultural backgrounds” (p. 5). Even if the number of 
cinemas has declined dramatically, technological change means that different, often cheaper, 
ways of watching are on the rise, among them pirated DVDs, streaming/downloading and VOD 
services. Ultimately the intersections of these changes with economic liberalization and a rising 
middle class, increasing urbanization and the growth of leisure mean that cinema has taken on a 
new salience and a particularly privileged (if controversial) place in public life. 
The public sphere and public intellectuals 
In her study of early American silent film, Hansen (1991) argues that cinema itself constitutes a 
public sphere and is responsible for shifting the boundaries of private and public, particularly 
“the standards by which certain realms of experience could be articulated in public while others 
remained private” (p. 2-3). Part of the novelty of the new Moroccan cinema is its representations 
of the everyday life experiences of urban modernity, and the taking up of ways of being and 
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living that had largely belonged to the pervasive discourse of the non-dit, or the unsaid, basically 
that which is unacceptable for articulation but tolerated in certain social circles. In increasingly 
transnational media landscapes the possibility of cinema as public sphere allowing for this type 
of alternative organization of experience begs the question: “Alternative for whom and at which 
historical juncture, in relation to which configurations of experience?” (Hansen, 1991, p. 91). In 
the case of Morocco, the new Moroccan cinema is one piece of an emergent independent media 
that makes public culture a platform for the circulation of new modes of publicness and specific 
values by a progressive counterpublic. This could perhaps be thought of as a liberal left 
attempting to bring private conversations into new public discursive spaces and capitalize on the 
possibility of a secular counterculture, particularly urban youth, becoming part of a 
counterpublic. In many ways this is the product of a historical juncture at which widespread 
disillusionment with the left based on global tolerance for authoritarianism and infringement on 
individual rights and liberties born out of the war on terror, and domestically disenfranchised by 
the major competing forces of Islamism and monarchical authoritarianism. By asserting claims 
in public and provocative ways through, and in conjunction with, public culture, filmmakers of 
the new Moroccan cinema produce new discursive possibilities at the intersection of popular 
culture and public life.  
 Saying cinema is more accessible or provides opportunities for the alternative 
organization of experience is not to suggest that the discourses emanating from the new 
Moroccan cinema are at all egalitarian. “As Geoff Ely has suggested, “it makes more sense to see 
the public sphere plurally, as an arena of contested meanings, where different and opposing 
publics manoeuvred for space, and from which certain ‘publics’ might be excluded altogether” 
(Dass, 2016, p. 15). The discourse emanating from the new Moroccan cinema is concerned with 
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challenging essentialist and Orientalist depictions of Arab and Muslim societies transnationally 
and conservative Islamist culture locally. Its success has been in striking a balance between art 
house cinema and truly popular cinema, while its irony has been that in aspiring to address 
international publics it has raised its status and seen unprecedented appeal to a growing middle 
class of urban Moroccans for whom cinema and cinema-going are accessible and with whom 
more modernist visions of everyday life resonate. In Outside the Lettered City, Dass (2016) 
argues that cinema transformed Indian public culture in the colonial era by creating new mass 
publics that challenged the status of an elite and exclusive literary culture as arbiter of taste. 
Instead of approaching cinema as “an alternative, oppositional, and purely subaltern public 
sphere,” Dass conceptualizes Indian cinema as “a contact zone between some of the elite spaces 
of the lettered city and the realm of the popular” (p. 8-9). In the Moroccan case cinema can 
similarly be seen as a point where cosmopolitan cultural forms shaped by local specificities come 
into contact with split publics and diverse tastes shaped by characteristics such as class, gender 
and ethnic identity.  
 Dass’s conception of cinema as a “contact zone” is reminiscent of Appadurai & 
Breckenridge’s (1988) formulation of public culture, conceived as an arena where various 
cultural forms encounter and contest each other. Thus we can see NMC as a new space within 
broader Moroccan cinema whereby a specific film culture emerges in conjunction with a small 
group of filmmakers. Pinney (2001) argues that “public culture occupies a new social space, one 
partially created by specific forms of media” (p. 5) and fundamentally characteristic of 
modernity. Significantly, the new Moroccan cinema and its film culture enters in the arena of 
public culture and circulates through leaked videos online, to blogs and social media, across 
newspapers and news magazines, to talk radio and in theaters and cafes, encountering other 
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cultural forms and domains and structuring interactions across media platforms as it moves. For 
Srinivas (2000) the Indian cinema hall provided for a sort of social proximity, but in the 
Moroccan case NMC is more about discursive proximity to a certain set of social realities and 
what that means for a highly stratified Moroccan society. While many people do not have access 
to the actual films, they do increasingly have access to media coverage and promotional 
materials, leading filmmakers to frequently voice frustrations about critiques of their films 
coming from those who haven’t actually seen them. For films often at odds with religious 
discourse about societal values and morality, their more reflexive forms of critique and globally 
engaged questioning of society represent a different type of film culture than educational or 
escapist films. If we think of public culture surrounding cinema as multiple and contested, then 
we begin to see how NMC positions itself between popular comedies (i.e. Said Naciri or les 
frères Noury) and more experimental or art cinema (i.e. Bensaïdi or Lasri). At the same time it 
adopts the universal model of Hollywood with the goal of doing it differently, especially in 
regard to representations of Muslims and the MENA region. These cultural forms evolve in 
conversation with each other, and in the struggle to assert systems of value, NMC operates 
within an ideological framework that displays a profound ambivalence toward modernity – 
particularly regarding the role of the state, religion and the workings of capital. The film culture 
surrounding NMC provides “cultural strategies and idioms which necessarily imply the 
apportionment of power” (Pinney, 2001, p. 18), and in doing so provides space for articulating 
alternative visions of modernity in conjunction with new understandings of publics and modes of 
publicness.  
 Filmmakers of the NMC are by and large part of a cosmopolitan class of cultural 
producers their commitment to exploring certain controversial realities associated with urban 
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modernity have often put them in tension with both conservatives and a rural or semirural society 
divorced from these realities. In India Tamil elites “privileged realism as the governing principle 
of good cinema” in order to break with traditions of popular drama/theater and separate 
themselves from lower class public (Pandian, 2014, p. 7). If filmmakers of the NMC, like Tamil 
elites, prefer “contemporary themes with realist orientations” (ibid.), that preference has 
particular historical roots. In Moroccan cinema there is a long history of Moroccan publics 
eschewing Moroccan films in favor of foreign ones, often related to a lack of realism. In the first 
several decades of post-independence filmmaking, Moroccan films were frequently disparaged 
for their poor technical quality and “excessive intellectualism (Carter, 2009, p. 95). Additionally, 
there were just not that many of them. In the 1980s, at a time when there were about 250 cinemas 
in the country, no Moroccan film sold more than 50,000 tickets while some foreign films sold 
800,000 (Carter, 2009, p. 213).4 By way of comparison, Marrakchi’s Marock sold 136,889 
tickets in 2006, Casanegra 214,473 in 2009, and Horses of God 93,718 in 2013, by which time 
the number of Moroccan cinemas had declined to 31 (CCM). So while the realism of NMC does 
set it apart from popular comedies in some ways, it does not necessarily separate it from working 
and middle class publics, especially those of urban youth. Realism also takes on added value in a 
society where audiovisual media have a long history of blatantly denying many factual realities. 
These denials extend to the cinema, as Carter (2009) recounts  
“[Mostapha] Derkaoui’s first feature film Events without Meaning (1974/1975) was 
never given a permit for exhibition supposedly because Derkaoui had told one official, in 
passing, that it dealt with unemployment. The official replied that unemployment was not 
                                                            
4 Films during this period were rarely distributed at more than a few theaters, as only a few copies could be made. 
For more specifics about distribution processes, see Dwyer, 2004.  
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a problem in Morocco, and for an unspecified reason the film was denied the film 
exhibition license for more than fifteen years (p. 97).  
Filmmakers of the NMC often describe a sense of loyalty to a story, as Marrakchi did in 
discussing Marock, saying “I wanted first of all to tell a story, knowing well that there were 
sensitive subjects” (Gauch & Lindsey, 2006). The emphasis of storytelling can be understood as 
a sort of intellectual honesty whereby there are no easy answers to the questions posed by NMC 
films. This includes questions about religion, as realism can also be related to “many secular 
intellectuals’ apprehension of a popular religiosity” (Pinney, 2001, p. 4), but also the erosion of 
social justice and human rights associated with capital (Bharucha, 1998). In engaging with these 
tensions, there is ultimately a sense that the Moroccan experience and stories grounded in it, 
have something to contribute to processes of meaning-making around modernity.  
Marketing the new Moroccan cinema 
Rock the Casbah 
Rock the Casbah’s cover is a stark white with a 
rectangular window frame occupying the top half. 
Crowded in the window is an entire extended family 
peering curiously as something out of the frame. Above 
the frame are the names of the actresses playing the 
film’s main characters alternating in red and black – three 
adult daughters and their mother – and below it the title 
of the film with “Rock” appearing in an irregular red font 
and “the Casbah” below it in black uniform uppercase type. 
A plain cover by most standards, it is effective in suggesting that this film is about interior lives 
 
Image 5: Rock the Casbah cover 
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and relationships, the things that happen behind the facades of houses or the fronts people show 
the world. In fact, a Norwegian poster for the film featured the same photo with the title 
translated as “A house in Morocco.” The crowding and peering of characters in the window 
invoke a sense of physical and emotional closeness, of an extended family that is in each other’s 
way and in each other’s business. Those who have seen the film will know the image is from one 
of the film’s final scenes when one sister’s estranged American husband follows her home to 
Morocco and the entire family watches as they are reunited on the front porch, so there is the 
connotation of coming together, of a resolving of differences and conflict. The title below the 
image is an obvious reference to the Clash’s 1982 hit, but it is the form of the words that 
particularly symbolic in this case. The word “Rock” is slanted on the same angle as the window 
from which the family peers, giving a sense of destabilization reinforced by the irregular letters 
of the font. “The Casbah” that is being rocked is a traditional North African citadel, of which 
there are many in Morocco, usually durable stone structures as alluded to by the uniformity of 
the text. Together, the phrase “Rock the Casbah” conveys both visually and symbolically a sense 
that traditional social structures and ways of being are being challenged in this film.  
 Rock the Casbah’s trailer starts with slow, sad instrumental music accompanied by scene-
setting shots of a luxurious villa interior and its grounds where people are walking slowly up a 
hill to the house, as if for a solemn occasion, as a black SUV arrives. The scene then cuts to 
Sophia being greeted by emotional hugs from her mother and two older sisters, with one 
remarking that “no one could have predicted it,” suggesting that she’s missed a major sad event 
in her family. It becomes evident that it is the death of her father when the camera cuts between 
Sophia seeing the preparation of his corpse and her sister caressing his portrait while reminiscing 
about his qualities as a self-made man and supporter of his family. Viewers quickly find out that 
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may not be the father’s only interpretation as the sister’s solemn remembrances cut back to the 
preparation of the corpse and the uncle’s shock to find his brother’s penis erect, serving as early 
symbolism of the father’s sexual exploits outliving him. Here the music shifts dramatically to 
Bing Crosby’s upbeat big band tune “Road to Morocco” paired with scenes of swimmers in 
Tangiers’ harbor and Sophia sitting on a hill overlooking the sea, with the juxtaposition 
suggesting that there might be more to Morocco than sunny holiday stereotypes. It becomes 
apparent that Sophia hasn’t been here in a long time as her mother remarks “We’ve missed you 
darling” and her sisters tease her about her success playing terrorists in Hollywood.  
 From here the trailer moves from establishing context and narrative to the conflicts at the 
heart of the film. A string of quick juxtapositions move from superficial to more serious: when 
Sophia asks why her sisters are talking about scars at the wake, one explains “She had her boobs 
done, her own personal revolution!” eliciting disapproving looks from a group of elders, the 
grandmother tells her emo grandson that his nose ring “makes him look like a girl” as she eats 
McDonalds and Sophia informs her family that she is separated from her husband, to which her 
mother adamantly responds “in our culture, we don’t divorce.” From this point we see an 
eruption of conflict, largely between Sophia and her older sisters, who have stayed in Morocco, 
and between the daughters and their mother, about her complicity in their father’s deceit. The 
climax comes as one daughter screams at her mother “How could you keep quiet??” and then 
cuts to an earlier scene where the mother slaps her at the funeral dinner to which she responds 
“Screw you! I’m going to drink beer and forget you all!”  
 Then the music shifts once more to a poignant ballad by Antony and the Johnsons 
combined with sweeping bird’s eye views of Tangier at dawn as one sister prays on the porch. In 
a scene highlighted in promotional photos we see the mother on the couch with her daughters 
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gathered around her as they comfort each other, giving a sense of reconciliation as she says 
“He’d be happy to see us all together, to see the house full like this.” There is the connotation 
that despite all the paradoxes and misguided attempts to establish a sense of self separate from 
the family unit, there is still love for the man they lost, mourning for certain truths they believed 
and acceptance of a more candid and critical understanding of the shared experiences of family 
and culture. The father is carried out of the house to his burial and then the sense that life goes on 
in a lighter register as the sisters drink beer, go to the supermarket and spy on Sophia’s reunion 
with her husband in the scene from the cover.  
Horses of God 
While Rock the Casbah is billed as “a comedy about a 
tragedy,” Horses of God is all tragedy. When I 
purchased a copy of Mahi Binebine’s Les Etoiles du 
Sidi Moumen, the book on which the film is based, in 
Casablanca, the proprietor of the bookstore solemnly 
informed me “This is a hard story. Very hard.”  Like 
Rock the Casbah, Horses of God’s cover also consists 
of a single image against a white background, but is 
significantly darker and more complex. The image is 
a close-up of a 10-year-old Nabil, the best friend of the 
film’s protagonist Yacine, whose body (head and torso) occupy the majority of the cover. Nabil 
is wearing a t-shirt under a dirty jersey as we see him in the early scenes of the film playing 
football matches with Yacine against boys from other slums that often end up in brawls, giving 
the sense that these boys have to fight for existence from an early age. The choice of Nabil for 
 
Image 6: Horses of God cover 
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the cover is an interesting one given that he is not the main protagonist, but can be read as one of 
the film’s most tragic characters by far given that he is the most sensitive, quiet, almost 
effeminate boy who perhaps suffers most from his harsh circumstances and setting. One of the 
most remarkable features of Nabil’s body is its lighting, with his left side illuminated as if from a 
far-off glow, while his right side is shrouded in darkness, with this juxtaposition showing up 
most clearly on his face and carrying connotations of both tensions between good and evil and 
the multifaceted nature of human beings. The other remarkable feature of Nabil’s body is the fact 
that his shoulders appear to be disintegrating before our eyes, a clear reference to the suicide 
bomber he will become. Across his chest is the Arabic title Ya Khayl Allah in white script, with 
the French title Les Chevaux de Dieu printed in yellow just above it. Like the script 
superimposed over Nabil’s body there is the suggestion that his fate as a suicide bomber has been 
pressed upon him. Below the title on Nabil’s lower torso is an image of a jihadist in army 
fatigues demonstrating a combat move to the adult Nabil and Yacine with a mosque in the 
background. Below the image is the text “No one is born a terrorist,” again in white Arabic 
script. The pairing of a training scene and this sentence, plus the decision to put an adolescent 
version of Nabil on the cover versus an adult, together carrying humanizing connotations and 
suggest an attempt to see the light beyond the darkness that is terrorism, or at the very least 
understand what makes a child who once dreamed of being a football star blow himself up in a 
crowded restaurant. 
 The trailer for Horses of God is much darker and plays with the dramatic conventions of 
action films. The movie is a fictionalized account of the May 16, 2003 series of suicide 
bombings in Casablanca that killed 33 victims and 12 suicide bombers, as well as the bombers’ 
background in now infamous Sidi Moumen shantytown. Its trailer begins at the end with the clap 
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of a drum and a shot of the back of a grand taxi crowded with men traveling down a nondescript 
city street suddenly appearing on screen, as if the viewer has suddenly awoken in the middle of a 
scene. Building sound effects accompany the taxi’s progress before the screen goes black with 
another drum clap and “Casablanca, 2003” appears in the center with a close up of Yacine in the 
front seat behind the text a second later. Then several jump cuts: a man with Islamic beard and 
dress asking “will you really do it?” a shot of four young men in dark jackets and backpacks 
walking down a shadowed Casablanca street, a close up of someone fastening a suicide vest and 
telling its wearer “we’ll meet in paradise,” Yacine’s face as he gazes up at the fastener, a shot of 
the four young men with backpacks from the front, with sun on their faces, who might have been 
four high school students on their way to class, Yacine and Nabil in the restaurant that is their 
target, looking at each other, followed by a black screen and the phrase Inch’allah, or “God 
willing.”  After a moment text showing the film’s selection for Cannes, then the black is gone. 
 The next thing we see is a bunch of boys playing soccer on a dusty dirt pitch and a close-
up of an adolescent Yacine yelling from the goal “Let’s go guys, cover the pitch!” then an aerial 
survey of a relatively small slum with the text “Shantytown of Sidi Moumen, Casablanca.” Then 
a close up of Yacine showing Nabil a picture of “the best goalie in the world” to which Nabil 
responds “You’ll be like him.”5 Next another aerial shot of the slum, which seems to have  
grown immensely, with the phrase “two brothers growing together” over its top, before a cut to 
an older teenage Yacine with a vendor’s cart in a dirt street lined with laundry telling his brother 
Hamid “I’m sick of this job.” Hamid resembles a gangster with his beanie, tank top, metallic 
chains and tattoo, which is confirmed when the camera jumps from Yacine selling oranges to his 
brother selling drugs, then back to both of them in the street as Hamid says “if something goes 
                                                            
5 The picture is of the world-renowned Soviet goalie Lev Yashin. 
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wrong we can’t both go under,” foreshadowing the following scene of violent police repression 
that ends in him being hauled off to prison. 
 Again, black, then an aerial shot of a boy running through the slum shouting that 
Yacine’s brother is back accompanied by a hopeful piano melody, and a shot of a very different 
looking Hamid – clean, in Islamic dress, with a beard – being reunited with Yacine, who tells his 
mother “he’s gone weird.” Hamid invites Yacine to someone named Noceir’s and Yacine and 
Nabil are shown entering the back of a room of praying men, followed by another clap of the 
drum and a shot of a factory surrounded by a wasteland of trash as a man says “here you will 
find your path through prayer.” Then a quick sequence: Yacine being threatened with a knife, 
joining the brotherhood, men praying in front of a mosque, a jihadist leading training exercises, 
the brothers sharing a meal in the mountains and a close-up of an Islamic cleric in black as he 
says “Death does not scare us.” The slow instrumental movement in the background reaches a 
crescendo as another sequence of mostly happy moments play across the screen: the future 
suicide bombers playing soccer during one of their training camps, flashing back to Yacine’s 
childhood days as a goalie, drinking tea with a girl he likes, contemplative window gazing, 
playing in a stream in the wilderness, ritual washing before prayer. It becomes apparent that a 
myriad of experiences have led these young men to this point and that in radical Islam they 
found brotherhood, protection, adventure and purpose in a world that treated their lives as 
inconsequential. We see the boys running through the streets of the slum, the only world they 
know, as both adolescents and teenagers, the freedom of Yacine on the back of a motorbike 
driven by Nabil, and finally an adult Yacine in Islamic dress staring at the picture of his goalie 
idol with Nabil’s words “You’ll be just like him” replaying in his head, as a cleric slowly pulls 
the picture from his fingers. Then, all childhood dreams eclipsed, we’re back at the beginning of 
 141 
trailer, replaying scenes for which we now have infinitely more context and meaning. Hamid 
asking Yacine “Will you really do it?” to which he harshly responds Ana makhayf, or “I’m not 
afraid.” Again, the strapping of suicide vests, Hamid watching his brother from outside the 
restaurant, Yacine and Nabil locking eyes, and then a final aerial shot of a group of figures in 
darkness on the edge of an abyss with the lights of Casablanca in the background.  
 These covers and trailers are indicative of how filmmakers imagine their films, as well as 
their attempts to fix an interpretive frame for publics. They are obvious simplifications of the 
narratives meant to draw publics in, but they also do remarkably well at conveying the internal 
complexities of characters rooted in particular social contexts. Above all they highlight the vastly 
divergent experiences of globalization whereby impoverished young children are subject to a 
myriad of violence while the elite adult daughters of an industrial magnate lack nothing 
materially yet suffer from a violence associated with the imposition of patriarchal authority.   
The new Moroccan cinema as discourse 
Rock the Casbah made its world premiere at the 2013 Toronto International Film Festival 
(TIFF), indicating expanding aspirations about the audience for Moroccan cinema and its role in 
an increasingly transnational cinema landscape. After the screening, Marrakchi took the stage to 
answer questions about the film in much the same language as many Moroccan filmmakers of 
her generation: saying the film is fiction inspired by reality, that she didn’t want the music to be 
folkloric but something more universal, and that she thinks Moroccan audiences are ready for 
boundaries to be pushed through cinema. These three themes stand out as a refrain in the 
discourse of the new Moroccan cinema: 1) the importance of telling stories rooted in the real, 2) 
participation in a universal alternative cinema and 3) an engagement with the publics as part of a 
new cultural politics.  
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Docu-Fiction 
Perhaps the most striking rhetoric about the new Moroccan cinema concerns its relationship with 
reality. Filmmakers repeatedly assert their intention to show a different or lesser-known side of 
Morocco, Arabs and Muslim society. This cinema is known for making films that challenge 
taboos and conservative social norms, but it is also caught up in a complex web of transnational 
storytelling and in a geopolitical moment where Arabs and Muslims have been presented in 
particular (often problematic) ways and state control has kept more traditional news media from 
opening up spaces for meaningful exchange. In some ways Moroccan cinema speaks back not 
only to the Western world, but also to the narratives constructed in Morocco and other 
authoritarian and transitional societies where globalization has sharpened social stratification. 
The realities addressed by this cinema are often opposed to superficial, often essentialist 
portrayals and Orientalist stereotypes, suggesting that what is being talked about is a particular 
set of taboo realities that were previously obscured, both in transnationally and locally where 
such issues as alcoholism and prostitution are often purported not to exist and blatantly absent 
from media discourse. Through these realities certain themes have become salient: religious 
fundamentalism, violence, sexuality, gender norms, corruption, migration, etc, as well as more 
nuanced ways to tell such stories.  
 A key component of the discourse surrounding Moroccan cinema is the desire to address 
the complexities of Moroccan modernity by telling stories rooted in the real. Often these stories 
originate from filmmakers’ personal experiences and are fictionalized to fit cinematic forms. 
Thus these films have been referred to as a new/hybrid genre of “docu-fiction” (Nejjar) or 
“cinema of the real” (Ayouch), but even absent explicit labels all of these filmmakers have used 
similar rhetoric to position their films as fiction inspired by reality and making use of 
 143 
documentary filming tactics. A report on the 2013 Moroccan National Film Festival in Tangier 
describes this movement in Moroccan cinema as “a dual structure with a documentary 
component, and another fictional, supported by the interplay of performers who give the real a 
dimension that transcends TV news” (Bakrim, 2013). Sometimes this documentary component is 
the result of small budgets that require filmmakers to make use of the world around them, but 
just as often it seems to be an aesthetic choice, or some combination of the two. Kilani describes 
some of the motivations for moving in this new direction in Sur la planche: “It looks like a 
documentary, but it isn’t at all a documentary…however, I wanted to keep the energy, the 
vitality, the rough and rugged dimension of the real” (Cratzborn, 2011). Part of this emphasis on 
documenting reality can likely be attributed to the journalistic and documentary background of 
filmmakers such as Kilani, and Ayouch has also discussed on multiple occasions his decisions to 
use non-professional actors being an aesthetic choice.  
 Purporting to address “reality” has also made these films and filmmakers, and their 
relationships to various realities, subject to debate. Given their position as cultural elites, telling 
stories from societal extremities has made filmmakers like Nabil Ayouch or Laïla Marrakchi 
subject to critiques: that Ayouch is representing realities that are not his own and that 
Marrakchi’s portrayals are not representative of the Moroccan majority, resulting in a dichotomy 
between miserablism and opulence. Mahi Binebine, the artist and author who wrote the novel on 
which Horses of God is based, discussed being shocked at the other Morocco he discovered after 
the terrorist attacks of 16 May 2003, saying “In going to Sidi Moumen, I discovered a Morocco 
that I didn’t know, a Morocco that shocked me, a sort of Calcutta” (Marmié, 2010). Ayouch cites 
his own experience growing up in a banlieue north of Paris as making him familiar with 
marginality: “I grew up in Sarcelles, I know physical, moral, verbal violence, I know what it 
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feels like to be on the margins” (Lafitte, 2013).6 Ayouch was familiar with Sidi Moumen as a 
filmmaker prior to the 2003 attacks, but still admits to being shocked that the suicide bombers 
came from there (ibid.). For Ayouch, Horses of God is an attempt to  
“show a reality that we did not want to see or that we didn’t know: that of a slum where, 
certainly, there is social, cultural, intellectual and economic misery. But I try to go beyond 
this. The axiom that says ‘misery equals kamikaze’ is false, because if not we’d have 
millions of kamikazes. I try to explain that the inhabitants of slums are above all human 
beings who have been abandoned by state and societal structures” (Guessous, 2012).  
In the film aerial shots show the shantytown growing dramatically over the course of the 1990s 
with the encroachment of neoliberalism and simultaneous growth of inequality, accompanied by 
a reductions in the social function of the state. An article about the Ayouch’s filmmaking almost 
a decade after the attacks makes clear that these realities haven’t changed, as one slum resident 
reported “‘We exist on odd jobs like this shoot and we wait. When the factory next door opened 
we were hoping to be hired, but were quickly disillusioned. They didn’t want anything to do with 
us,’ said Aziz, 27 years old, unemployed since he dropped out of school” (Oulmouddane, 2012). 
Ayouch’s refrain that there were victims on both sides of the attacks belies a notion of liberal 
society in which Morocco is based on “cultural diversity and multiculturalism, different 
communities, different races, different religions” (Forster, 2013). Amidst the controversy 
surrounding her first film Marock, Marrakchi likewise decried notions of a homogenous 
Morocco, but also of peaceful coexistence, saying “I’m sick of this phony Morocco, falsely 
homogenous, harmonious. Morocco is diverse and varied, multiple, splintered…” (Barrada, 
                                                            
6 This is true, however, in Morocco Ayouch is seen as a sort of fils à papa, or daddy’s boy, given that his father 




2006). To a certain extent we see realism being interpreted as the material conditions of everyday 
life, yet stopping short of a radical denunciation of structural inequalities while privileging 
individual difference. 
 If Horses of God shows the reality of shantytown life, Rock the Casbah delves into 
realities from the other end of the social spectrum, that of a family of a wealthy industrialist who 
has clearly been on the “right” side of the neoliberal equation. If people ignored or remained 
ignorant of places like Sidi Moumen, Rock the Casbah’s luxurious villa on a hill overlooking 
Tangier is a vision of Morocco that many have perhaps too often wanted to see. As a lukewarm 
review from La Vie Eco reported “The tourism office must be beside itself with joy: In Rock the 
Casbah, Tangier dazzles, figs are full of sun and the women damningly beautiful. Laïla 
Marrakchi spares no expense in flattering the public’s eye, in honing fantasies of luxury, of calm 
and pleasure, perhaps even some envy” (Guessous, 2013). Another publication refers to the film 
as “a beautiful tribute to Tangier and a sort of paradise lost” (Boussageon, 2013). Suggestions of 
Orientalist opulence and more than a hint of colonialist nostalgia raise questions about the 
neocolonial nature of Morocco and the extent to which an elite with close ties to the former 
colonizer has merely taken over its function, living within a cocoon of wealth. Marrakchi has 
frequently talked about wanting her films to show a different side of Moroccan society than a 
Moroccan cinema she has qualified as “miserabilist,” but by focusing on internal lives and 
struggles she also ignores the extraordinary impact of this elite on lives beyond their own and 
offers an escape into a privileged Morocco where everyday struggles don’t exist. That said, while 
the settings are idealized, the characters are not and in many ways could be read as misguided, 
self-centered and not particularly positive, if sympathetic, portrayals. 
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 Both Marrakchi and Ayouch have both discussed that their films seek to represent certain 
often-obscured realities rather than judge anyone, despite the fact that representations are never 
mere reflections. According to Ayouch, Moroccans were a bit too eager to move on from the 16 
May attacks, deciding not to talk about them without attempting to understand the realities that 
produced them. In returning to the attacks almost a decade later, Ayouch stated “What interests 
me is understanding how 10-year-old kids transform into human bombs. If we really want these 
things not to happen again, we have the duty to go through the looking glass (to see from other 
perspectives)” (Forster, 2013). This idea of cinema as a mirror of society is espoused by many 
filmmakers of the NMC, including Marrakchi, who “considers more than ever cinema to be a 
mirror that must be brandished in the face of Moroccans” (Pajon, 2013). Marrakchi shows that it 
is women, and their ability to make decisions and take responsibility for them, that is most often 
sacrificed under the weight of a patriarchal family culture that often makes use of religion to 
reinforce itself. This situation is made even more evident in considering the dominance of media 
by men, and the fact that the strong women’s voices in Moroccan cinema are seen as a sort of 
anomaly. In depicting the transgressive ways that some women deal with this state of affairs, 
Marrakchi’s films can be and are interpreted as offensive by many segments of Moroccan society 
and interpreted as attacks on the foundations of what it means to be Muslim and Moroccan. 
 In considering the public discourse provoked by these films, the roots of mediated 
depictions of Moroccan “reality” in colonialism must be considered as well as its relationship 
with the postcolonial state. For many, filmmakers’ use of state and French funding coupled with 
flagrant and unabashed representations of everyday life that contradict Islamic norms or construe 
them as backward, underscores an extension of discursive logics associated with colonialism. 
Yet filmmakers see their films as important interventions in a field (and on subjects) too long left 
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to foreigners. Many Moroccan and Arab filmmakers more broadly feel a duty to contribute to 
conversations about terrorism in particular and the difficulties their societies are facing in this 
historical moment, when the prevalence of representations of terrorism in (particularly Western) 
popular culture has skyrocketed in the wake of 9/11, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and ongoing 
conflicts around al-Qaeda and ISIL. At the same time, terrorism’s status as a geopolitical priority 
means that the resources available for storytelling around this issue and public interest are 
immense. In discussing the evolution of his filmmaking, Ayouch points to 9/11 as a formative 
moment and the differences between the films he made before and after that event, calling 
Horses of God “harsher, more in touch with reality” (Mrabet, 2013). According to Ayouch, the 
film tries to counterbalance simplistic and stereotypical representations of Islamic 
fundamentalism, as well as Muslim societies more broadly.  
“I’ve always been extremely saddened by the way most American blockbusters interpret 
violence, especially violence associated with radical Islam. They have a pretty phenomenal 
ability to dehumanize it, to remove names and faces. I wanted to explore this kind of 
violence, with the duty to probe the depths of reasons why a kid would transform himself 
into a human bomb. I wanted to focus on this genesis, on this way of life, without making 
violence into a spectacle. This is really the intention of the film, to say that the micro-traumas 
that shape us in childhood inform the type of adults we become later. This violence makes it 
so that one is a little more permeable than others to certain ideas, ideologies. And it is this 
relationship – constructed, visceral, organic – that interests me” (Mrabet, 2013).  
When asked about the prevalence of terrorism as a theme in Moroccan cinema Ayouch 
responded “It’s logical that Moroccan filmmakers talk about Islamism. Americans do it 
regularly, so why not us? We have the right to give our point of view on a topic that affects us so 
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deeply” (Saadi, 2013). This also comes at the risk of reifying certain societies’ association with 
terrorism, in a region that has many realities, especially those regarding everyday life, that are 
not at all wrapped up in terrorism. In stark contrast to Horses of God, Rock the Casbah’s 
engagement with terrorism takes the form of a comedic plot line as the film pointedly pokes fun 
at American media through Sophia’s typecasting as a terrorist. According to Marrakchi, “Here 
there is always a bit of humor, of irony, or derision, even when facing serious crises” (Pajon, 
2013). Humor doesn’t necessarily fit well with what Marrakchi says are Western expectations of 
“[Arab] filmmakers who make shocking, provocative films that violently denounce injustices” 
(Hamri, 2013), one reason she says Rock the Casbah didn’t show well in Western markets. 
 Inherent in these debates about neorealist representations in Moroccan cinema is the 
question of who speaks for Morocco? Both Ayouch and Marrakchi tell stories rooted in specific 
social contexts: Ayouch dealing with the impoverished margins and Marrakchi with a 
cosmopolitan elite. To critics they are often understood as patronizing, as purporting to hold a 
mirror to Moroccan society for the people that inhabit it. The question of who gets to brandish 
that mirror and for what purpose is obviously controversial, and its difficult to overestimate the 
interpretive power accorded to filmmakers. Admittedly one of the strengths of Moroccan cinema 
is its diversity, however in an increasingly transnational media environment the films that get 
taken up, publicized and debated, seem to be those concerned with realities that challenge 
fundamentalist ideologies while affirming transnational discourses about secular modernity and 
avoiding outright criticism of the neoliberal state.  
A universal alternative cinema 
Often using the personal as a window to the universal, the new Moroccan cinema tells stories 
based in the realities of Moroccan society, yet is underscored by more universal themes capable 
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of being transferred to other contexts and identified with by diverse publics. According to 
filmmaker Nour-Eddine Lakhmari, Moroccans have similar problems as those plaguing societies 
around the world. “We’re a little bit sick of representing Morocco as a folkloric stereotype…We 
want to see films about us, told from our point of view, telling the world that we have universal 
problems” (Quilty, 2009). In Marrakchi’s first film those problems related to adolescence, while 
Rock the Casbah takes on patriarchy and familial conflict, highlighting tensions between 
individuality and the group as well as between generations. As Marrakchi remarked “There are 
both personnel things and those that are more universal. As soon as you touch the topic of 
adolescence, you tell stories that are for the most part common, which are key to situations that 
transcend borders and cultures” (Antona, 2006). Likewise Horses of God takes on poverty and 
exclusion on the margins of global capital. Fundamentally the universal dimensions of these 
stories makes it possible for Moroccan filmmakers to simultaneously draw on and develop their 
own cultural referents while speaking to diverse publics.  
 In many ways this aspiration to the universal is built on the universal model of 
Hollywood even if it aspires to do it differently. Horses of God and Rock the Casbah bear 
marked signs of the action and dramedy genre conventions to which they respectively subscribe. 
Significantly, both are lauded in the trade press for their production values (particularly editing), 
which had a primary complaint about Moroccan cinema in the past. In innovating around 
production structures and taking on taboo topics, filmmakers of the new Moroccan cinema 
demonstrate aspirations to not just to open up their own market, but to also become a leader of 
the cinema in the Global South and an advocate for alternative viewpoints to those articulated by 
a globally dominant Hollywood industry. When asked if he considered himself a product of 
“Third World cinema,” Lakhmari responded “Cinema is universal. Maybe we don’t have the 
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same means, the same industry, but we’re there. Today we no longer have complexes: we put our 
cameras where we want and we dare much more” (Mrabet, 2013). Addressing universal issues 
and telling stories of urban modernity in a transitional society, however, often means that 
industry norms and expectations are challenged. According to filmmaker Swel Noury “Foreign 
sales agents often complain our films don’t feel Moroccan enough” (Dale, 2009). Yet these 
concerns seem to be exactly the point for filmmakers of the NMC who express a desire to defy 
stereotypes and clichés, often using the specific as the path to the universal.  
 Both Ayouch and Marrakchi have expressed a fundamental interest in attempting to 
understand the complexities of the human experience through storytelling. With Horses of God, 
Ayouch wanted to emphasize the universal nature of youth in showing “Young Muslims have the 
same aspirations as Western youths, we have to stop believing they come from a planet with 
distant customs/mores” (Strauss, 2015). In doing so, Ayouch contends that fundamentalist Islam 
adopts the same trajectory as other radical ideologies, from anarchism to right-wing nationalism. 
In Rock the Casbah, notions of universality revolve around family tensions, patriarchy and 
generational conflict whereby “…we discover a one-of-a-kind family similar to so many others” 
(Milleliri, 2013). The notion of family drama as universally relatable, however, is often 
combined with Western narratives about modernity and the Arab World. “While Casbah plays 
more like a conventional French family saga [than Marock], complete with sibling rivalries, 
sexual tensions and contentious inheritances, it continues to explore notions of class and culture 
in a country caught between Muslim traditions and ever-encroaching Western influences” 
(Mintzer, 2013). According to Marrakchi, these are exactly the reductive binaries she sought to 
subvert, as she said “We are all contradictory, we all have weaknesses, we all have strengths. 
What interests me is to show women with their weaknesses, their emotions…this is the truth I try 
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to portray” (Febrayer, 2013). The film is frequently referenced by Western media (in this case 
French, as the film did not receive any major attention in the US) as a case study in 
contradictions between tradition and modernity, demonstrating the difficulties of ambivalence in 
the face of modernity. The point is that these are not “fragile/delicate” women with flaws, 
contradictions and imperfections because they are Arab women, but rather because they are 
human beings. These contradictions might have local specificities and challenges, but they are 
fundamentally the products of a globally hegemonic patriarchal modernity, even as it exists in 
uneven and varying degrees.  
 That these films have been popular and debated does not mean that they are not subject to 
critique. Rock the Casbah’s storyline was frequently referred to as familiar and predictable at 
best and clichéd at worst. For one Moroccan critic these clichés focused on class, as she stated 
“these women’s qualms ring hollow, false, it is very difficult to identify with them, to believe in 
their protected sufferings, to be moved by their programmed attempts at emancipation…” 
(Guessous, 2013), while foreign critics tended to focus on character development and dialogue. 
As Le Monde wrote “One can clearly see where Laïla Marrakchi is coming from with this family 
drama in the form of a Persian fable: to give voice to Moroccan women, conditioned by the rules 
of an oppressive society. The problem is that in trying to be explicit, convincing, it ends up 
becoming cliché” (Nouchi, 2013). The title of the Le Monde article “Rock the Casbah": nothing 
to do with the legendary Clash song” seems to suggest that the film is not explicitly political 
enough, the tone too light and its beautiful visuals and whimsical nature detrimental to the story 
it wants to tell. “As an Arab woman filmmaker, people expect you to be a radical auteur and 
make very serious dramas like ‘A Separation,’ (...) but I grew up watching Hollywood movies 
and I aim to make popular films that do address serious issues but also feature characters that we 
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can relate to, not necessarily people living on the margins” (Keslassy, 2013). The question of to 
whom people can relate aside, the critiques of Marrakchi’s films are often gendered in nature and 
appear to be anchored in perceptions of elite women’s frivolity and a version of modernity 
inextricably linked to the habitus of a particular social class.  
 Horses of God, on the other hand, is much darker and construed as infinitely more 
socially relevant. Moroccan critiques tended to focus on Ayouch making the terrorists too 
human, but by and large the press supported this intervention emphasizing societal failure: 
“…even if they committed abominable, atrocious acts, they were also victims because they were 
manipulated, recruited. And because the family, society did not do what they were supposed to 
do” (Guessous, 2012). Foreign press focused much more on the individual factors than societal 
failures, characterizing radical Islam as a form of redemption for individual failures or faults 
(Forster, 2013; Lafitte, 2013). In general Western media seem preoccupied with the process of 
radicalization as if radical Islam has some universal magical formula through which it 
brainwashes people. Ayouch is thus critiqued for not providing all the answers to a Western 
radicalization thesis that above all wants to know “but HOW do suicide bombers become 
radicalized?” In discussing the difficult of disagreeing with films made to denounce terrorism, 
one critic claims Horses of God “never succeeds in bringing us into the programming of blind 
faith…The omnipresent why and how of entrapment in a certain religious life with its absurd 
precepts remains nevertheless inaccessible to the pseudo-acuity of these films” (Péron, 2012). 
Likewise, another critique stated “The film explains everything: the bankruptcy of society, 
corruption, poverty, the absence of points of reference…without giving a real answer. Because 
Nabil Ayouch skipped the key period in the story: the prison” (Forster, 2013). The assumption 
that a character going to prison a thug and coming out an Islamist is the key transformation 
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ignores the multitude of micro aggressions and indignities that populate the lives of those on the 
margins, and on which the entire first half of the film focuses. In this case we might as well be 
talking about disenfranchised black youth in the US living lives saturated with various types of 
violence, going to prison and coming out gang members. Both cases are a play for easy answers 
that don’t involve addressing actual injustices built into societal structures locally and globally, 
but rather disrupting the mythical moment of radicalization. Because Ayouch’s film was less 
likely to be written off, he was offered greater opportunities to speak back to these critiques. 
When asked about leaving out this “key” scene, Ayouch responded “Indoctrination is 
discursively unremarkable. It’s the manipulation of texts and current events. An almost ripe fruit 
is picked. A fruit that ripens through abandonment, because of the absence of education, of a 
health system, of social justice…All these traumas inform the adults they become. At the end of 
this path, Islamists show up to brainwash them. What interests me, it what happens before that” 
(Aubel, 2013). Ayouch also references similar social situations happening in the European 
suburbs, meaning that the margins of global capital transcend borders and religions in 
constructing two very different experiences of social development, of winners and losers in the 
neoliberal globalization game.  
 As an outward-looking industry with a colonial past and aspirations at infiltrating markets 
in Europe and elsewhere, one of the primary concerns of Moroccan cinema’s critics seems to be 
the image of Morocco abroad. Marrakchi’s frustrations with this are telling, as for many, the new 
Moroccan cinema could be damaging to a Arab Muslims already much-maligned by media and a 
country heavily dependent on international tourism and investment, where depicting social 
problems could challenge its credibility in the international community. Director Hakim Noury, 
who makes popular comedies, once referred to Moroccan films solicited by international 
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festivals as “miserablist films with a colonial sensibility,” saying “The West sees us as natives. It 
encourages this genre of films because it bothers them when we come compete with them on 
their territory” (Bennani, 2005). Yet the new generation of filmmakers is much more ambivalent 
to the forces of capital and institutional politics, frequently working within them in a way that 
privileges certain ideological frameworks, but also makes possible certain critical interventions. 
That the government doesn’t seem interested in withholding support or suppressing these films 
suggests that they are in fact benefiting from the recognition of Moroccan critical voices in the 
international arena and the accompanying perception of the country as a bastion of artistic 
freedom in the MENA region. In a moment of regional instability, Morocco seems to be seizing 
the opportunity to use Moroccan cinema as currency to improve its reputation vis-à-vis freedom 
of expression and human rights more broadly. As Moroccan cinema pioneer Ahmed El 
Maanouni points out, Morocco enjoys “a freedom to tackle subjects which is sufficiently rare in 
the Arab world to be noteworthy. But we filmmakers also have to be more daring. I'm convinced 
of one thing: the more we show ourselves as we truly are, the more we are universal," (Masters, 
2007). If filmmakers can continue opening up spaces for expression, Kilani believes Moroccan 
cinema can become synonymous with an alternative approach. “If we can make it from a 
different point of view, then we will be making a real contribution to cinema” (Quilty, 2009).  
Popular culture and politics 
Long the domain of the state, the rise of the new Moroccan cinema and independent media more 
broadly signal a shift in the relationship between culture and politics, gradually making room for 
multiple and more ambiguous visions of Moroccan modernity. As cultural producers make use of 
transnational networks and alternative funding models they also secure more flexibility in 
whether and how to use state resources. This liberalization of the cinema sector is notable in the 
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context of Arab media long limited to official narratives, as one journalist pointed out “we have a 
lot more liberty in culture than in politics” (Bennani, 2007). This greater leeway makes public 
culture an avenue for political commentary challenging the status quo in a way that is not 
possible in politics itself, stymied as it is by corruption, in-fighting and monarchical intervention. 
Culture has typically been seen as a secondary concern, but that is changing given the rise of the 
knowledge economy and creative industries increasingly being seen as a vector of economic 
development. That production has proliferated at a time when Islamists political power was on 
the rise means that cinema has come to serve a critical social function as a site of commentary 
and claim-making by citizen-subjects. As one actor alleged “In my opinion, the role of Moroccan 
cinema replaces the function of the intelligentsia in other societies, particularly in the 19th and 
20th centuries” (ALM, 2005). This critical function is especially powerful given the lack of 
reading culture in Morocco, a society that produces more movies than books (Rfaif, 2014), and 
also raises questions about who this cinema is for and the function it serves for various publics.  
 While both Marrakchi and Ayouch have affirmed that having Moroccan publics engage 
with their films is important to them personally, there is also the sense that Moroccan publics 
alone are not enough. Marrakchi recounts that with a film distributor for an uncle she spent a lot 
of time at the cinema as a child and “I wanted to created what I missed most in my childhood as 
a film-love, Moroccan films for Moroccans” (Pajon, 2013). While Marock broke records at the 
box office and can be seen in some ways as the first film of the NMC to challenge taboos, 
generate an uproar and pass the censors, Rock the Casbah received remarkably little coverage in 
the Moroccan press relative to the plethora of press generated by Marock. Especially notable in 
this regard is that Telquel did not dedicate one feature article to the film, when the magazine was 
among the most ardent publicizers and supporters of Marrakchi’s previous film. Telquel 
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copiously covered Horses of God from the “making of” to its festival showings. When Horses of 
God played at the Marrakech film festival Ayouch said “Despite the success of the film abroad, 
I’m particularly happy to present it to the Moroccan public. After all, it is our trauma” 
(Oulmouddane, 2012). For Ayouch his film is an alternative account from that of authorities, 
aimed at the Moroccan public first and foremost, but in touch with the economic realities that the 
Moroccan market is small and shrinking.  
“I want the film to touch Moroccans. This is really important to me. The attacks wounded the 
whole country, and its reaction counts eminently in my eyes. I am very happy about 
appropriation of the film, the reactions it provokes, I’m happy that it opens up the debate. 
Afterwards, yes, I want the film to travel. And in terms of market, I can’t count on Morocco” 
(Lafitte, 2013).  
Horses of God did extremely well on the festival circuit, and got more vastly more international 
play than most Moroccan films, including an endorsement from producer Jonathan Demme who 
was able to facilitate a North American distributor.  
 But in an article following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, Ayouch lamented the fact 
that the film didn’t elicited the kinds of wide-ranging debates in France that it did in Morocco. 
“In France I would have liked the film to generate a broader debate. I find it a shame that 
extreme situations like the one on January 11 have to happen in order for us to be deeply 
concerned with these problems” (Strauss, 2015). Franco-Maghrebi cultural producers like 
Ayouch and Marrakchi were pushed to the fore in the aftermath of the attacks, and along with 
other intellectuals and artists Marrakchi signed an open letter published in Le Monde titled “Et 
maintenant, qu’est-ce qu’on fait?” that calls for defending French values. The letter states “These 
murders are the expression of the worst. The deaths are ours. But we should not weep in our 
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corner, we must unify our tears so that they become a tide, a force. And now, what do we do? 
Together, let’s be in solidarity. We stand ready!” (Collectif, 2015). Then, and in the aftermath of 
the Paris terror attacks later that year, there is the sense that culture plays a crucial role defending 
and advancing the liberal social project in Morocco and elsewhere. After the attacks Ayouch 
maintained that he was “still hopeful for [France] and for the youth of this country and the 
changes that we can bring as artists, as film directors. We’re on the front line” (Dale, 2015b). 
According to Marrakchi “We must resist, because culture remains the best weapon against 
obscurantism” (Hamri, 2013). The importance of being outward looking and engaged with the 
world, of fighting for openness and understanding in increasingly heterogeneous societies where 
difference and dissent are often demonized, are seen as critical functions for cultural producers 
and their products.  
 Horses of God and Rock the Casbah both came out in theaters in 2013, by all accounts a 
bumper year for Moroccan cinema, when 9 of the top 11 films at the country’s box office were 
Moroccan and many made extensive rounds on the festival circuit. It was also the wake of the 
Arab Spring, when increased attention to the region and its dynamics were a geopolitical priority 
and revolutions had disrupted film industries elsewhere in the region, creating an opportune 
moment for Moroccan cinema and for a broader national cultural offensive positioning Morocco 
as exceptional. As part of an exhibit at the Louvre dedicated to Medieval Morocco Ayouch was 
“given ‘carte blanche’ to organize a 3-day event in mid-2015, including screening of his films 
and exhibition of his photographs, complemented by debates with a journalist from Le Monde 
newspaper” (Dale, 2015a). This type of engagement with the realities of contemporary 
geopolitics marks a shift in Ayouch’s filmmaking as it has been affected by events like 9/11, 16 
May and the Paris attacks of 2015, as he said “I moved on to a more contemporary cinema, 
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which relates to a dynamic geopolitics and an environment in which I live, that I observe daily in 
Morocco”  (Lafitte, 2013). These global events have served as inspiration for a many 
filmmakers, including Ayouch, and there is also the sense of bearing witness to a society amidst 
divergent experiences and responses to globalization. For a filmmaker like Ayouch “The geo-
political situation of Morocco is so rich, especially given that the rest of the world is talking 
about Arab countries. The Arab world is moving fast and I feel very excited to be part of that. 
We should be the first ones to express our point of view on the key issues we face” (Dale, 
2015a). Marrakchi’s interventions are less direct and more metaphorical, as she equated the 
death of the patriarch in Rock the Casbah with recent developments in the Arab world, saying 
“This death symbolizes the end of an era. Now that the leader is gone, one starts to feel the 
rumbles of revolt” (Nedelec, 2013). This revolt is inextricably linked to Marrakchi’s film title 
Rock the Casbah, a song by English punk band The Clash that is widely reputed to have been 
inspired by the Iranian revolution and the banning of rock music by Ayatollah Khomeini. As 
Marrakchi stated “My film is not really rock’n’roll, but it also carries a message of freedom. 
Sofia, one of the daughters of the family, who works in New York, explodes everything when 
she returns to the family home. She sets fire to the Casbah, not really of course, but 
symbolically” (Pajon, 2013). The implicit suggestion that revolution against traditional forms of 
power is imported from the West, whether via music from The Clash or Sophia’s return, denies a 
long history of indigenous resistance and incremental struggles as part of Moroccan modernity. 
Marrakchi’s ambivalent portrayal of Western modernity clearly indicates that the West does not 
have all the answers, however, it’s not hard to see why such suggestions have ignited 
controversy. For Marrakchi, the employ of that fraught relationship is born out of her own 
experience, but fundamentally her point is about the questioning of authority; in other words 
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about social constraints and a certain distance that allows for alternative ways of understanding 
the world. In many ways Marrakchi and Ayouch’s embedding in transnational networks of 
funding and storytelling in a post-9/11 era impose on them a certain burden of representation at 
the intersection of public culture and politics.  
Cinema as mediated activism 
The new Moroccan cinema industry is characterized by a production process whereby 
filmmakers draw on their networks abroad and the global cinema community as well as/in 
addition to domestic Moroccan resources. While a need exists for a broader range of cinema 
investors, funding opportunities from both the Moroccan government and European Union 
projects aimed at promoting development and democracy through culture have provided the 
foundation for many productions whose budgets are often completed by private capital. That 
said, the new Moroccan cinema is confronted with distribution mechanisms that often exclude its 
products from major markets and theaters. A growing engagement with the global film festival 
circuit is ameliorating the situation somewhat and a constant cycle of news coming out of the 
region post-Arab Spring has helped increase visibility and interest in its cultural products, 
although this interest is often accompanied by specific expectations about genre and topic. What 
is clear, however, is that films such as Rock the Casbah and God’s Horses intervene in public 
culture by taking on controversial social issues and in doing so challenge the hegemony of state-
produced narratives about Moroccan society and culture.  
 The discourse of Moroccan cinema is one that emphasizes its roots in reality and the 
universal nature of its narratives. Two ways in which this discourse is constructed is through a 
hybrid genre combing reality and fiction, and appeals to universal values and themes, in an 
attempt to construct the new Moroccan cinema as an alternative cinematic space openly engaged 
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with political realities and its context of creation. The discourse of new Moroccan cinema 
positions these films as a form of mediated activism challenging Morocco’s traditionally 
centralized media discourses, as well as well as an attempt to integrate political norms and 
participation with those of global civil society in a way that is inclusive of, yet not specific to 
Morocco. In many ways these films act as platforms for the production of a certain segment of 
Moroccan filmmakers as public intellectuals speaking for a progressive counterculture oriented 
toward individual liberties, secularism and a more variegated understanding of Moroccan 
experiences and everyday life. 
 All of this suggests that shifting industry logics create the conditions of possibility for 
ideological interventions, creating cinema as a space of encounter through which filmmakers 
negotiate societal tensions, offering alternative visions of Arab societies in opposition to official 
channels. For the filmmakers constructing this discourse as an intervention, their new Moroccan 
cinema is symbolic of a society in transition and a version of Moroccan modernity more open to 
the world. Additionally, this suggests that a key component of new Moroccan cinema is the 
intention not only to make a contribution to cinema, as Kilani suggests above, but also to 
intervene in the social and political landscape by illuminating certain realities, asking difficult 
questions and eliciting debate from a society in the midst of many transitions. By embracing 
these roles, new Moroccan cinema has become a space that blurs the lines between cinema as art 
form and mediated activism. The conditions of possibility for this type of critical social 
commentary emerged in conjunction with economic, and to some extent political, liberalization 
in Morocco, in increased openness to global capital and new distribution mechanisms have 
opened up avenues for alternative storytelling and depictions of Moroccan life that challenge 
hegemonic narratives about society and culture through cinema. Ultimately the simultaneous 
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development of critical discourse and the “eruption of Moroccan cinema in the social field as an 
expression of the imaginary” seems to have changed the relationship – and relevance – of cinema 
and society (Bakrim, 2013). Engagement with the social imaginary has put cinema on the 
political agenda, as heated debates demonstrate. 
 While the changing role of cinema in society is attributable to many factors, perhaps the 
most influential is increased filmmaker autonomy and willingness to engage in open activism. 
“Filmmakers, yesterday stuck in a narrow theoretical framework…have opened their eyes, their 
arms to the real, the modern, the complex. And good debate, one that can circulate between 
cinema and society, has emerged” (Boukhari, 2007). If the new Moroccan cinema has aspirations 
at the real, it also has aspirations at influencing real outcomes. The uprisings and political 
reforms of 2011 have presented new challenges and issues to be addressed, and in some ways 
this cinema is as experimental as the recent changes in society. In addressing her subjectivity and 
the way she positions herself as a filmmaker, Kilani says “in becoming a filmmaker I left the 
neutrality of a researcher in order to deliver all my subjectivity and say ‘I’” (Fabre, 2012). By 
speaking from somewhere and pushing the boundaries of representation the filmmakers of the 
new Moroccan cinema have participated in the production of culture as a deliberative space, 
even if the nature of their interventions are often called into question. While some audiences 
interpret this cinema’s social criticism as aversion to Moroccan society, filmmakers seem keen to 
demonstrate exactly the inverse: that it is commitment to their society and belief in its 
possibilities that keep them engaging in social and political debates through cinema. Marrakchi 
emphasized in an interview that the end of Marock “isn’t a sad end for my heroine, it is this 
memory that demonstrates the attachment she has to Morocco. And this is a positive force” 
(Antona, 2006). Similarly, standing on the stage at TIFF four years later, after the premier of her 
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second film, Marrakchi emphasized the important role leaving Morocco played in allowing her 
to engage in social commentary, saying “there comes a moment where it’s important to leave the 
family, the clan, in order to realize oneself and express oneself.” In other words, the shifting 
industrial logics of the new Moroccan cinema and its situation within transnational networks 
allow for ideological interventions by filmmakers that construct cinema as a discourse of social 










Mamfakinch: From Protest Slogan to Mediated Activism 
In February of 2011 Moroccan protestors took to the streets en masse, joining a wave of 
collective uprisings throughout North Africa and the Middle East that became known as the Arab 
Spring. In Morocco the protest movement became known as le Mouvement de 20 Février, or 
M20, after the kingdom’s largest day of protests that led King Mohamed VI1 to promise 
constitutional reform. One of the slogans of the Moroccan protestors was Mamfakinch, which 
means “no concessions” in Moroccan Arabic, in reference to the frequent cooptation of 
oppositional movements by the regime and frustration with the slow pace of democratic reform.  
 While Moroccan protests have come and gone, Mamfakinch remains as the name adopted 
by an offshoot of M20 that developed into a powerful media organization. Modeled after the 
Tunisian website Nawaat.org, which played a role in the country’s Jasmine Revolution, 
Mamfakinch defines itself as an activist citizen media portal, which according to the website, is 
composed of Moroccan activist bloggers who value democracy, liberty, respect for human rights 
and the right of access to information. Unlike Tunisia’s revolutionary orientation, Morocco’s 
protests were largely oriented toward reforming the existing system, with a focus on limiting the 
political power of the monarchy and its allies. In this moment, Mamfakinch served several 
functions aimed at exerting pressure on authorities to accelerate reform: compiling live coverage 
                                                            
1 Mohammed VI is the current king of Morocco, who is popularly referred to as “M6.” He took over the throne in 
1999 after the death of his totalitarian father, Hassan II, and is widely popular due to his “prince of the people” 
persona and reformist agenda, although few of those reforms have resulted in any meaningful change to the 
governing authority of the monarchy. 
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of protests, circulating both reformist and revolutionary culture, distributing news to both 
Moroccan and foreign media, and distributing foreign news coverage to Moroccans – all with the 
aim of making information accessible to average citizens (Akalay, 2011). In less than a year 
Mamfakinch had more than one million unique visitors to its site, was attacked by pro-regime 
groups, and won the 2012 Google/Global Voices Breaking Borders Award. What was initially a 
blog-based platform for aggregating information about protests and dispelling rumors about the 
M20 movement, eventually developed into a space for discussion and analysis of political 
agendas that continued to aggregate and curate content about M20 and social change in 
Morocco.  
 Mamfakinch raised questions about the process of public formation and engagement with 
a new cultural politics, whereby a divided political sphere, the Arab spring moment and its 
aftermath, and media affordances intervened in Morocco’s historically authoritarian political 
culture. Bayat (2010) calls this “agency in a time of constraints” in reference to the ways 
ordinary people make themselves present to or encroach on power in their everyday lives. In the 
case of Morocco cultural initiatives such as Mamfakinch have resulted in new modes of cultural 
politics defined by the formation of flexible publics, which primarily exist around the periphery 
of political life and occasionally coalesce around specific claims in highly visible ways that 
cannot be ignored, both by a monarchy not accustomed to responding to its citizen-subjects, and 
global society at large. In the case of Mamfakinch we see independent media become a forum for 
interaction outside the purview of the state in an environment where the media have long been 
closely linked with those in power. Additionally, the mediation of protests and protest culture by 
independent media allowed for public formation across diverse geographic and social spaces 
from the local to the global, expanding the range of relevant approaches and actors. The loosely 
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networked publics that emerged employed discourses and networks of protest emerging out of 
the Arab Spring moment to make claims aimed at the monarchy and government, demanding 
increased accountability from those bodies. 
Mediated activism and new modes of cultural politics 
This chapter uses Mamfakinch as a lens through which to analyze mediated activism in 
Morocco. Following Telquel and the new Moroccan cinema, the collective is yet another 
manifestation of an emergent independent media in Morocco that is creating new discursive 
spaces across platforms, this time with a non-commercial and explicitly activist bent. The 
Moroccan regime’s liberal attitude toward the Internet in its early days led to its construction as 
radically democratic and unregulated space, an understanding that has shifted as high profile 
crackdowns on individual actors, including some associated with Mamfakinch, have made the 
Internet a new frontier for Moroccan civil society’s longstanding struggles over human rights. 
Mamfakinch’s use of the digital in processes of content creation, campaign coordination and 
information curation constitutes one node in an alternative information infrastructure constructed 
around democratic conceptions of culture that are increasingly distant from official discourse and 
institutional politics.  
 I situate this work within a subset of the emergent global media literature on mediated 
activism that is concerned with the nature of online contention in various contexts. Specifically I 
draw on the work of Zayani (2015), Sreberny & Khiabany (2010), and Yang (2011), all of whom 
make arguments about the implications of the digital for the relationship between people and 
power in authoritarian states. Their work focuses on understanding dynamics of contention 
online as rooted in local articulations of multiple forces, many of which are transnational in 
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nature and historically contingent. My work aspires to be part of this tradition, while also putting 
it into conversation with the literature on contentious politics and publics.  
 In Networked Publics and Digital Contention, Zayani (2015) contends that the changing 
media environment in the MENA region is changing the nature of political engagement through 
“new ways of creating, consuming and using information” (p. 6). In analyzing the evolution of 
what he calls “digital spaces of contention” in Tunisian everyday life, Zayani comes to the 
intersection of the digital and political from the ground up, emphasizing the myriad of social 
forces at play and the ways in which articulations online may not be “necessarily politically 
framed, but are political in other ways” (p. 13) and the types of challenges that poses to an 
authoritarian society. While I agree that digital platforms and practices have offered new 
discursive spaces and modes of contention (in fact that is the key argument of this chapter), I 
argue that the digital accounts for only a subset of larger cultural field and, in the Moroccan case, 
its construction as a space of contention for a left in crisis.  
 In their book about blogging in Iran, Sreberny & Ghiabany (2010) make a similar 
argument that “the blogistan has become a space of contention between the people and the state” 
(p. 5) and any attempt to account for this phenomenon must address the porous nature of 
authoritarianism in the country. The contradictory role of the state in this context, as developing 
ICTs while simultaneously attempting to manage ideological challenges to its authority, is 
indicative of the political potential that exists in these spaces. Similar to Morocco, “in Iran, the 
closure of many press titles meant the opening up of websites carrying news and editorials, while 
blogs contain new material not available within the regime-controlled channel” (p. 10). In order 
to analyze the intersection of such materials with the politics, Sreberny & Ghiabany situate 
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blogging within a longer historical trajectory of revolution and pro-democracy movements 
without reducing blogging to an inherently political act.  
 Yang (2011) emphasizes the creative aspects of online culture while emphasizing that 
“contention is not limited to the political realm…Nor does activism necessarily have explicitly 
political goals” (p. 2). Many online discourses and debates are fundamentally about the 
articulation of various social imaginaries and are as much about the nature of modernities as 
particular causes or claims. In China, the internet offers a platform for “humor, play, and 
irreverence” while also being “participatory and contentious” (p. 15). We see similar dynamics 
of play and parody online in most parts of the world (including Morocco), and Kumar (2015) 
argues that participatory practices associated with viral culture are part of a “newly emerging 
discourse of social and cultural critique on the Indian web” (p. 232). While digital technologies 
do offer affordances that facilitate content creation and circulation, in many ways the internet is 
just the latest platform offering uncharted territories for self-expression and community 
formation. While focusing explicitly on online activism, Yang (2011) acknowledges that these 
developments parallel offline developments in around “the expansion of culture, community and 
citizen activism” (p. 17). The intersection of on- and offline spaces is fundamental to 
understanding the dynamics of digital contention in terms of ongoing discourses to which publics 
respond, what texts people to take up online and where the political comes into play.  
 My intervention involves integrating analyses across industry logics, technological 
platforms and cultural politics, so that it becomes clear how political economic shifts and 
technological affordances create the conditions of possibility for certain types of claim-making, 
as well as how those mediated claims are then taken up in public culture. Additionally, in regard 
to the emergent field of digital studies, I make the case that the artificial separating out of the 
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digital makes little sense and that in order to really understand the digital we have to look at it as 
part of intermedia relationships and convergences. Given the way media systems have developed 
around the world, I adopt a comparative, cross-platform approach in order to situate the digital in 
relation to other media forms. Ultimately, this discursive analysis of Mamfakinch as an 
organization sheds light on the minute practices through which online collectives come together 
with media and civil society to establish networks of mutual support and reinforcement that are 
at times capable of bridging ideological divides.  
 The question raised by using Mamfakinch as a lens to think about media and cultural 
politics in Morocco is: How do organizations such as Mamfakinch produce and mobilize 
information infrastructures and symbolic resources?  Additionally, in what ways does this 
mobilization produce opportunities for the articulation of alternative social projects and critical 
issues by publics often disillusioned with institutional politics? I contend that Mamfakinch taps 
into newly networked and increasingly worldly youth digital cultures in order to act as a platform 
for publics disillusioned with institutional politics and unaccustomed to making direct demands 
of power. In doing so it allows for making the private public and leverages transnational 
networks against national politics. Mamfakinch’s production and circulation of oppositional 
culture taps into the widespread frustration with corruption and constant cooptation that made 
Mamfakinch such a successful Arab Spring slogan in the first place. Mamfakinch members, like 
many other independent media producers, frequently talk about bypassing the state and 
established media organizations in producing “real” stories from “real” people. This suggests 
that the symbolic systems advanced by the state are somehow not real, or at the very least do not 
represent the everyday realities inhabited by many Moroccans, while Mamfakinch opens up a 
space for defiant claims that publics are no longer willing to make concessions on certain issues.  
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 As stated above, I conducted a discourse analysis of Mamfakinch as an organization, 
building an archive of their work from 2011 through 2014. I also followed the collective and 
individual members on social media and conducted interviews with four members of the 
collective, including co-founder Hisham Almiraat. I originally intended to focus my analysis on 
three moments in which Mamfakinch intervened, however the Amina Filali case proved to be so 
rich in terms of illuminating dynamics at play in the aftermath of the Arab Spring that I decided 
to focus primarily on that case and relegate Free Koulchi and Danielgate to supplemental 
analyses.  
 I start by discussing Mamfakinch’s operations and aims before situating them in the 
literatures on contentious politics and publics. I then construct a genealogy of the digital in 
Morocco and what it means for dissent. Finally I detail Mamfakinch’s participation in 
mobilizations around the Amina Filali affair before concluding with the organization’s 
transformation into the Association of Digital Rights (ADN), and its ongoing prosecution by the 
state.  
 There are several threads running through Mamfakinch that I want to outline before 
getting into its specifics. The first is industry and capital and in the case of Mamfakinch this is 
important because the Moroccan government has been partnering with major 
telecommunications firms (Vivendi, Etisalat) and investing heavily in making Morocco a 
regional telecommunications hub. Maroc Telecom has introduced two new, entirely self-funded 
high-speed fiber optic submarine cables since 2007 and is extending its reach into other West 
African countries. At the same time, the number of internet subscribers grew by 60 percent 
between 2005 and 2010 and it is estimated that a third of the country is online, mostly through 
mobile phones. The second thread is technological affordances, specifically the rise of user-
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generated content, access to a wide variety of cultural forms and perspectives, and the possibility 
of anonymity. The third and final thread involves a cultural politics that centers on the 
production and circulation of texts, including information, editorials and irreverent or sarcastic 
humor. Through these overarching threads, it becomes clear that Mamfakinch makes possible 
both the production and mediation of conversations and sensibilities that previously took place in 
private, ultimately acting as a forum that merges public and private in order to push back on 
power.  
Mamfakinch operations and aims 
The collective was co-founded by three bloggers, all of whom are activists involved in multiple 
online initiatives. At its height approximately 30 bloggers in various locations comprised the 
Mamfakinch collective, although the public was invited to submit information and essays for 
publication. As time passed a handful of 10-12 activists came to form the core of the collective 
that was required to have a four-year post-secondary degree. Operating through mailing lists, 
Google Docs, and occasional meetings or Skype sessions, the collective debated ideas for essays 
and articles, posted through Posterous, edited and translated information from other sources, and 
located its site on a server in Switzerland. Many Mamfakinch members have their own blogs or 
are involved in numerous other activist initiatives and say the site benefits from the cross posting 
between these platforms and publics (Errazzouki, personal communication, 2013). As 
Mamfakinch attempted to improve the legitimacy of the amorphous M20 movement and dispel 
rumors, one of its major challenges was verifying information. The site has been critiqued for 
publishing some information that turned out to be false, for instance a report that the northern 
city of Al Hoceima was surrounded by tanks (Mamfakinch, 25 Fev 2011). Despite these 
moments, Mamfakinch’s goal of creating an alternative media not dependent on advertising and 
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a movement without concessions to the regime, can be seen as an attempt to affect cultural 
change and turn M20 into a viable political alternative by producing flexible publics that 
coalesce around issue-specific claims. 
 One Mamfakinch blogger believes that M20 and Mamfakinch emerged out of widespread 
disillusionment with the left in Morocco. “When the socialists came to power in 2002 and 2007, 
he said, they looked at the monarchy and said it’s too strong, so we’ll work with it on the 
conditions of respecting human rights and elections. The left had come to power in the collective 
imagination, but its collaboration with the traditional state apparatus and lack of progressive 
change left it without credible leadership, a clear political program or electoral strength” 
(Bennamate, personal communication, 2013). The failure of the left to institute meaningful 
change in Morocco led many, especially youth, to reject the ideologically-oriented political 
parties and activism of their parents’ generation, and the divided political sphere in general. 
Another Mamfakinch blogger I interviewed stated that the refusal of older generations and those 
in power to incorporate youth and new ideas into existing power structures has made youth a 
“formidable force” in opposition to “a palace that’s disconnected from reality…a blinded 
government that also happens to be deaf…[and] political parties’ [whose] main concern is to 
sabotage each other and get the majority while bowing down to the king’s will at all times” 
(Belmkaddem, personal communication, 2013). The ability of the king to exert influence, 
particularly on the media, means that frequently the only story being told is that of the 
government elites, and youth tend to be shut out of participation in discourse. A third 
Mamfakinch blogger contended that one mark of the group’s success has been “the greater media 
attention Morocco has received and continues to receive since protests began in February 
2011…the most important thing is that international media organizations are not simply 
 172 
defaulting to statements produced by state media, she said. The fact that our members are 
regularly getting interviewed suggests there’s space and an interest to cover what the Moroccan 
regime doesn’t want outsiders to know” (Errazzouki, personal communication, 2013). Rallying 
cries such as “Mamfakinch!” that began as protest slogans have developed into a form of 
symbolic capital that can be mobilized both on- and off-line in order to produce publics around 
oppositional discourses and culture. As a media organization Mamfakinch is a product of 
diasporic networks and technological affordances that allows for the production of different 
types of texts and publics than those of mainstream Moroccan media. 
Flexible publics 
For Morocco, thinking about social change necessitates looking outside the realm of institutional 
politics to attempts to engage people in politics through culture. Warner’s (2002) conception of a 
textual public is organized by discourse, sovereign in relation to the state and involves the 
attention of a populace unknowable until its address. It is rooted in social reality, but its power 
exists precisely in its ability to go beyond the known or intended and remake worlds by 
expanding the range of social imaginaries and their structural manifestations. Warner (2002) 
builds this notion of publicness on recuperative readings of Habermas, Arendt and Kant as part 
of the liberal tradition, where the individual as private person becomes the site of “publicly 
relevant rights” merely by virtue of being human (p. 39). This relationship between private and 
public has come to define modern political thought, especially in regard to the state’s bearing on 
the individual. A public can be sovereign because it is composed of individuals operating outside 
the limits of state power. In short, it is “a space of discourse organized by discourse. It is self-
creating and self-organized; and herein lies its power, as well as its elusive strangeness” (Warner, 
2002, p. 69). This “elusive strangeness” derives from the self-organization of strangers, 
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interaction with whom is essential to modern society. Publics are often talked about as national 
or as necessarily corresponding with a political entity, but Warner (2002) draws on Kant’s 
distinction between public and political, in recognizing that there are publics, particularly textual 
publics, “that do not correspond to any kind of polity,” (p. 45) yet are political in a different way. 
“These critical publics…may set a higher standard of reason, opinion, and freedom - hence the 
subversive potential in [Kant’s] picture of enlightenment” (Warner, 2002, p. 46). The subversive 
potential of reading publics is well documented throughout history, with perhaps the best 
example coming from Martin Luther’s reforms aiming to end the Church’s monopoly on 
knowledge and restore a direct relationship between God and vernacular publics.  
From this perspective we can start to understand “the multi-contextual spaces of circulation” 
(Warner, 2002, p. 119) involved in the cultural life of the transnational Moroccan left (as part of 
media, educational institutions, NGOs, cultural orgs, etc) as part of a progressive counterpublic. 
Warner contends that counter publics are defined by their reflexive relation to dominant society 
and culture in that “They are structured by different dispositions or protocols from those that 
obtain elsewhere in the culture, making different assumptions about what can be said or what 
goes without saying” (ibid., p. 119). The Moroccan discourse of “bled schizo” is fundamentally 
about the norms of acceptability and their ideological foundations being radically different in 
different social spaces (a situation exacerbated by a highly stratified society and split publics) 
and the constant awareness of a public that is negotiating among those spaces, even if that 
negotiation involves a relatively privileged position. “Counterpublics are ‘counter’ to the extent 
that they try to supply different ways of imagining stranger sociability and its reflexivity…” (p. 
122). In many ways the progressive counterpublic associated with Mamfakinch is responding to 
an Islamist counterpublic that came out of the marginalization of the left and has gained 
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legitimacy and political power in recent decades with its version of stranger sociability based on 
conformity to Islamic precepts. Both of these counterpublics have acquired varying degrees of 
agency in relation to the state, for which nationalism rooted in the monarchy is still the dominant 
paradigm. For moderate Islamists this meant formation of a political party (the PJD) and 
increasingly professional politicization, while the left has pinned its hopes on everyday urban 
culture and youth in particular as most recently manifest in the Arab Spring-associated M20 
movement.  
 Warner refers to “mediated publics” in the sense that they are textual publics constructed 
through discourse, but the structure of their mediation in relation to digital platforms and 
practices warrants further consideration, particularly across variations in time and space. Warner 
blatantly states “One of the central claims of this book is that when people address publics, they 
engage in struggles – at varying levels of salience and consciousness, from calculated tactic to 
mute cognitive noise – over the conditions that bring them together as a public” (p. 12). That 
struggle is increasingly taking place online and processes of mediation associated with the digital 
are producing new kinds of publics and possibilities. In The Wealth of Networks, Benkler (2006) 
argues that a new stage of the information economy is emerging that is defined by networks 
where the “coordinate effects of the uncoordinated actions of a wide and diverse range of 
individuals and organizations, acting on a wide range of motivations” results in the “peer 
production of knowledge, information and culture” (p. 5). Benckler outlines a shift from an 
industrial information economy based on [centralized] capital-intensive industrial production of 
mass media to a networked information economy associated with increased access to the tools of 
information production [more decentralized], reduced barriers to entry and enhanced autonomy 
for participation in non market collaborative info production efforts.  
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 The implications of access to the means of production and distribution for democracy and 
the public sphere are summed up when Benckler speaks of the internet revolution, not as a 
singular event or series of events as many accounts have done, especially as seen in the myriad 
of references to the Arab Spring as a Facebook or Twitter revolution. Rather, Benckler speaks of 
the internet revolution as a deep and ongoing structural transformation in the relationship 
between liberal markets and liberal democracies (p. 1). While acknowledging ongoing battles 
over the network’s material and institutional manifestations, I analyze what these changes mean 
for illiberal authoritarian or semi-authoritarian societies. In the case of Mamfakinch we see an 
expanding array of relevant actors, realms of collaboration and opportunities to learn from and 
work with other initiatives – all associated with more democratic understandings of culture and a 
plane of politics that extends beyond the nation. In some ways writing in 2006 perhaps leads 
Benckler to understate the Internet’s market-driven development as a tool for buying and selling, 
but his comparison of its capacity for information production with the previous mass mediated 
public sphere rather than some idealized version of the marketplace of ideas is a fair one. A 
networked information economy undeniably enables qualitative improvements in “the diversity 
of perspectives on the way the world is and the way it could be for any given individual” (p. 9).  
 Ito et al. (2008) bring together understandings of publics and networks in the concept of 
“networked publics,” which they use to refer to dynamically engaged publics defined by 
multidirectional information flows. Rather than traditional top-down flows of information, four 
trends that Ito et al. say define these new forms and forums for engagement are: accessibility, 
peer distribution, value at the edges and aggregation of information and culture (p. 2). Publics are 
networked in that they are increasingly active and able to both input and extract information at 
will, creating new possibilities for participation and sociability both in and outside of 
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institutional politics. In a case study of Indian Idol 3, Punathambekar (2010) uses the phrase 
“mobile publics” to explore participatory cultures surrounding television and their possibilities 
for overcoming ethno-national politics in northeast India. He argues that the combination of 
mobile phones and reality TV allows for the resurrection of certain modes of publicness and 
public interactions previously unimaginable due to the separatist politics of the region (p. 243). 
Specifically, the fan following of Idol contestant Amit Paul encompassed diverse publics 
mobilized to work cooperatively as “fluid and ephemeral” publics allowing for “the articulation 
of new cultural and political possibilities that might not be possible in more formal institutional 
settings” (p. 251). The modes and mechanisms of sharing and collaboration enabled by mobile 
phones for Indian Idol fans are forms of sociability that have the potential to be generative. 
 In the Moroccan case, significant hurdles also exist in the realm of institutional politics. 
A divided political sphere characterized by (at last count) thirty-four political parties, a king 
acting as ultimate arbiter and the complex system of royal privilege surrounding the makhzen2 
mean that the barriers to political change often seems insurmountable, especially in a country 
where politics itself has been reason for gross human rights violations at worst and paternalistic 
authoritarianism at best. Political parties are often seen as out of touch with reality and 
disillusionment with the proferred choices means that an emergent independent media are using 
technological affordances to reshape and democratize public culture. From its beginning as an 
attempt to aggregate information and media reports about Arab Spring protests to its shift toward 
critical analysis and operation as cultural conduit, Mamfakinch maintained that peer production 
of information and a culture of critique could challenge the status quo in a traditionally top-down 
                                                            
2 Makhzen is a Moroccan Arabic word meaning “storehouse,” that was used to refer to the state in the form of a 
governing establishment revolving around the sultan and associated notables in various sectors. More recently it has 
come to stand in for an extensive system of royal privilege and clientelism associated with the contemporary 
Moroccan state. This “deep state” surrounding the monarchy is understood to be the real center of power in 
Moroccan political life despite the existence of parliament and other ostensibly democratic institutions. 
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political and media environment. The organization played a role in producing what I am calling 
“flexible publics,” or groups that coalesce around particular issues, asserting claims in public and 
provocative ways. In the Moroccan case, flexibility is key due to a long history of cooptation of 
opposition movements and particularly in finding places to counter the maneuverings of power at 
critical junctures. When moments of crisis and particularly problematic issues arise, groups such 
as Mamfakinch are capable of harnessing technological capabilities, social capital and symbolic 
resources in order to coalesce around public conversations, resulting in a sort of activist 
information infrastructure that can be mobilized via its loosely connected network.   
 When I say flexibility I mean it in multiple senses: the flexibility to move between 
platforms, to tackle diverse issues, to move between on and offline spaces, to respond quickly to 
the maneuverings of power and, perhaps most importantly, the ideological flexibility to build 
support among disparate groups. This sort of coalition-building among sometimes unlikely allies 
fundamentally involves attempts to construct a meaningful/viable opposition through 
orientations toward broad issues like human rights and dignity. Unlikely allies though they may 
be, leftists and Islamists share the common experience of being seen as the greatest threat to the 
monarchy at some point and the target of repression both in physical space and online. A global 
crisis of the left and a generation of youth more likely to forsake fixed ideological orientations 
for loose ties and individual commitments, mean that this can be seen as a project of critique that 
takes as its target the both the powers that be and the movements, parties and ideologies that 
have historically opposed them. In the midst of this disillusionment with political parties 
(understood as lacking real power) and institutional politics writ large, there is the sense that a 
more democratic culture has the potential to be generative in a way that politics does not. This is 
about changing mentalities to some extent, but also about starting a conversation that engages 
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with the diverse lived realities of Moroccans and creating points of encounter among split 
publics. In this way flexible publics are very much a process that through articulation seeks to 
expand the social imaginary and find resonance among diverse and diffuse subjectivities, 
ultimately seeking to reconstruct the relationship between the individual and society, as well as 
the private-public continuum. 
Digital genealogies 
Telecommunications and ICT Service providers  
Telecommunications in Morocco are built on the back of postal, and later telegraphy, 
infrastructure. Although today the word “telecommunications” is associated with electronic 
communication, the prefix “tele-“ derives from the Greek “at a distance” meaning that the post is 
in fact among the earliest of telecommunication mechanisms. Sultan Moulay Hassan, established 
the “poste chérifienne” in 1892, which became the l’Office Chérifien des PTT3 in 1913 after the 
Treaty of Fez established Morocco as a French protectorate (Barid Al-Maghrib, 2013; Maroc 
Telecom, 2014). A 1924 dahir, or royal decree, established the monopoly of the “Moroccan 
Office of Telegraphs and Telephones” in all telecommunications services (Bulletin Officiel, 
1924), which continued after Moroccan independence in 1956 under the new “Ministry of Post 
and Telecommunications” (Barid al-Maghrib, 2013; El Kabsi, 2003, p. 63). A reorganization of 
the ministry in 1984 led to the establishment of al-Maktab al-Watani lil-barid wa al-Itissalat, or 
the National Post and Telecommunications Office (ONPT) as a public institution formally 
separate from political power (Barid al-Maghrib, 2013; Ibahrine, 2004, p. 2; ITU, 2001, p. 7; 
Maroc Telecom, 2014). 
                                                            
3 PTT stands for Les Postes, télégraphes et téléphones, the French government telecommications agency, or which 
the Moroccan PTT was derived. 
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 Today the major telecommunications provider in Morocco is Itissalat al-Maghrib 
(IAM)/Maroc Telecom, the successor of the ONPT. Maroc Telecom emerged from Law 24-96, 
which separated the postal and telecommunication functions of the office and aimed to liberalize 
and privatize the Moroccan telecommunications sector, previously under government monopoly 
(Maroc Telecom, 2014) Maroc Telecom4 was born as private corporation in 1998, although it 
continued to be 100 percent government owned until 2001, when French multinational Vivendi 
bought 35 percent for $2.3 billion USD (ANRT, 2001, p. 4; ITU, 2001, p. 7; M.K., 2000), 
followed by additional acquisitions. In 2004 Maroc Telecom listed 14.99 percent of its capital on 
the Casablanca and Paris stock exchanges (Maroc Telecom, 2014). Vivendi’s 53 percent stake in 
Maroc Telecom was bought by Etisalat in 2014, and the Moroccan state continues to control a 30 
percent stake in the company (Maroc Telecom, 2016). 
 The same law that gave birth to Maroc Telecom established National Agency of 
Telecommunication Regulation (ANRT) in 1998 to oversee the liberalization of the 
telecommunications market. Along with Jordan, Morocco was the first country in the Arab 
region to issue a second mobile license in 1999 (ITU, 2009, p. 16-17). According to the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), WTO agreements were an important factor in 
driving telecommunication market liberalization in the Arab region (ITU, 2009, p. 17). An early 
study of the internet in Morocco states “Morocco obtained around $215 million from 
international organizations at the end of 1998 to liberalize its telecommunications, postal and IT 
sector” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 100-101). In 1999 the World Bank approved an Information 
Technology Sector Adjustment Loan (TPI-SAL) of $101 million USD in conjunction with 
                                                            
4 “…result of Law 24-96, the incumbent Maroc Telecom was created as a limited liability company and partially 
privatized in 2001 when 35% was sold to the French company Vivendi.xviii Since then there was an additional sale 
to Vivendi and in 2007, part of Maroc Telecom was offered to the public through a listing on the Casablanca Stock 
Exchange. At the end of 2010, Vivendi owned 53% of the shares, the Kingdom of Morocco 30% and the public 
14%.” (Constant, 2011, p. 8) 
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African Development Bank funds of $113 million USD requested by the ANRT to “support 
Government efforts to effectively implement the reforms the new legal and regulatory 
framework now makes possible” (World Bank, 1999, p. 2), basically privatization of the 
telecommunications sector. In particular the loan supported the distribution of a second mobile 
license, which was awarded to Médi Telecom in December 1999 after a transparent bidding 
process that yielded a record-breaking $1.1 billion USD (ANRT, 2001, p. 19; ITU, 2001, p. 5; 
World Bank, 2001, p. 2). A multinational corporation, Médi Telecom was composed of foreign 
investors Portugal Telecom (30.5%) and Téléfonica (Spain, 30.5%,), as well as local players 
BMCE Bank (20%), Groupe Afriquia (11%) and CDG (8%), a signal that the Moroccan 
government was serious about opening up the telecommunications sector to foreign direct 
investment (Constant, 2011, p. 9; ITU, 2001, p. 13).  Established in 2000, Médi Telecom became 
the second mobile operator with its Méditel5 mobile service.  
 In the early 2000s, the mobile market in Morocco exploded, which is particularly 
significant given that it came to be the mechanism through which most Moroccans access the 
internet. In its first annual report, ANRT noted that “teledensity in the mobile sector role rose 
dramatically from 0.4 percent to 15.68 percent, an increase of 3820 percent between 1998 and 
2001” (ANRT, 2001, p. 6). Similarly, a 2004 report states “Growth rates in the Moroccan 
cellular market have exceeded 242 percent for the last four years making the cellular market one 
of the fastest growing, not only in Africa and the Arab world, but also in the entire world,” 
                                                            
5 Portugal Telecom and Téléfonica left Médi Telecom in 2009, and CDG and FinanceCom became the major 
shareholders (Orange Maroc, http://corporate.orange.ma/A-propos-d-Orange-au-Maroc/Histoire ). In December 
2010, Orange, which is a 2006 rebranding of France Telecom, bought a 40 percent stake in Méditel - by 2015 it 
controlled 49 percent and began rebranding the company as Orange au Maroc (Orange au Maroc, 
http://www.orange.com/fr/content/download/40331/1268468/version/2/file/CP_Orange_Meditel_FR_081216.pdf ). 
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(Ibahrine, 2004, p. 4). In 2007 ANRT issued a third mobile license to Wana6, this time a CDSM 
license (Henni, 2007), although in 2009 Wana received a GSM license and shortly afterward a 
joint venture between Kuwaiti firm Zain Groupe and Morocco’s Al Ajial Investment Fund 
Holding bought 31 percent of the ONA’s7 51 percent stake in the company (ANRT, 2009, p. 23; 
TeleGeography, 2009). As of 2017 these three players – Maroc Telecom, Méditel and Wana – 
continue to be the only mobile operators in the country. By 2015, mobile penetration reached 
127 percent (ANRT, 2016, p. 3). These significant transformations in the telecommunication 
sector were part of a broader movement toward economic liberalization in Morocco and occurred 
around the same time that Morocco signed free trade agreements with Europe and the U.S. as 
part of a more generalized processes of privatization.   
 Internet entrance. In Morocco public access to the internet became available in 1995 
through the ONPT (Constant, 2011, p. 2; El Kabsi, 2003, p. 36). According to a World Bank 
report “Initially, ONPT rented out its bandwidth to ISPs through leased lines and the ISPs then 
sold dial-up services to customers…When Maroc Telecom was formed in 1998, it modified its 
policy and began selling services directly to customers making it difficult for smaller ISPs to 
compete” (Constant, 2011, p. 27). In 1999 Maroc Telecom purchased 80 percent of Casanet 
(Jankari, 2000), an internet service provider (ISP) and creator of Menara, the first Moroccan 
search engine in 1995 (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 47). By 2002 Casanet was 100 percent owned by 
Maroc Telecom (Maroc Telecom, 2014). Limited bandwidth meant that “internet service 
providers suffered from bandwidth saturation; they feed from specialized 64Kb/s lines, which 
                                                            
6 Originally Wana was an internet service provider under the name Wanadoo Maroc a subsidiary of France 
Telecom’s ISP division Wanadoo and then became Maroc Connect after being bought by Attijariwafa Bank and 
CDG. In 2005 Maroc Connect was sold for 40 million euros to ONA, now SNI, whose major shareholders are the 
Moroccan royal family. In 2007 it was rebaptized Wana Corporate (Constant, 2011, p. 9 & 27; Henni, 2007). 
7 Omnium Nord Africain, or ONA, was a private Moroccan holding company controlled by the royal family. In 
2010 it merged with Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI) and dropped the ONA title, although it is still 
controlled by the royal family. 
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creates a bottleneck and slows data throughput” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 68), leading many 
Moroccans to refer to the internet as the “world wide wait” (Ibahrine, 2004, p. 7). Other early 
barriers to the internet in Morocco included cost in relation to incomes, low literacy (and digital 
literacy) levels, a significant rural population and lack of non-English content, especially Arabic 
content (non-Latin URLs, or IDNs, didn’t become available until 2011).  
 Broadband. In 2003 high speed internet became available in Morocco via ADSL 
(ANRT, 2003, p. 20 & p. 27). At that time “users had options in obtaining high-speed Internet at 
speeds ranging from 128, 256, 512, or 1024 kbits” (Constant, 2011, p. 8). The year high speed 
internet became available, ANRT reported “Morocco has about a million internet users, 
representing a penetration rate of 3.3 percent and a 42 percent increase over 2002 estimates” 
(ANRT, 2003, p. 26). ADSL service was and continues to be dominated by Maroc Telecom, 
which inherited the wired network. Fixed broadband access is “essentially limited to ADSL 
because cable modem is not a viable alternative (due to the popularity of satellite television) and 
where the cost of fiber installation for local access is often prohibitive” (Constant, 2011, p. 25).  
 Deployment of 3G. By all accounts, the arrival of 3G in Morocco heralded an incredible 
expansion of internet usage. In 2006 ANRT awarded three 3G mobile licenses to Maroc 
Telecom, Méditel and Wana Corporate at a price of 360 million MAD per license (ANRT, 2006, 
p. 26). In selecting the operators ANRT held what Constant (2011) calls a “beauty contest” 
rather than a bidding war, in a process that “focuses on technical criteria rather than price, and 
includes questions that request prospective operators to address equity in coverage especially in 
rural areas, job creation, service provision, and to also provide strong indication of financial 
viability” (p. 15). The introduction of 3G mobile broadband in 2007 resulted in: an almost three-
fold increase of international internet bandwidth (from 25 130 Mbit/s to 75 000 Mbit/s), a 40 
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percent fall in fixed broadband prices and expansion in mobile broadband penetration from 2.3 
percent in 2008 to 10 percent in 2010 (ITU, 2011, p. 18). Maroc Telecom’s ADSL monopoly 
was challenged by the introduction of 3G mobile broadband, leading to a significant drop in 
prices and corresponding increases in usage; Morocco now ranks among least expensive both in 
Arab region and EU for mobile internet pricing (ANRT, 2016, p. 8-9; ITU, 2011, p. 18). 
 During the period when 3G was introduced in Morocco the country improved by 10 
places to 90/152 on the ITU’s ICT Development Index (IDI) (ITU, 2011, p. 13), resulting in a 
second place ranking in the most dynamic countries based on change in IDI ranking between 
2008 and 2010 (ITU, 2011, p. 15). While Morocco ranks relatively well in the access (79/152) 
and use (65/152) sub-indices of the IDI, its ranking is dramatically lower in the skills sub-index 
(122/152), which uses literacy rates and school enrollment to measure “a country’s level of 
human capacity and its ability to absorb and take advantage of ICTs” (ITU, 2011, p. 37). 
Problems with education continue to plague the country despite improvements, and are one 
reason a major emphasis on increasing postsecondary education has been part of Morocco’s 
digital policy initiatives. Despite education problems, “The number of internet users grew by an 
estimated 60 per cent from 2005 to 2010” and became “the communication platform preferred by 
Moroccan youth” (Zaid & Ibahrine, 2011, p. 7). In 2010, 65 percent of individuals ages 12-65 
were using the internet (ITU, 2011, p. 109), although access continues to be uneven. Morocco 
has the sharpest rural/urban divide listed in the ITU index – 40.4 percent in rural areas8 and 75.6 
percent in urban areas (ITU, 2011, p. 119). Reported motivations for internet use are primarily 
communicative and cultural/entertainment (ITU, 2011, p. 123). 
                                                            
8 Rural users also more likely to use via internet cafe (ITU, 2011, p. 119). The number of cybercafés had reached 
8,950 in 2009 (Ibahrine & Zaid, 2011, p. 18). 
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 More recent numbers from the ANRT show that more than 90 percent of subscribers use 
mobile internet access (ANRT, 2016, p. 7), via 3G using a mobile phone or USB modem. Mobile 
broadband usage has mushroomed from 1.4 million subscribers in 2010 to 13.3 million in 2015, 
while ADSL subscribers grew from .5 million in 2010 to 1.1 million in 2015, for a total of 14.4 
million Moroccans with Internet access or about 42 percent of the population, not counting 
internet cafe users (ANRT, 2016, p. 7). The country’s early adoption of 3G means that in 2011 
the percentage of the Moroccan population online “exceeded most countries in the MENA region 
including neighbors Egypt and Tunisia” (Morocco = 49/100; Tunisia = 37/100; Egypt = 27/100) 
(Constant, 2011, p. 20). Morocco’s early prioritization of telecom development and liberalization 
have been lauded by organizations like the ITU, which published a report titled “Effective 
regulation case study: Morocco 2001,” even as the country has at times struggled to keep up its 
early momentum.  
State strategies 
The Moroccan state was an early advocate of the strategic importance of telecommunications, 
and its turn-of-the-century regulatory framework and liberalization politicies are often lauded as 
an example for the Global South, as well as a reason the Morocco manages to break the ranks of 
countries with far more resources in terms of telecom penetration and usage.9 The major 
regulatory shift associated with law 24-96 in 1998 was preceded by several state initiatives to 
modernize and expand the telecommunications sector beginning in 1987 with a $125 million 
USD loan from the World Bank (World Bank, 1995, p. 5), followed by a 1993-1997 project 
receiving 743,56 millions UC from various donors, including the African Development Bank 
(ABD, 1999). “A major effort was made as part of the 1993-1997 program to extend and 
                                                            
9 “Similarly to mobile telephony, four out of five countries with the highest level of Internet user penetration are 
GCC countries (chart 1.13). The only exception in the top five list is Morocco, with a penetration of 33.0 per cent, as 
of 2008” (ITU, 2009, p. 10). 
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modernize the telecommunications network, develop rural telecommunications together with a 
wide range of new services such as data transmission and cellular services” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 
35). After the passage of law 24-96 the Sécretariat d’Etat aux Postes et Technologies 
d’Information (SEPTI) constructed a five year plan (Plan quinquennal 1999-2003) promulgating 
ICT development as national priority (e-Morocco 2010, 2007, p. 10). 
 Telecommunication reform for the digital age and as part of the global economy, like 
many successful Moroccan projects, had support at the highest levels. In his 1997 Throne 
Speech, King Hassan II talked about telecommunications privatization being imperative because 
the need for investment in the sector went beyond the abilities of the state, saying “In the field of 
communications, a reform of the institutional framework governing this sector is inevitable due 
to demands from the increased liberalization of the world economy on the one hand and rapid 
technological developments on the other” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 62).   For the Moroccan state, 
telecommunications was seen as a profitable industry in and of itself that the country was 
uniquely positioned to benefit from, but also a tool for economic development and access to 
other industries10 associated with the global knowledge economy. This was of special urgency in 
Morocco given that the economy suffered dramatically as a result of drought and “the economic 
situation is characterized by predominantly low value-added commercial activities and low 
levels of productivity, Morocco must orient itself toward the knowledge economy, which 
constitutes a formidable vector of development, capable of orienting commercial activity toward 
sectors with high added value” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 20). In 2001, telecommunications accounted 
for 4 percent of Morocco’s gross domestic product and between 1998 and 2001 the sector 
accounted for 66 percent of foreign investment in the country (ANRT, 2001).  
                                                            
10 One industry that has created jobs in Morocco as a result of the country’s investments in telecommunications is 
call centers. Morocco has become a major hub for the off-shoring of French and francophone call centers. 
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 The government adopted several successive strategies to capitalize on this growth and 
become a player in the global information society. A national strategy under the name “E-
Morocco/E-Maroc” was adopted in 2001 to “establish a very high bandwidth national data 
network for applications in education, e–commerce, e–government and many other important 
areas” (Ibahrine, 2004, p. 8). “Drawn from the SEPTI strategy of 1999-2005, the themes of e-
Morocco focused on closing the digital divide and positioning Morocco globally as a key ICT 
player. The premise was to create an ecosystem of good governance and enabling regulation that 
fosters competition, knowledge production and ICT exportation” (Constant, 2011, p. 6). The 
major points of the plan included: liberalization of telecommunications; establishment of a legal 
and regulatory framework for infrastructure; education, training and research; e-government at 
state and local levels; and battling the digital divide (Rochdi, 2001, p. 254-255). According to a 
2007 plan update, Morocco’s emphasis on ICTs is based on the industry’s  “crucial role in the 
effort undertaken to elaborate and materialize a specific model of sustainable social and 
economic development for Morocco” and cites Mohammed VI as saying, “This is because we 
strive to ensure for our great people a global and integrated development, allowing Morocco to 
occupy the position that it deserves in a world transformed by the digital revolution 
underway”(Morocco, 2007, p. 9).  
 Digital Morocco 2013 (aka Maroc Numeric): National Strategy for Information Society 
and Digital Economy 2009-2013 was initiated in 2009 under the patronage of the Ministry of 
Industry, Trade and New Technologies with the support of Mohammed VI. It outlines four 
strategic priorities: social transformation, utilities based on usage, computerization of small and 
medium enterprises, and development of the IT industry (Morocco, 2009, p. 21). The major shift 
from previous strategies seems to be its external focus, as seen in the emphasis on offshoring, 
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export of IT services and establishment of Morocco as a regional telecommunications hub. 
Constant (2011) contends that Maroc Numeric 2013 stands out from previous strategies in its 
emphasis on broadband and integrated support for ANRT’s regulatory mandate (p. 6-7). 
Investment in the project was estimated at 5,187 millions MAD, not including private sector 
capital (Morocco, 2009, p. 96).  
 However, a 2014 evaluation of the project by Court of Auditors, the body charged with 
analyzing public sector finances, indicates the project achieved less than optimal results. 
Specifically, the evaluation notes that “The MN2013 strategy was weak in priorities, initiatives 
and actions,” basically lacking in concrete measures as to how these overarching ambitions 
would be realized (Cour des Comptes, 2014, p. 4). Of the four strategic priorities listed above, 
the best results came in e-Gov projects (this is also probably the priority over which the ministry 
has the most direct control), although only 36 percent were completed and 38 percent in progress 
at the time of the evaluation (Cour des Comptes, 2014, p. 2). The worst results came from social 
transformation/educational initiatives, of which only 11 percent were completed and 20 percent 
of the initial projects were abandoned (Cour des Comptes, 2014, p. 2). As this was the first 
formal evaluation of such a strategy, it was impossible to take the challenges of previous projects 
like e-Morocco into account in developing Maroc Numeric 2013 or to compare their results 
(Cour des Comptes, 2014, p. 4). Several online news outlets picked up the report, indicating a 
move toward transparency and accountability on government projects, with H24info reporting 
“In a severe report, the Court of Auditors enumerates the flaws and malfunctions of a strategy 
supposed to get Morocco out of the digital torpor…Rarely has a national strategy been so 
decried” (H24info, 2014). Despite this, by the end of 2014 a new plan “Maroc Numéric 2020” 
was in the works. 
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 Aside from, and sometimes as part of, these overarching visions for a digital Morocco, 
the country has taken steps to build investment in and development of telecommunications into 
its regulatory framework from the beginning. One of the most important provisions in this area is 
the concept of universal service, which was “first introduced into Morocco in Law 24-96, which 
defines it as ‘the making available to everyone of a minimum service consisting of a telephone 
service of specified quality at an affordable price, together with the connection of emergency 
calls, the provision of an information service and a directory of subscribers, either in printed or in 
electronic form, and the provision throughout the country of telephone booths installed in public 
places, all in keeping with the principles of equality, continuity, universality and flexibility’” 
(ITU, 2001, p. 35). It is even more remarkable to note that this concept originated at a time when 
the total teledensity of the country (fixed and mobile) was 5.4 percent (ANRT, 2001, p. 6). 
According to the ANRT “The introduction of competition into the telecommunications sector has 
been accompanied by measures enabling access to telephone service for everyone, whatever their 
social category or place of residence” (ANRT, 2001, p. 51).  
 In order to make progress toward this reality, Law 24-96 required all operators of public 
networks to contribute 4 percent of their turnover to a Universal Service Fund (ITU, 2001, p. 35). 
This provision was not enacted until 2004 when Law 55-01 modifying and completing Law 24-
96 specified that all operators of public telecommunications networks must contribute 2 percent 
of their turnover before taxes to a Universal Service Fund to expand access in underserved areas, 
and .25 percent of turnover for research (Bulletin Officiel #5266, 2004, p. 2064-2065). The 
Universal Service Fund in particular aimed at “incentivizing infrastructure development in 
remote and hard to reach areas. If operators invest in those areas on their own, the amount they 
spent is reduced from their USF contribution (“Pay or play”)” (Constant, 2011, p. 17). One 
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program supported by this fund is PACTE, which aims at bridging the digital divide and bringing 
telecommunications service to rural communities. Adopted in 2006, it was implemented in 2008 
with a budget of 1.44 billion MAD and the aim of reaching 9,263 rural communities and 
completed in 2012 (ANRT, 2016). Subsequently a National broadband plan was adopted in 
2012, with the goal of generalizing access to high speed internet by 2022 (ANRT, 2012).  
The material internet 
One of the major contributions of the state has been its investments in building Morocco’s 
material telecommunication infrastructure. By 2001 Morocco’s transmission network was almost 
entirely digital (ITU, 2001, p. 11), a process that has since been completed. El Kabsi’s (2003) 
report on the early development of the internet in Morocco states that “In July 1999, the national 
telecommunications operator IAM undertook an operation aimed at improving Morocco’s 
Internet infrastructure that extended the capacity of its Internet network by constructing a new 
international cable capable of 4 Mbps of traffic, an increase of about 40 percent of the global 
capacity of the Moroccan network which became 14 Mbps” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 38).  
 Maroc Telecom has introduced two new, entirely self-funded high-speed fiber optic 
submarine cables since 2007. The Atlas Offshore cable was a 34 million USD project with 
France’s Alcatel to connect Asilah in northwest Morocco to Marseille (TeleGeography, 2007), 
and then in 2012 Maroc Telecom invested 16 million USD constructing the Loukkos cable to 
connect Asilah with Rota, Spain via the Canalink cable based in the Canary Islands 
(TeleGeography, 2012). Cable construction has been largely oriented toward dealing with 
increasing demand from call center traffic as well as broadband users. Morocco is now 
connected to the international network via four fiber optic submarine cables, with Maroc 
Telecom owning the two connecting Asilah and part owner of the two connecting Tetouan 
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(SeaMeWe3 consortium cable and Estepona-Tetouan) (TeleGeography, 2016). “During 2002 – 
2010 Morocco increased its international bandwidth capacity from 200 Mbit/s to 75,000 Mbit/s, 
with 25 percent increase in the last year alone. In 2010, there was 2,461 bits per person in 
Morocco, higher than Algeria and Egypt, similar to Jordan but significantly below Tunisia” 
(Constant, 2011, p. 9). Maroc Telecom has also stated plans to construct a new terrestrial cable 
between Laayoune in the disputed Western Sahara and Nouakchott, Mauritania to increase 
service to its sub-Saharan Africa11 clients, one of its biggest growth areas.  
 Cables have also been a source of controversy over the years as Maroc Telecom has been 
accused of throttling transmissions to benefit its own interests, especially given its position as the 
sole landline internet provider. The operator has blocked VoIP applications multiple times (2012, 
2014, 2016), and in 2012 blamed a drastic decrease in internet speeds on a cut in the Atlas 
Offshore cable (Yamani, 2012), a declaration that was greeted with suspicion by many users as it 
came at a time when the company was trying to push its own VoIP application, MTBox. The 
2016 VoIP blockage was the result of a vague decision issued by ANRT in January 2016 and 
included all internet providers, which were subject to widespread social media campaigns aimed 
at reversing the ban. When VoIP applications were unblocked in October 2016 prior to Morocco 
hosting an international climate conference (COP22), many Moroccans were outraged at the 
implication that the communicative convenience of foreigners took precedence over their own.   
Democratic hopes and dystopian fears 
Because the early official vision for telecommunications and the internet in Morocco focused on 
economic and social development, with the government approaching new forms of online 
                                                            
11 Maroc Telecom began buying telecom operators in West Africa shortly after its privatization and has continued to 
make acquisitions in this area over the years. When Etisalat bought Vivendi’s stake in Maroc Telecom, Maroc 
Telecom took over Etisalat’s investments in the region. 
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expression largely as a steam valve, few restraints were imposed. Early on the internet inspired 
hope, both for democratization and for a re-ordering of the center/periphery that would allow 
Morocco to overcome many of its development hurdles and participate in the new global 
economy. El Kabsi (2003) contends that “For Morocco, unlike other countries of the Maghreb 
and the Middle East, the Internet is synonymous with liberty and open-mindedness thanks to the 
pluralistic sources of data that it puts unreservedly at the disposal of the citizen and the 
opportunities for contact with others through e-mail” (p. 80). On the other hand, there were fears 
that countries struggling to overcome colonial legacies and economic dependency would fall 
further behind in this new high tech world. “This can lead to new international alliances that 
favor new penetration of large foreign companies and thus a new permanent dependence that can 
be called ‘electronic colonialism.’ Instead of getting countries back in the running, the arrival of 
the Internet would create a new long-lasting dependence on the masters of technology" 
(Mattelart, 1994, p. 24-25) ” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 84). And although technology does put the tools 
of information production in the hands of everyday users, it’s hard to argue that companies like 
Google haven’t come to own the internet in certain ways that allow the company to impose its 
will on the global stage.  
 Internet development was limited by telecommunications infrastructure, but also 
imaginaries about the role internet could occupy in society. At the Internet Society’s (ISOC) 
annual conference (INET) in 1997, Najat Rochdi, the president of the Moroccan branch of the 
Internet Society (MISOC) stated “Internet will never be a working class phenomenon. It will be a 
tool for the specific purposes of professionals” (El Kabsi, 2003, p. 66). As with many early 
predictions about the internet, this one was wrong and only four years later Rochdi wrote an 
article about the government’s E-Maroc strategy, in which she stresses that “new opportunities 
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are opening to all Moroccans, allowing for more social inclusion, competition, progress, 
development and quite simply, active and informed citizenship” (Rochdi, 2001, p. 264). What 
Rochdi perhaps could not have anticipated is the extent to which the internet and digital tools 
became a new front in the fight for freedom of expression and human rights more broadly.  
New front for freedom of expression 
Morocco has consistently ranked poorly on the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Press Freedom 
Index, with its highest ranking (#89/139) coming in the index’s first year, 2002, while its worst 
came between 2010-2014 when it consistently ranked #136/152. This is important to consider 
because digital media are built on the back of other media, as well as their norms and 
understandings of what is acceptable. In this way online freedoms are intertwined with broader 
environments around freedom of speech and expression rather than isolated to the internet. As 
seen in previous chapters, Morocco’s media have consistently walked a fine line between 
freedom and repression, with widely acknowledged “red lines” around the monarchy, Islam and 
the Western Sahara. A 1999 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report about the state of the internet in 
the MENA region asserts that “Jordan and Morocco…have no Internet-specific laws restricting 
free expression; however, both have laws that curb press freedom, and those laws, such as the 
ones that prohibit defaming or disparaging the monarchy, narrow the boundaries of what can be 
expressed online” (HRW, 1999, p. 3). Generally the challenges for press freedom are not about 
widespread violent repression, but inconsistency and the constant uncertainty about when a 
journalist or publication will become public enemy number one. This leads to a high degree of 
self-censorship and widespread unwillingness to push boundaries for fear of being hauled into 
court and fined or subjected to an advertising boycott, as in several high profile cases that 
resulted in substantial drops in Morocco’s ranking on the RSF press freedom index.  
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 On the other hand, the advent of the internet as a platform for information meant the 
opening up a far less regulated space that allowed for both new kinds of media outlets and new 
types of content, especially content off limits for traditional media. According to HRW “Algeria, 
Morocco, and the Palestinian Authority have made little if any effort so far to control online 
content, allowing Internet users access to a wealth of political and human rights information that 
the local print and broadcast media cannot publish” (HRW, 1999, p. 1). At this point Moroccans 
using the internet were primarily using it in cybercafés located in major cities, and without 
restrictions. But it is important to note that the lack of censorship online was not the result of a 
lack of ability by the state. It maintains ownership of the international gateways required to 
access the internet, making it much easier to control content if it desired. Instead, it mostly used 
this control to maintain the competitive advantage of IAM over other early ISPs. As one 
Casablanca-based ISP owner reported to HRW “Private ISPs…must use the lines and 
international gateway maintained by IAM. For the services it provides them, IAM ‘imposed 
whatever prices it wants’ while competing with them as an ISP itself” (HRW, 1999, p. 65). IAM 
driving up prices also meant that the cost of internet use remained prohibitively high for many 
Moroccans until increased competition was introduced in the form of 3G.  
Filtering regimes 
The OpenNet Initiative (ONI), a collaboration between Citizen Lab at University of Toronto’s 
Munk School of Global Affairs, the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard, and 
cyber research think tank the SecDev Group, aims to “investigate, expose and analyze Internet 
filtering and surveillance practices” (ONI, 2016). In 2006 ONI conducted empirical testing for 
internet filtering in 40 countries, including Morocco. The report concluded that “Morocco’s 
Internet filtration regime is relatively light and focuses on Western Saharan independence, a few 
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blog sites, and highly visible anonymizers” (ONI, 2007, p. 4). However: this filtering, limited 
though it is, is the product of a filtering regime that is highly centralized (most likely blocked 
from the Internet backbone), highly consistent, and highly concealed (Faris & Villeneuve, 2008, 
p. 17). The country’s motivations for filtering at that time were confined to the security/conflict 
category, focusing on the Western Sahara and terrorism associated with radical Islam (Faris & 
Villeneuve, 2008, p. 26). ONI (2007) also noted that the filtering is not comprehensive 
(information available on blocked sites can often be found elsewhere) and that internet 
censorship does not compare to crackdowns on free speech and the press. Analysis showed that 
of the 40 countries tested Saudi Arabia and Tunisia competed for the title of most prolific 
filtering regime, while Libya filtered only political content, Morocco only security/conflict and 
Egypt and Algeria remarkably didn’t demonstrate any evidence of filtering (Faris & Villeneuve, 
2008, p. 6 & 19). Several years later follow-up testing found that most Western Sahara-
associated and Islamist sites were accessible (ONI, 2009). Instead of systematic filtering, 
authorities started prosecuting individual users based on existing press and penal codes, as well 
as an anti-terrorism law passed in the aftermath of the May 16, 2003 Casablanca bombings. 
Blogoma  
Moroccan bloggers, also known as the “blogoma,” began testing the boundaries of their 
newfound online freedoms early on. Fouad Mourtada was among the early arrests related to the 
internet. The 26-year-old IT engineer was prosecuted for creating a fake Facebook account in the 
name of the king’s brother, Moulay Rachid, which was characterized as identity theft despite 
Mourtada’s claims the profile was meant as a joke. Mourtada was sentenced to 3 years in prison 
and fine of $1300, suffered mistreatment in prison and received a royal pardon about a month 
later (Manach, 2008). According to RSF “This is the first time a Moroccan has been convicted 
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for an online offense and Mourtada was the victim of a summary trial. We are worried about the 
effect on freedom of expression on the Moroccan Internet as all of the country's bloggers will 
feel targeted” (RSF, 2008b). Bloggers and human rights advocates launched a campaign calling 
for Mourtada’s release with a website helpfouad.com, indicating the beginnings of a network 
dedicated to protecting freedom of speech online.  
 Later in the year blogger Mohamed Erraji was arrested for publishing an article titled 
“The King encourages the nation (to rely) on handouts” via online news site Hespress (Amnesty, 
2008). Erraji was hastily tried and sentenced to two years in prison plus a 5,000 MAD fine for 
“disrespecting the king” (Pfeiffer, 2008). He appealed the verdict and was provisionally released 
a few days later, only to be acquitted on procedural grounds in the following weeks following a 
strike by bloggers and an international mobilization at soutienerraji.blogspot.ca (RSF, 2008c). 
According to the 2008 RSF press freedom index “ A series of prosecutions of journalists and 
Internet users has shown that press freedom in Morocco stops at the doors of the royal palace” 
(RSF, 2008a, p. 16).  
 While Erraji will forever hold the distinction of being Morocco’s first imprisoned 
blogger, many more have joined his ranks. Hassan Barhoum, a blogger and journalist, faced 
defamation charges for circulating a petition to put a local prosecutor on trial for corruption 
(CPJ, 2009). Barhoum was sentenced to six months in prison and a fine of 5000 MAD for 
circulating false information (RSF, 2009). The Association of Moroccan Bloggers (ABM)12 
formed in April 2009 to represent the interests of bloggers and elevate their standards under the 
                                                            
12 The Association des blogeurs marocains, or ABM, elected Said Benjebli, an Islamist and member of Al Adl wa 
Ihsan, as its president, leading to allegations from authorities that the group is a fundamentalist one and refusal of 
official recognition (Mandraud-Le Monde, 7 April 2010). Benjebli, a future M20 leader, responded to questions 
about the association’s relationship with Islam saying “J’étais islamiste mais je suis laïc à présent. Notre mouvement 
aussi est laïc et nos adhérents viennent d’horizons très divers. Athées, socialistes, amazighes, laïcs, toutes les 
couleurs sont représentées dans notre association. Nous sommes avant tout libres et nous fonctionnons de manière 
démocratique” (Belayachi - Afrik.com, 9 April 2010). 
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rubric of citizen journalists. In December 2009 and January 2010 two ABM members, Bashir 
Hazzam and Boubakr Al-Yadib, were imprisoned in conjunction with protests in the south of the 
country: Hazzam for posting a statement calling for the release of student protesters and linking 
to a video from the protest and Al-Yadib for participating in an illegal protest and covering it on 
his blog. Additionally, Abdullah Boukfou, the owner of the cybercafé from which Hazzam 
blogged received one year in prison, the harshest sentence of the three. The following year 
Mamfakinch co-founder Almiraat published an interview with Hazzam on the Global Voices 
Advocacy page, in which Hazzam stated “I think the reason behind my arrest was to impose a 
media blackout around the events that occurred in Tarhjicht, after the violent intervention of the 
security forces against unarmed students and the population that sided with them. They are trying 
to prevent the truth from filtering to the public” (Almiraat, 2010). Notably, Hazzam credited both 
human rights and Islamist organizations for his release, both of which organized campaigns to 
support him. The Moroccan state has a long history of not talking about events or information 
that it would rather ignore, and bloggers present an imminent threat to the state’s ability to 
control information. 
 In many ways the internet became a refuge for Moroccan independent journalists after 
prosecution of their print publications. Many independent online publications like Lakome, Goud 
and Febrayer were born out of the same moment as Mamfakinch. For example, Lakome was a 
joint project of Ali Anouzla and Aboubakr Jamaï, both of whom had worked for numerous 
publications known for independent watchdog reporting and subsequently shut down by court 
cases and fines. For stalwarts of Moroccan independent media, the new spaces created by digital 
platforms allowed access to content that traditional media could not cover. By some accounts, 
Web 2.0 and social media in particular “triggered a revival of the media’s traditional function as 
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a watchdog, acting as a check on the misconduct of the political regime” (FOTN, 2013). 
Although in no way a traditional news site, Mamfakinch participated in this revival with a more 
activist agenda and a focus on information curation, becoming part of a network of mutual 
reinforcement, support and publicity alongside its peers in the new electronic press.  
Mamfakinch!  
What one notices in analyzing Mamfakinch is the flurry of activity that pops up around certain 
issues and then dissipates when the issue is resolved or reaches a stalemate. Obviously the Arab 
Spring received intense coverage on the site, but since then the site has acted as a sort of 
structuring mechanism and collection of cultural resources that remains in the background until 
called upon to deal with a particular crisis or advance a specific claim.  
 On February 17, 2011 Mamfakinch came online. The site’s first post was an open letter 
dated January 29, 2011 directed to King Mohammed VI and Moroccan citizens calling for 
democratic political reform. Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, the letter states: 
“Morocco is in a phase of setbacks and recoil in its democratic project. The social and economic 
situation of large segments of the Moroccan people is cause for great concern in conjunction 
with the rampant cronyism and rent economy (clientelism?)” (Mamfakinch, 2011b). It then goes 
on to call for dismissal of the current government and dissolution of parliament, the formation of 
a national committee representing the interests of all communities to draft a democratic 
constitution based on a parliamentary monarchy, a variety of measures oriented toward social 
and economic justice and further investigation into the misuse of public funds and human rights 
violations. It ends with: “Morocco and Moroccans deserve a smooth and rapid transition to 
democracy,” followed by 31 names, including that of Mamfakinch’s co-founder Hisham 
Khribchi, who also goes by Hisham Almiraat. The letter was an echo of the call put out January 
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29, 2011 by 7ouria wa dimo9ratia l2an, or “Freedom and democracy now” on Facebook calling 
for a demonstration on February 20. At this point planning for the Feb 20th march was well 
underway as Mamfakinch’s third post out of 28 for that day is an embed of a Feb 20 campaign 
video produced by Montassir Drissi that went viral, featuring first person accounts from young 
activists about why they’d be joining the demonstration February 20, including Mamfakinch 
contributor Nizar Bennamate. Already rumors and attempts to discredit the organizers were 
circulating, and one of Mamfakinch’s primary goals to provide a reliable portal for aggregating 
information about the demonstration. To this end the majority of the 28 posts on the site’s first 
day of existence were a collection of endorsements from political parties, NGOs and trade 
unions, including: Marxists, socialists, Islamists, human rights activists, and two trade unions, 
UMT and CDT. Importantly, Mamfakinch aggregated statements and endorsements from all 
these fronts into one place, linking to press releases and original stories in other media outlets, 
and providing some sense of who intended to participate and for what purpose.  
 What is clear from Mamfakinch’s first few weeks is the extent to which a battle of 
information took place around the initial demonstrations and the site placed itself on the front 
lines of that battle by responding to rumors, press coverage and the needs of a nascent movement 
that became known by the date of its first major demonstrations (February 20). Allegations 
abounded that this was a Polisario conspiracy, an anti-monarchy protest, and that the leaders 
were people of ill repute. At one point, the state news agency, MAP, printed a (false) press 
release announcing that the demonstration had been cancelled (MAP, 2011). Mamfakinch 
became a channel to talk back to these allegations, but also for expressing support, circulating 
plans and slogans, explanatory videos about the demonstrations, and for admonishing against 
violence and vandalism. On the day of the demonstration, it became the site for mapping and 
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documenting protests taking place around the country. In the midst of contemporary debates 
about “fake news” and “alternative facts,” it is clear that the battle over information did not begin 
or end with Mamfakinch. But the use of digital technologies in a country with an emergent 
independent media environment, an authoritarian monarch and a relatively new relationship with 
the digital led to a lot of accusations about their potential to lead people astray. A certain 
(limited) democratization of the information environment was taking place and it led to less 
dependency on official narratives advanced by the state, both to its own people and to the 
international community.  
 In order to make sense of Mamfakinch’s contributions, I look at its interventions around 
the Amina Filali affair and, to a lesser extent, the Free Koulchi campaign as indicative of the 
collective’s engagement with dynamics of contention coming out of the Arab Spring moment. 
While not necessarily the most intense of Mamfakinch’s mobilizations, they are representative of 
the diverse campaigns to which the collective contributed as part of a emergent information 
infrastructure moving across on and offline spaces. I want to make clear up front that in no way 
do I wish to suggest that these moments and their outcomes were produced or orchestrated 
entirely by Mamfakinch. In the case of Amina Filali, for example, women’s rights groups had 
been campaigning to repeal article 475 for years and led the way in raising awareness of Filali’s 
case. What I do want to suggest is that Mamfakinch’s members are particularly adept at using 
digital tools to pool relevant commentary, putting local and global press into conversation with 
each other, publicizing and documenting events, and activating activist/journalist/civil society 
networks to bring disparate groups into one conversation crafted to put pressure on those in 
power. The collective moves between on and offline spaces in constructing a critical media 
platform that intervenes in ongoing activist campaigns, in addition to launching some of its own. 
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In this way Mamfakinch operates as one piece of an emergent activist information infrastructure 
that is particularly effective in using digital tools to curate and aggregate conversations, as well 
as provide big picture analysis about the relevance of individual campaigns for broader social 
change in Morocco.13 
The Amina Filali Affair 
Amina El Filali was a 16-year-old who swallowed rat poison in March 2012 after being forced to 
marry her rapist and suffering subsequent abuse in a village near the seaside town of Larache, 
Morocco. Her suicide sparked a wave of protests that focused their outrage on Article 475 of the 
Moroccan Penal Code,14 which is often interpreted to allow rapists to avoid legal penalties if they 
marry their victims. These protests took place both in physical space and, perhaps to a greater 
extent, online, through diverse mobilizations such as the #RIPAmina hashtag on Twitter, an 
“#RIPAmina: No to rape with the complicity of the state” Facebook page, a documentary film 
entitled 475: When Marriage becomes Punishment, as well as countless blog posts, editorials and 
local news stories. Filali’s story was picked up by global news organizations such as Al Jazeera, 
Le Monde, the BBC and the New York Times, which ran multiple stories, including a follow-up in 
January 2014 when Article 475 was successfully overturned. Moroccan media activists 
associated with Mamfakinch participated in attempts to attract the attention of global civil 
society and media to this issue while also engaging in more localized contentious politics. In its 
interventions Mamfakinch was forced to negotiate the tension between staging representations of 
Arab/Muslim women embedded in patriarchal political culture, and women as autonomous 
actors possessing reflexive subjectivities that empower them to affect change. 
                                                            
13 Mamfakinch bloggers contribute to the site under names including mamfakinch, basta, ibn kafka, nietzschan, 
demokratia karama, feb20democracy, and others. Unless the bloggers have been open online about their identities 
offline, I refer to them by the pseudonyms under which they publish on the site. 
14 The provision is not specifically Moroccan; similar provisions exist in Tunisian, Algerian, Jordanian and 
Lebanese law. 
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 Prior to Filali committing suicide, Morocco was already embroiled in dynamics of protest 
and repression, as well as anxieties accompanying the first few months of a new Islamist 
government. To some extent protests carried on from the previous year, especially in the 
northern Rif region where activists associated with M20 demonstrated against the rural 
mountainous region’s widespread poverty and economic marginalization in January and 
February 2012, marking the one-year anniversary of M20. Violent treatment by police and 
arrests of activists led to new waves of protests in Taza, and spreading to smaller villages like 
Beni Bouayache where a local M20 activist was arrested15 (Schemm, 2012). On March 12 
AMDH issued a statement that “The central office of the Moroccan Association for Human 
Rights expresses its solidarity with the citizens of Beni Bouayache, victims of a repressive 
campaign of intimidation by the Makhzen, demands the release of all arbitrary detainees and 
deplores the escalation of systematic repression of the state against the protest movements 
(AMDH, 2012a), and on March 14 a Rabat demonstration in solidarity with the Rif was violently 
dispersed by police under the auspices that it was unauthorized (Karam, 2012). The previous day 
Mamfakinch launched a campaign to “MediatizeRif,” calling for an end to the media blackout on 
events occurring in the Rif. Mamfakinch retweeted from one of its contributors “RT 
@YassirKazar: MAP doesn’t want to cover what’s happening? No worries. Citizens will take 
care of it #MediatizeRif” (Mamfakinch, 2012b). Mamfakinch began live blogging coverage of 
protests, continued circulating the few stories being published (mostly in the electronic press) 
and reached out to international outlets. 
 It was in this environment that the news of Filali’s March 10 suicide broke via an article 
published in the independent newspaper Al Massae, and bloggers and social media reacted 
                                                            
15 Bachir Benchaib was ostensibly arrested for being involved in gang and criminal activity (Washington Post, 12 
March 2012). 
 202 
immediately, with one blogger writing “Amina Filali is my Bouazizi” (Idrissi, 2012). On March 
13, Almiraat picked up the story on Twitter, asking if anyone knew of additional sources and 
monitoring the spread of the #RIPAmina hashtag across the globe. Almiraat also used Storify to 
compile relevant materials and produce a timeline and narrative of developments in the case, 
while encouraging Al Jazeera’s The Stream, which focuses on social media, to pick up the story. 
“@AJStream Follow hashtag #RIPAmina. It mourns 16 yo Moroccan who committed suicide 
after being forced 2 marry her rapist w/parent's consent” (Almiraat, 2012b). On March 15 the 
Democratic League of Women’s Rights (LDDF) organized a sit-in of several hundred people in 
front of the Larache tribunal as part of its campaign against Article 475 (Bruneau, 2012). Article 
47516 does not explicitly address rape, but rather the “kidnapping or deception” of a minor, for 
which the perpetrator cannot be prosecuted once the victim “has married her ravisseur” (R.A. & 
M.B., 2012). The Filali affair comes on the heels of March 8, International Women’s Day, when 
the secularist Alternative Mouvement for Individual Liberties (MALI) published a manifesto 
titled “State! You rape us: March 8, 2012 Manifesto” (MALI, 2012). Posted on Vox Maroc, the 
blog of journalist and MALI militant Zineb El Rhazoui, the statement inscribes the fight for 
gender equality within human rights and voices concerns about the role of religion in Moroccan 
law, especially pertaining to women. “The Moroccan state holds onto archaic laws inspired by 
religion, making it an accomplice in the crimes committed everyday against women and their 
dignity” (MALI, 2012). By way of example the statement points to Article 475 and calls for a 
campaign against the law, citing testimonies of women being prosecuted for prostitution when 
they report rape and being married to their rapists, which absolves the state since spousal rape 
                                                            
16 Article 475 du code pénal: QUICONQUE, sans violences, menaces ou fraude, enlève ou détourne, ou tente 
d’enlever ou de détourner un mineur de moins de dix-huit ans, est puni de l’emprisonnement d’un à cinq ans et 
d’une amende de 120 à 500 dirhams. Lorsqu’une mineure nubile ainsi enlevée ou détournée a épousé son ravisseur, 
celui-ci ne peut être poursuivi qu’à la suite de la plainte des personnes ayant qualité pour demander l’annulation du 
mariage et ne peut être condamné qu’après que cette annulation du mariage a été prononcée (R.A. & M.B., 2012). 
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isn’t recognized in Morocco – all of which indicate that the controversy surrounding Article 475 
preceded Filali.  
 On March 14 the “#RIPAmina: No to rape with the complicity of the state” Facebook 
page came online courtesy of Houda Chaloun. The page articulates six demands, including 
prosecution of Filali’s rapist (who remained free), immediate repeal of Article 475 as it is “in 
flagrant contradiction with the treaties and international conventions ratified by Morocco,” a 
redefinition of rape and harsher penalties in the penal code, better judicial training and 
enforcement, and help for all women suffering similar fates as Filali (#RIPAmina, 2012). The 
page also called for a sit-in in front of parliament on March 17 and commissioned graphic artist 
Faiçal Oulharir to design posters and t-shirts. The Mamfakinch account’s first posts about 
#RIPAmina were made on March 17 when it shared a Global Voices article about the 
#RIPAmina protest page that included information about the sit-in taking place, and posted a 
Storify compilation of the sit-in made by Almiraat. Mamfakinch contributor Zineb Belmkaddem, 
who has been open about her own experience with domestic abuse, live tweeted the sit-in. The 
sit-in brought together multiple generations of feminists, including Union d’Action Feminine 
(UAF), a secular feminist organization in operation since 1987 and Woman Choufouch, an anti-
harassment organization formed by students in (Woman Choufouch, 2011). According to Fatima 
Outaleb of UAF, “We know that in Morocco when women are united, it pays. The problem is 
that there is a crisis of leadership among the women’s movement. Each group wants to take the 
lead on different issues…But women are divided and the left has been divided…We have to say, 
there is no compromise. The law should be adopted now. No excuses. We have to mobilize 
youth, the [anti-government] February 20 movement, even though we don’t agree with some of 
their slogans” (Alpert, 2012). Filali’s case highlights the stark stratification of access to 
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resources, education and assistance from associations among women of different geographic and 
class backgrounds, as well as associated ideological divisions in the women’s movement and 
established civil society more broadly.  
 One remarkable aspect of the sit-in was that it was broadcast live by state TV station 2M. 
One Mamfakinch contributor tweeted “RT @__Ghali: Bravo to 2M which is covering the 
demonstration live! Big up! #RIPAmina” (IbnKafka, 2012b). Two days earlier 2M invited the 
Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development, Bassima Hakkaoui, and 
Nouzha Skalli, who held Hakkaoui’s position in the previous government, to discuss the Filali 
case. Hakkaoui, the only woman minister in the new PJD government, had already been the 
subject of scrutiny from secularists given that she wears the hijab, which is unusual among 
Morocco’s political class (Boukhari, 2012). On 2M Hakkaoui called for a debate to reform the 
law, but subsequently made several controversial statements about the case, including suggesting 
that women’s rights groups were damaging Morocco’s reputation. At one point she reportedly 
told blog-based news platform Yabiladi “Article 475 is unlikely to be repealed overnight under 
pressure from international public opinion. Sometimes the marriage of a raped woman to her 
rapist does not harm her” (Belabd, 2012). For Mamfakinch, an organization that had just 
launched a campaign to bring media attention to horrific events happening in the Rif, 2M’s 
eagerness to cover the Filali tragedy might have seemed a convenient distraction on an issue 
clearly supported by the monarchy, as seen by its initiative in the 2004 Moudawana17 reforms. 
On March 17 Almiraat shared a tweet supposedly from 2M’s news director Samira Sitail “RT 
@SamiraSitail: -@YassirKazar I gave the order to cover #RIPAmina in order to eclipse the 
                                                            
17 The Moudawana is Morocco’s family code, which was originally drafted in 1957 and reformed in 2004 after 
decades of activism on the issue and in a political context where a young monarch was in the process of cultivating a 
progressive image. The reforms resulted in Morocco being lauded as a leader among Arab/Muslim nations in putting 
in place a legal framework oriented toward gender equality. Among other changes, the Moudawana specifically 
outlaws marriage under the age of 18, but in practice the marriage of minors continued to be common. 
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Mamfakinch’s operation #MediatizeRif (Almiraat, 2012d), although the @SamiraSitail account 
is now marked as fake.  
 Several petitions were circulated, including on petitionduweb.com and ipetitions.com that 
led Almiraat to tweet “A petition that supposed to invoke international solidarity written only in 
French? We lose a lot my friends. #RIPAmina” (Almiraat, 2012c). A petition addressed to 
Morocco’s ministers on Avaaz.org stated “Since 2006, the government has been promising to 
pass a law to stop violence against women, but has failed to do so. As concerned global citizens, 
we call on you to stand with women by immediately repealing Article 475 and passing 
comprehensive legislation addressing violence against women” (Avaaz.org). Avaaz18 is forum 
for internet organizing founded in 2007 and run by Ricken Patel, a Canadian formerly associated 
with MoveOn.org. Ultimately the petition in Arabic secured almost 1.2 million signatures, and a 
corresponding one in English more than 700,000 (Avaaz, 2012). Many of the #RIPAmina tweets 
were shared by petition signees such Mamfakinch contributor Bennamate “Just signed a petition 
urging @benkiraneabdel to stop violence against women and repeal Article 475 #RIPAmina 
#Morocco avaaz.org/en/forced_to_m... (Bennamate, 2012). Others expressed outrage at the 
situation, blaming tradition, Moroccan culture or Islam19 as a backward and violent religion in its 
treatment of women. On March 17 Almiraat tweeted “Islamophobes jumping on the bandwagon 
2 label #RIPAmina as a case of Islamic law enforced on women. Know this: ths has nothing 2 do 
w/Islam” (Almiraat, 2012e). This is just one of the ways Mamfakinch positions itself between 
Morocco and the world, challenging both local practices and power structures as well as 
                                                            
18 Avaaz (which reportedly means “voice” in Persian) specializes in supranational forms of online mobilization, with 
“a single, global team with a mandate to work on any issue of public concern--allowing campaigns of extraordinary 
nimbleness, flexibility, focus, and scale” (Avaaz.org). For more on Avaaz.org, as well as its critics, see: 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/17/avaaz-online-activism-can-it-change-the-world 
19 One quote included in Almiraat’s Storify account said “#RIPAmina. What a disaster. Look at what the wrong 
perspective of Islam leads to. I bet there are hundreds of similar stories….” (@JustLuai, 13 Mar 2012). 
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Orientalist perspectives and international interventions. The organization curates information 
specifically for the West and international NGOs as well as Moroccans in order to broaden the 
array of narratives coming out of the country, but also does not hesitate to critique those actors 
and institutions. Mamfakinch contributor Ibn Kafka, who self describes on his blog as “a 
Moroccan lawyer on probation,” also took on the idea that Article 475 was rooted in Islam by 
tracing the legal origins of article 475 to pre-revolutionary French law, saying “it is not because 
of the Islamization of Moroccan law that this rule exists, but because of its francization…” (Ibn 
Kafka, 2012a).  
 Meanwhile Mamfakinch continued to engage in debates around the Filali case, 
circulating blog posts, news articles and statements from human rights organizations. On March 
20 Mamfakinch tweeted simply “#RIPAmina This isn’t your fault,” and linked to the blog of a 
Moroccan woman who published a testimonial of her rape at the age of 17 under that heading 
(Lamqaddem, 2012). Mamfakinch contributor Errazzouki appeared on Al Jazeera’s The Stream 
as part of a panel discussion devoted to Filali. In the discussion Errazzouki asked whether Filali 
was already changing mentalities about rape in Morocco given the circulation of anonymous 
rape testimonies online in the aftermath of her suicide (Al Jazeera, 2012). As debates continued, 
it quickly became apparent that Filali’s case was not unique, nor was Morocco’s legal provision 
for rapists to marry their minor victims. The extent of sexual violence and abuse, as well as 
societal silence about them, quickly became apparent. On March 27 Mamfakinch published an 
excerpt from anonymous testimonies shared on Qandisha,20 a collaborative women’s e-zine 
                                                            
20 Qandisha is named after the Moroccan folklore figure Aïcha Qandisha, who according to legend used her beauty 
to seduce the Portuguese soldiers occupying El Jadida, after which they disappeared. According to founder Misk 
“j'avais proposé Qandisha entre autres noms et termes marocains inspirant la force, la volonté, l'intelligence et la 
fierté. Qandisha a séduit tout le monde, d'autant plus que l'on s'attendait à déranger, vu les thèmes qu'on comptait 
aborder, exactement comme elle, ce qui lui avait valu une diabolisation séculaire” (Boyet, 2013; 
http://www.lejournalinternational.fr/Qandisha-la-libre-parole-marocaine_a818.html ). 
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founded by journalist and activist Fedwa Misk in 2011, linking to the testimonials in their 
entirety (Mamfakinch, 2012j). Qandisha, like Mamfakinch, is another example of online 
platforms opening up alternative discursive spaces from which to question the status quo and 
built an alternative information infrastructure.   
 By all accounts March 2012 was a busy month for Mamfakinch, as the collective 
continued working on other campaigns and in many cases made efforts to connect those 
campaigns to Filali. The day after the #RIPAmina sit-in, Mamfakinch tweeted “RT @Basta 
#FreeEzzedine #RIPamina #MediatizeRif one people one fight! #Morocco #Maroc” 
(Mamfakinch, 2012c) and the following day “Today, the #FEB20 movement will protest all 
around the country for #RIPAmina, #RIPNabil, #FreeEzzedine, for change in #Morocco” 
(Mamfakinch, 2012f). Mamfakinch posted a petition in Arabic, English and French on 
ipetitions.com explaining Ezzedine Erroussi’s case and launched a campaign to bring attention to 
his plight via the hashtag #FreeEzzedine (Mamfakinch, 2012e). Mamfakinch also produced a 
twitter avatar, a Facebook page and organized a “freeze” to raise awareness of Ezzedine’s dire 
situation. The 23-year-old student at the University of Taza and UNEM21 member was arrested 
on December 1, 2011 after participating in student protests against living conditions at the 
university and charged with belonging to an illegal organization. He started a hunger strike on 
December 19 that endured more than 100 days until he was released in May 2012 after having 
served the entirety of his sentence (Taarji, 2012). Mamfakinch circulated a letter from Erroussi 
published by L’Humanité.fr (Perrier, 2012) alleging that he’d been tortured in prison 
(Mamfakinch, 2012d). One Mamfakinch co-founder tweeted “#FreeEzzedine because a young 
peaceful protester deserves a better fate than a rapist #RIPAmina” (@souhail_, 2012), 
                                                            
21 UNEM or the Moroccan National Students’ Union, has been at the center of student activism since the 1960s and 
has been outlawed at various points. 
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referencing the fact that Filali’s rapist walked free while a peaceful protestor remained in prison. 
On March 20 Almiraat tweeted “To read, by @IbnKafka: "Amina, Nabil, Azzedine, the victims 
of a Morocco gone wrong” yabiladi.com/articles/detai... #FreeEzzedine #RIPAmina” (Almiraat, 
2012f). Mamfakinch contributor Ibn Kafka writes that Moroccan youth are paying the price for 
societal stagnation and lack of political and economic reforms, citing the examples of Filali, 
Ezzedine Erroussi and Nabil Zouhri22, who died falling into a ravine after participating in Rif 
protests and being chased by police. According to Ibn Kafka: “To paraphrase General De Gaulle, 
Morocco has an appearance: Morocco Mall, the TGV and the festival of Marrakech, which play 
on repeat in Morocco’s brand communications between Hillary Clinton press releases. It has a 
reality: a country where a child is forced by judges and families to marry her rapist, and where 
students die from contact with the police or for want of resignation to an arbitrary trial” (Ibn 
Kafka, 2012c). In addition to the Ezzedine mobilizations, in March 2012 Mamfakinch also 
circulated a full pdf of Catherine Graciet and Eric Laurent’s book The Predator King, which had 
been banned in Morocco, as well as interviews with its authors. The collective also supported the 
#StopTGV campaign, pushed for fiscal reforms and launched a series of podcasts under the 
name MamCast.  
 In all of these cases public ire was primarily directed at Article 475 and the PJD 
government, specifically Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, Hakkaoui and Minister of Justice 
and Freedoms Mustapha Ramid. The new PJD government, which has itself been adept in the 
use of social media, became the target of appeals directly to officials online: “@PJDofficiel 
#PJD nous exigeons une réforme d'urgence #RIPAmina #Maroc” (Almiraat, 2012a; @M_Benaj, 
2012). In a press conference Mustafa Khalfi, Minister of Communication and spokesman for the 
                                                            
22 The Moroccan government maintained Zouhri’s death was the result of an accidental fall, while others contended 
he was pushed by police. 
 209 
Benkirane government, stated “This girl was raped twice, the second time when she was married 
(…) This situation needs to be investigated thoroughly with the possibility of increasing the 
penalties in the context of reforming article 475. We cannot ignore this drama” (Jazouani, 2012). 
Meanwhile Hakkaoui’s statements showed less conviction and more contradiction, as she refused 
to clearly state whether she would take the legislative lead on such reforms. Ramid added to the 
furor by issuing a statement that questioned whether Filali was actually raped, saying “the young 
Amina had a relationship outside marriage with the man who later married her, a relationship 
during which she lost her virginity” (Amar, 2012; Ministry of Justice, 2012). The statement from 
Ramid’s ministry questions many of the facts of the case, including: was Amina raped, or was 
she merely involved in an extramarital sexual relationship? Did she consent to the marriage and 
as a minor under pressure from the legal system and her family was she even capable of consent? 
Who is to blame for her death, the legal system or society? The lack of clarity in terms of the 
government’s response and elaboration of concrete steps toward reform exacerbated already 
existing anxieties among civil society (especially from secularists and the left) about the 
regression of human rights, including women’s rights, under the PJD. 
 On March 23 Hakkaoui, Ramid and Lahbib Choubani, minister of relations with 
parliament and civil society, held a press conference about the Filali affair. The event was live 
tweeted by Mamfakinch contributors Karim El Hajjaji and Omar Radi (who was there as a 
journalist) among others under the hashtag #debatBassima. According to the tweets, the 
ministers gave long-winded, off-topic introductions and emphasized that society bears the 
responsibility for Filali. The ministers took questions, and in a country where sex outside 
marriage is illegal according to article 490 of the penal code, Radi prefaced his question to the 
minister of justice by stating directly that he and his girlfriend have sex outside the context of 
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marriage. However, Radi was cut off by Ramid, who advised him not to continue as he was 
admitting to breaking the law and could be arrested. When Radi continued, the microphone was 
taken away from him. Later that day Mamfakinch shared a Storify account of the debate that 
ended with the tweet “Summary: ‘In Morocco no sex before marriage and no rape of street girls’ 
#WhatElse #RipAmina #debatBassima” (Mamfakinch, 2012h; @ChamaLesage, 2012). 
Mamfakinch also published an episode of the sketch show Webnates23 (bnates = girls), on 
virginity that ridiculed the importance of placed on virginity, the double standard for men and 
women, and the fact that many women have sex lives with the intention of re-recreating their 
virginity surgically if it becomes a problem later (Mamfakinch, 2012h; Webnates, 2012). The 
fetishization of virginity in Morocco (and elsewhere) often means that once a woman is no 
longer a virgin her chances of marriage are practically nonexistent and she is dependent on her 
family for long term support, constituting an economic burden, as well as a mark on the family’s 
honor. It then becomes more acceptable to consider rape as merely a pre-marital indiscretion by 
marrying the woman to her rapist.  
 The next day the exchange between Radi and Minister Ramid made the front page of Al 
Massae. Almiraat wrote a blog post in support of Radi titled “PJD Hates Love - #RIPAmina 
#DebatBassima” saying “In Morocco in 2012, our political leaders continue to be divorced from 
reality and denial of their era, perpetuating the hypocrisy of a society that refuses to look in the 
mirror. The readily authoritarian attitude of the ministers, on the other hand, speaks volumes 
about the state of mind of those who govern this country today” (Almiraat, 2012i). Almiraat also 
produced a simple graphic poster (for use at the roundtable) with white and black text against an 
orange background with one side showing a man and a woman embracing with the text “-
                                                            
23 Webnates features impersonations of Moroccan women from various backgrounds in the middle of humorous 
confessionals to their webcams about a variety of topics. It was commissioned by Morocco’s first web TV station, 
Yek TV, and was particularly controversial and often accused of being vulgar. 
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marriage = haram” and on the other side a man holding a gun to a woman with the text 
“+marriage = halal” (Almiraat, 2012i). The #RIPAmina Facebook page shared Almiraat’s poster 
and associated blog post, which elicited mixed reactions. One user posted: 
“Hold on a minute…the purpose of the page is to defend a victim and abolish certain 
practices that are outside logic and outside religion…but talking about a journalist who lives 
with his concubine?!…How is that related?…We are talking about the noble cause of 
Amina…taking advantage of the situation to talk about repressed sexuality, really it’s 
unacceptable. We are in a Muslim country and we are all against these practices - just to be 
clear - and thank you” (Nihale Yakine, 24 March 2012).  
This led another user to reply:  
“I think the author of the article wants to highlight the moral double standard that 
condemns sex between two consenting people who are not married, yet accepts that a 
rapist marries his victim. It’s sick. So, there is a connection” (Ensaf Azuagh, 24 March 
2012).  
That evening Hakkaoui participated in a roundtable organized by Al Massae (which had 
originally published the story) about Filali’s suicide at Casablanca’s Royal Mansour Hotel along 
with Filali’s parents and several civil society leaders. Filali’s rapist-turned-husband was also 
invited to the roundtable, leading Mamfakinch contributor Errazzouki to tweet a few days earlier 
“Bassima Hakkaoui apologetically defending Amina's rapist and inviting him to a conference. 
This is sheer absurdity. #RIPAmina” (Errazzouki, 2012a). Again, Omar Radi attended the 
roundtable tweeting  “Slogans in the audience. General indignation. #Almassaeconf #RipAmina” 
(Radi, 2012a) and “Ryadi24: stop talking about the facts related to #RIPAmina, talk about the 
                                                            
24 “Ryadi” refers to a statement made by Khadijah Riyadi, head of AMDH, who was participating in the roundtable. 
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causes, and change the law” (Radi, 2012b). After the debate, a final tweet from Almiraat “Must 
say that Hakkaoui at least has the courage to face the public. We don’t like her much, but we’ve 
seen worse. Alright good night! -#RIPAmina” (Almiraat, 2012h). In a country that requires 
journalists to have official press credentials, many who attended the 
conference/roundtable/gatherings were bloggers or activists engaged in the online furor, a fact 
that Almiraat referenced the following year as part of a UNESCO conference about freedom of 
expression online. “Even without a press card, there were micro-bloggers at the press 
conferences on the high speed rail line (TGV), and also during the explanations of…Hakkaoui 
and the family of Amina Filali in 2012” (Mamfakinch, 2013). 
 Another group created on Facebook in the aftermath of Filali’s suicide was “The March 
of Free Women of Morocco which organized a women’s march for March 25, 2012 in opposition 
to Article 475 (Elouizi, 2012). Initiated by Najiba Berrada, the march effectively acted as a 
follow-up to the previous week’s sit-in in Rabat whereby a variety of organizations and actors 
assembled in Casablanca to decry what happened to Filali and push for reform. Mamfakinch 
documented the march, live-tweeting and posting several videos to its YouTube channel. Several 
European deputies took part in the march, having taken up the Filali affair in the European 
Parliament earlier in the week in the presence of Morocco’s ambassador to Belgium (Jaabouk, 
2012). Other international reactions included a statement from UNICEF saying “The case of the 
young Amina is revealing of dysfunctions in the system of child protection in Morocco today” 
(UNICEF, 2012), while Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa director Sarah 
Leah Whitson said “Article 475, as bad as it is, is only the tip of the iceberg in Morocco’s failure 
to protect women and girls from violence. Despite reforms in Morocco’s 2004 family code, girls 
and women are far from being protected under the law when they are the victims of violence” 
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(HRW, 2012). In the face of intense local pressure and international attention the new PJD 
government made no move to act, likely wary of appearing to give in to public opinion, foreign 
or domestic. Within Morocco a National Human Rights Council (CNDH) delegation made 
several recommendations, including “…accelerating the implementation of a revised penal code 
(which has been pending for many years) so that this provision - and all other provisions - that 
are contrary to human dignity, the Constitution, the Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women, as well as the Convention on the rights of the child, are repealed” 
(CNDH, 2012). Important here is the idea that Article 475 is contradictory not only to the July 
2011 Moroccan constitution, which proclaims gender equality, but also multiple international 
conventions to which Morocco is a signee, notably CEDAW and CIDE. Additionally, the 
constitution includes a clause that “establishes the primacy of international conventions ratified 
by Morocco over national legislation” (CNDH, 2011). In the aftermath of the press conference 
with the ministers Almiraat tweeted “@slima2485 the government is supposed to respect the 
constitution which stipulates that international law takes precedence #RIPAmina 
#debatBassima” (Almiraat, 2012g). Filali’s impact on international opinion was evident when 
former Telquel editor Benchemsi appeared at the Oslo Freedom Forum for a debate about “The 
Arab revolts: A year after” only to be asked about Filali’s case. Mamfakinch published a 
transcript in which Benchemsi attributes the outrage over Filali’s case to a sense of power 
coming out of the Arab Spring, so that “when it happened, people rose up to say it's 
unacceptable. And to challenge is our right” (Mamfakinch, 2012i).  
 Over time immediate action gave way to analysis, which is where the bigger picture 
purpose of Mamfakinch comes into play. When the outcry surrounding Filali’s suicide had 
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faded, the site published an interview with AMDH’s deputy secretary Samira Kinani, who 
reflected  
“Amina Filali shed light on a common occurrence. It is a rather frequent and rather taboo 
subject at the same time. These are the things that we don’t say, but that are practiced 
regularly in society. And normally, associations/NGOs defending women’s rights should do 
everything possible to break these taboos. Since then, there are many groups, for example on 
Facebook, that talk about this case. But we have not yet changed the law to forbid the rapist 
from marrying his victim, under the pretext that there are cultural particularities. So far 
nothing has been done” (Mülchi, 2012).  
According to Kinani, it is everyone’s responsibility to make sure cases like Filali’s do not 
happen, and the fact that it does happen represents a societal failure. Many positive things have 
been said about Morocco’s legal protections for women’s rights in the aftermath of 2004’s 
Moudawanna reforms and a 2011 constitution that proclaims equality of the sexes, however, the 
existence of contradictory codes, lack of enforcement and a persistent gap between legal 
provisions and lived reality mean that in practice rights are much more uncertain than they 
appear on paper. For Kinani “just talking about women’s liberation in an impoverished, 
marginalized society…on which many things are imposed, this is pure hypocrisy” (Mülchi, 5 
June 2012). If Amina Filali had not agreed to marry her rapist, what were her prospects then? 
Would she have an education or employment to fall back on? Family resources? Other marriage 
proposals?  
 Mamfakinch devoted the second edition of its MamCast podcast with lawyer Omar 
Mahmoud Benjelloun25 to Amina Filali and Article 475 (Mamfakinch, 2012l). Mamfakinch 
contributor Kazar tweeted “Don’t miss the next #Mamcast of @Mamfakinch with Omar 
                                                            
25 Benjelloun is a leftist militant and the nephew of Omar Benjelloun, a socialist activist assassinated in 1975. 
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Bendjelloun #Justice #freel7a9ed #RIPAmina #FreeSokrat #Freekoulchi #Ramid #Maroc” 
(Kazar, 2012). Mamfakinch shared AMDH’s 2011 report on human rights in Morocco in both 
Arabic and French, noting in a section on women’s rights Morocco’s poor position (127/135) on 
the World Economic Forum’s hierarchy of gender equality and the frequency of violence against 
women, including minors like Amina Filali (AMDH, 2012b). In this context Filali’s case 
becomes significant because it opens up discussion about many things – rape, legal loopholes, 
marriage of minors, victim blaming, familial honor, access to resources, gender-based violence, 
education – but also because the government’s response to these discussions doesn’t bode well 
for its relationship with civil society and indicates the same old stagnation long associated with 
dysfunctional institutional politics, despite promises for change. 
 Filali also figured in a Mamfakinch Counter Corner column written by Samia Errazzouki 
in response to a marketing professional’s article posted on a the U.S. Morocco lobby website 
about attending a 2012 International Women’s Forum conference in Morocco. Errazzouki 
contends that the account privileges the state narrative of Moroccan exceptionalism rampant in 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring. One of many problematic statements in the article states 
“Because of his [King Mohammed VI’s] decisions, divorce is legal, girls are encouraged to 
attend school and women are becoming an economic force in this country,” to which Errazzouki 
counters “If the author is going to applaud and generalize the position of women in Morocco, the 
author conveniently disregarded the case of Amina Filali. The young Moroccan girl who 
committed suicide after a court forced her into a marriage with her rapist” (Errazzouki, 2012b). 
This article is indicative of a common dynamic in the Mamfakinch project - that is a project of 
translation between the local and global, as well as a double critique of domestic politics and the 
way they are taken up in transnational discourses that circulate globally.  Many of the events 
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held in Morocco each year are meant to feed the makhzen’s narrative of the nation that is at best 
the product of a benevolent patriarch and at worse a benign authoritarianism. In the process 
many of them support retrograde representations of Morocco associated with orientalist 
exoticism, but that again is good for tourism, a major industry. In ignoring the nuances of 
modern Morocco and especially the highly variable situations facing a diverse and highly 
stratified society, these accounts are often oriented toward stability and fitness for investment 
above all else. 
 Mamfakinch co-produced a film by Nadir Bouhmouch titled “475: When Marriage 
Becomes Punishment”26 (Bouhmouch, 2013). The product of a Kickstarter campaign and a 
collaborative team, the film was released almost a year after Filali’s death and documents 
responses to Filali’s case from media, feminist and human rights organizations, politicians and 
Filali’s family, essentially asking “What makes a 16-year-old girl swallow rat poison and where 
does such desperation come from?” Narrated by Houda Lamqaddem, the activist and blogger 
who earlier published a testimony of her own rape on her blog, the film portrays Filali’s suicide 
as the product of a myriad of forces deeply rooted in Moroccan society, but by no means unique 
to Morocco or Islam. In Filali’s case the encounter of a young girl with a dysfunctional family, 
patriarchal society, financial dependency, lack of legal protection and physical violence may 
have ended with Article 475 of the penal code, but unfortunately many of these dynamics can be 
found most places in the world. Above all the film makes clear that Filali’s is not an isolated case 
and connects the desperation of her act to that of other women who for various reasons live 
outside traditional gender norms and are marginalized even further for it. It shows the self 
immolation of Fadoua Laaroui, a single mother who lit herself on fire February 21, 2011 because 
                                                            
26 The film is available in its entirety on Vimeo https://vimeo.com/60159667 
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her application for public housing was denied due to her being a single mother. The tragedy of 
Filali and Laaroui’s deaths is also discussed in an academic article by Mamfakinch contributor 
Errazzouki titled “Working class women revolt: Gendered political economy in Morocco” 
(Errazzouki, 2014). In January 2014 Mamfakinch published an interview Errazzouki did with 
Jadaliyya and an excerpt of her article (Mamfakinch, 2014). In assessing the impacts of political 
economy on marginalized women, Errazzouki attempts “to situate the circumstances of these 
disenfranchised working-class women within a broader political economic framework that 
considers factors such as the implementation of neoliberal economic policies and the 
entrenchment of a patriarchal authoritarian regime” (ibid.). Again, this case highlights the 
disconnect between discourse, especially official discourse about reform, and the everyday lives 
of women. 
 On January 22, 2014, nearly 2 years after Filali’s suicide, Morocco’s parliament voted 
unanimously rid Article 475 of the clause that allowed rapists of minors to escape prosecution by 
marrying their victims (Alami, 2014). That day H24Info journalist and Mamfakinch contributor 
Bennamate tweeted “It’s official: Article 475 is amended! #RIPAmina” (Bennamate, 2014a) and 
linking to his article about the amendment, which states “the proposed amendment was brought 
by several parliamentary groups, including l’USFP, le PPS et le PAM,” indicating that the PJD 
did not take the legislative lead on amending the law (Bennamate, 2014b). While amending 
Article 475 is just the beginning, the debates that erupted in the aftermath of Filali’s suicide and 
Mamfakinch’s engagements in them, highlight the intersection of local contentious politics, state 
media blackouts, emergent youth digital cultures, Islamic anxieties at home and abroad, and 
transnational mediated activism. The resonance of Filali’s case with widespread post-9/11 
Orientalist discourses about Islam and the MENA region surely influenced its uptake 
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internationally, while new information infrastructures emerging out of the Arab Spring moment 
allowed civil society to seize on the issue while also speaking back to those discourses. As part 
of that information infrastructure Mamfakinch crafted and curated counter-discourses to both 
explanations rooted in Islam and tradition, as well as those coming from Morocco’s Islamic PJD 
government while simultaneously engaging in mediated activism campaigns across a broad 
range of issues.  
Free Koulchi 
In addition to acting as information producer and aggregator for diverse mobilizations, 
Mamfakinch has also launched some campaigns of its own. Early on it was instrumental in 
organizing the “Mamsawtinch” campaign against voting in the July 2011 constitutional 
referendum on constitutional changes endorsed by the monarchy and most political parties 
(Mamfakinch, 2011d). Almost a year later Mamfakinch collaborated with the Moroccan Human 
Rights Association (AMDH), and M20 activists and used the occasion of Morocco appearing 
before the UN Council of Human Rights in Geneva (May 22, 2012) to launch a campaign for 
general political amnesty in Morocco under the name #FreeKoulchi, or “free everyone.”  The 
campaign launch denounced lack of governmental action on the Equity and Reconciliation 
Commission’s (IER) report aimed at amending for and improving Moroccan human rights and 
called “on the Benkirane government and the House of Representatives to break with the status 
quo and to submit, discuss and adopt an amnesty law for all those who have been sentenced for 
political reasons” (Mamfakinch, 2012k). Pointing to reforming legislation on rape (an Amina 
Filali reference), the right to strike and reform of the press code as examples of the monumental 
amount of reform work remaining in Morocco, Mamfakinch outlined its goal of using general 
amnesty as “a starting point to a more profound democratization of Morocco” (ibid.). With this 
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in mind, Mamfakinch participated in the construction of a website at freekoulchi.org (now 
defunct), which hosted profiles and data on political prisoners. 
#FreeKoulchi followed mobilizations dedicated to specific political prisoners, including 
#FreeEzzedine, and became a rallying cry for the release of various political prisoners, among 
them journalist Rachid Niny, rapper Mouad Belghouate “l7a9ed,” and dissidents of the February 
20 movement. It shared personnel, sit-ins, hashtags, protests and blog posts with Mamfakinch 
and other activist groups. Part of the outrage and sarcastic humor surrounding Danielgate used 
the symbolic repertoire of the #FreeKoulchi campaign, which tweeted “PS/Reminder: The 
Everyone in #FreeEveryone does not include serial rapists” on August 1, 2013, while another 
user tweeted “The Makhzen misinterpreted #FreeKoulchi.” Mamfakinch subsequently used the 
#FreeKoulchi campaign to advocate for journalist Ali Anouzla via #FreeAnouzla, the co-founder 
and editor of the online publication Lakome, who broke the story about Daniel Galvan Vina’s 
pedophilia and pardon.  Anouzla was arrested several months later for being an “apologist of 
terrorism” because his website linked to a reported Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
video. Although Anouzla has been provisionally released he is still facing legal challenges, while 
Lakome has been blocked.  
 Through Mamfakinch’s formulation of the #FreeKoulchi campaign, and ongoing use of 
#Free[insert name] campaigns to advocate for the political prisoner of the moment, the hashtag 
and its language have been synonymous with the unjustly detained. It has also made 
Mamfakinch part of a far-reaching network of global civil society actors advocating for freedom 
of speech and legal protections for the press, not the least of which is Reporters without Borders, 
who constructed a mirrored version of Lakome. Mamfakinch’s defense of Anouzla is also a 
defense of dissent and an attestation to the technological, legal and symbolic tools it is able and 
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willing to invoke for Moroccans to have access to a diversity of voices and a discourse 
constructed outside the purview of state-sanctioned media. 
From Mamfakinch to ADN 
In July 2012 Mamfakinch was the target of a spyware attack that jeopardized the anonymity on 
which many members of the collective depended. The site’s editorial team received an email 
suggesting it would reveal a major scandal, but which turned out to be bait for the installation of 
spyware on the collective’s personal devices. Earlier the site had been subject to DDoS attacks 
that made it difficult to access, but the spyware attack signified a new level of surveillance and 
significant investment in monitoring activists. Mamfakinch sent the spyware to Citizen Lab27 at 
the University of Toronto, which identified it as “a variant of a commercial backdoor sold by the 
Italian Company ‘Hacking Team’” in an October 2012 report (Marquis-Boire, 2012). Hacking 
Team claims to only sell its technologies to “worldwide law enforcement and intelligence 
communities,” billing itself as “The Hacking Suite for Governmental Interception” (Hacking 
Team, 2016).  Hacking Team’s spyware is both sophisticated and expensive, meaning that cost 
would make it prohibitive to most individuals.28 Hacking Team’s Remote Control System 
software (also known as DaVinci or Galileo) allows for remote access to and tracking of infected 
devices: logging emails, passwords, social media accounts, webcams and more (Gallagher, 
2012). Even if Hacking Team intended that its spyware be used against criminals and terrorists, 
technologies have affordances that can be used for a myriad of purposes, both good and bad, and 
intentionality doesn’t always match up with use.  
                                                            
27 Citizen Lab does research “that monitors, analyzes, and impacts the exercise of political power in cyberspace.” 
For more information see: https://citizenlab.org/about/  
28 A Privacy International report suggests that the software itself costs about $200,000 USD (PI, 2015, p. 10). 
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 This was not the Moroccan government’s first purchase of surveillance technologies: in 
2011 French newspaper Le Canard Enchaîné (Canard, 2011) and the cyber surveillance 
monitoring site Reflets published invoices showing that Morocco had invested more than 2 
million dollars in computers and hard drives associated with a surveillance system named Eagle 
sold by a company named Bull through its subsidiary Amesys (Reflets, 2012). Eagle allows for 
Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), which allows for the filtering of data packets as they pass through 
the system. Amesys was the subject of a judicial inquiry in France (Gallagher, 2012) after the 
Wall Street Journal reported finding its Eagle software being used by Gaddafi’s regime against 
its own citizens along with other surveillance technologies purchased from foreign companies 
after the UN ended international sanctions against Libya in 2003 (Sonne & Coker, 2011). Shortly 
afterward Amesys sold Eagle-related activities to a former Bull/Amesys director in an apparent 
attempt to improve its corporate image (Manach, 2013). RSF labeled both Amesys and Hacking 
Team as top five “Corporate Enemies of the Internet” in its 2013 report on cyber surveillance in 
the “era of digital mercenaries” (RSF, 2013). A 2016 piece about Hacking Team founder and 
CEO David Vincenzetti titled “Fear This Man,” states that “existing international arms 
regulations did not cover spyware” (Kushner, 2016) until a 2013 amendment to the Wassenaar 
Agreement included surveillance software (Grannick, 2014).  
 As early as 1999, Human Rights Watch (HRW) acknowledged privacy online to be 
fundamental to extending freedom of expression into a global era. “By guaranteeing privacy of 
communications and authenticating the identity of communicators, encryption also enables free 
association between individuals in cyberspace, an important extension of a traditional right in the 
new circumstances of globalization” (HRW, 1999, p. 10). At a time in which people’s lives and 
communities are less likely to always be local, they are often reliant on technologies to 
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communicate at a distance and should be able to expect privacy and access to tools (like 
encryption) that allow for anonymity. The power and resources of governments and corporations 
often mean that they are able to use new technologies to advance their own interests in ways that 
do not necessarily align with the rights of individual users. In a 2003 PI/GET report that warns 
about the widespread use of anti-terror legislation to crack down on civil rights in a post-9/11 
world, the NGOs point out: “Governments of developing nations rely on Western countries to 
supply them with the necessary technologies of surveillance and control, such as digital 
wiretapping equipment, deciphering equipment, scanners, bugs, tracking equipment and 
computer intercept systems. The transfer of surveillance technology from first to third world is 
now a lucrative sideline for the arms industry. Without the aid of this technology transfer, it is 
unlikely that non-democratic regimes could impose the current levels of control over Internet 
activity” (PI & GET, 2003, p. 7). Vincenzetti is only one among many taking advantage of 
security fears to make sales of software that allow governments (including authoritarian ones) to 
surveil citizens. 
 The sale of surveillance technologies has become big business, and Morocco is a good 
customer. In 2015 Hacking Team itself got hacked, with the hacker tweeting from the company’s 
account “Since we have nothing to hide, we’re publishing all our e-mails, files and source code,” 
and linking to 400GB of company data (Ghattas, 2015). Leaked files showed that after Mexico 
and Italy, Morocco was the third highest revenue source, spending more than 3 million in recent 
years (Gallagher, 2015). A presentation prepared for a surveillance conference references 
regulations, activists (specifically mentioning Citizen Lab, Human Rights Watch, Privacy 
International and Anonymous) and the Wassenaar Agreement as having a chilling effect on the 
use of technology to fight crime (Gallagher, 2015), an ironic reversal on the usual use of the term 
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“chilling effect” which is usually used to refer to discouragement or suppression of free speech. 
Internal email revealed in the hack show disregard for concerns of human rights organizations 
about rights abuses, with one Financial Times article titled “Spectre of ISIS used to erode rights 
in Morocco” circulated by Vinzenetti with [NOT REALLY] added to the email subject line. 
Vincenzetti’s email states: “The ISIS menace looms on Moroccan horizon. The King of Morocco 
is a benevolent monarch, he never overcame any Moroccan Parliament decision, he is very 
different from his father, Morocco is actually the most pro-western Arab country, national 
security initiatives are solely needed in order to tighten stability and defend the country from 
extremists. Casablanca has been bombed by extreme Islamist a few years ago, FYI,” (Currier & 
Marquis-Boire, 2015). Clearly Vincenzetti believes himself more capable of assessing 
Morocco’s security and rights situation than the Moroccan Association of Human Rights 
(AMDH), the organization whose concerns are voiced in the article and which has been working 
on human rights issues in the country since 1979. For Mamfakinch the hack was accompanied by 
a sense of vindication as one contributor tweeted “ET VOILA. MAKHZEN A 
EFFECTIVEMENT UTILISE OUTILS DE SURVEILLANCE PAR HACKING TEAM 
CONTRE CITOYENS” and linked to analysis from The Intercept (Belmkaddem, 2015).  
 Morocco continues to be a Hacking Team client, a state of affairs Hacking Team justifies 
by the nation’s cooperation in the global war on terror. “Vincenzetti says his company lawfully 
engaged with a government that, he notes in an email, ‘is an ally of the U.S. and a partner in the 
fight against terrorism. Morocco is also an ally of most European nations, and Moroccan 
intelligence agencies recently provided France with essential information to locate the terrorists 
in Paris and in Bruxelles’”(Kushner, 2016). Later in 2016 internal documents from New 
Zealand-based surveillance company Endace revealed Morocco’s domestic surveillance agency, 
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the DGST, to be among its clients (Gallagher & Hager, 2016). According to Amnesty’s North 
Africa researcher “In Morocco, digital surveillance is intimately linked with repression of 
peaceful dissent — people who are peacefully protesting or criticizing the authorities face 
intimidation, arrest, unfair trials, and sometimes imprisonment. We fear that the more that these 
surveillance tools are sold [to Moroccan agencies], the more we will see human rights abuses, 
especially in relation to freedom of expression and information” (Gallagher & Hager, 2016). A 
2015 Amnesty International report on torture in Morocco between 2010 and 2014 alleges the 
DGST participated in torture on multiple occasions and links the organization to secret 
detentions at a Temara prison (Amnesty, 2015). In any case, it is clear that Moroccan authorities 
have used and continue to use surveillance technologies obtained from foreign firms, which seem 
to have little concern about selling these tools to regimes with questionable respect for human 
rights and the rule of law. 
Association des Droits Numérique (ADN) 
Mamfakinch ceased publication in February 2014, and the two main reasons cited by members 
for its discontinuation were loss of momentum in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and backlash 
from authorities that threatened the anonymity depended on by many of the site’s members. 
According to Almiraat, the Hacking Team spyware attack discouraged members until the 
number of participants made the project simply unsustainable. Several members of Mamfakinch 
subsequently organized the Digital Rights Association (ADN), an NGO dedicated to establishing 
and protecting rights such as freedom of expression online, access to digital technologies, 
protection of personal data and participative governance of the internet, among others. This shift 
in focus demonstrates the flexibility and creativity of these types of collectives and their publics. 
Unfortunately ADN seemed to be under attack from the beginning. In September 2014 ADN 
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released a communiqué on Facebook decrying intimidation from authorities that caused a Rabat 
hotel to decline to host a joint workshop of AMDH and Privacy International that was to end 
with a press conference announcing ADN’s formation (ADN, 2014b). The workshop, “Freedom 
of expression and human rights in the digital age,” took place at AMDH headquarters, but 
ADN’s communiqué issues a warning that the organization has sought legal council and reminds 
authorities of existing legal protections for freedom of assembly.  
 ADN was not allowed to register as an NGO, meaning the association lacks government 
approval and is de facto illegal. In its Facebook profile the organization outlines its mission to 
“raise awareness, promote and undertake research on digital rights; Defend human rights in the 
digital space; Advocate, mobilize and foster the convergence of stakeholder initiatives - 
government, private sector, civil society, the media; Constitute a force of proposal in terms of 
Internet governance” (ADN, 2014a). The organization hosted its first “Rencontres Raqmiya” 
(Digital Meetings) Dec. 13-14, 2014 in Rabat under the theme “Internet: Between private life 
and freedom of expression.” Like the earlier atelier, authorities blocked the scheduled venue, but 
the conference took place elsewhere with many former Mamfakinch bloggers attending. Several 
months later in February 2015 an ADN communiqué indicated that police raided their 
headquarters, to which the association responded by denouncing “this new violation of civil 
liberties, a new episode in a black series of systematic attacks carried out by the State since the 
summer of 2014 against human rights associations and for which our association has also paid 
the price” (ADN, 2015). Amid this generalized campaign of dissuasion, ADN continued its 
campaigns to educate and mobilize publics in opposition to reforms of the penal and press codes 
that increased legal provisions aimed at cracking down on digital dissent in a post-Arab Spring 
environment.  
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 ADN collaborated with international privacy activists at Privacy International to produce 
a report titled “Their Eyes on Me: Stories of Surveillance in Morocco” that aims to give names 
and faces to the often invisible targets of cyber surveillance (PI, 2015). Four Moroccans, 
including three former Mamfakinch contributors, participated in the report: Hisham Almiraat, 
Samia Errazzouki, Yassir Kazar and independent journalist Ali Anouzla. The report highlights 
increasing threats to privacy and freedom of association/speech online in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring, especially for activists associated with M20, highlighting threats posed by 
government investments in surveillance technologies and nationalist hacking groups. Above all 
the report makes clear that Moroccan authorities combined cyber surveillance with more 
traditional means of intimidation such as phone tapping and police questioning. “State agents” 
visited the family of one Mamfakinch blogger located abroad multiple times, an act she 
described as “not [about having] answers or information. It is just to intimidate me so I can get 
the message. It is just about ‘We want you to know that we’re watching you, not just online but 
in person’” (PI, 2015, p. 25). Likewise, the article states that “Ali Anouzla likes to remind people 
that he’s been a victim of spying of all types. ‘There have been cars following me outside of 
Rabat, someone once came to film the keyhole of my flat – it turned out that he worked for the 
secret services. And obviously phones are tapped’” (PI, 2015, p. 33). Long held restrictions on 
traditional media extended to the internet and new means emerged to keep activists in check.29  
 While the internet had been heralded as a new terrain for liberty in Morocco, government 
use of surveillance technologies and post-Arab Spring crackdowns on dissidents meant that for 
Almiraat “they have turned the internet into something dangerous for those who want to take part 
                                                            
29 Rather than imprison bloggers (especially those associated with M20) for their online activities, the regime began 
bringing trumped up drug charges against bloggers like Mohamed Sokrate, Mohamed Dawass and Said Ziani. 
Sokrate was allegedly forced into signing a confession so that his father and brother would be released from jail 
(RSF, 4 Oct 2012). 
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in the public debate but have something to lose” (PI, 2015, p. 20). This chilling effect was 
especially potent for those who were not well-versed in digital technologies to begin with. 
According to Yassir Kazar, who describes himself on Twitter as “a serial startuper” of cyber 
security companies, people react differently to the trauma of having their privacy invaded. 
“Some people manage to transcend it and to turn into a positive experience and others remain 
traumatised, especially if technology was not their cup of tea in the first place” (PI, 2015, p. 30). 
For Kazar the experience was an affirming one in that the government felt sufficiently threatened 
by Mamfakinch to put significant effort into its surveillance and intimidation. And Mamfakinch 
was by no means/hardly the only independent site under attack in post-Arab Spring Morocco. 
Around the time that Mamfakinch was subject to the spyware attack Lakome, Goud and 
Febrayer were all targeted by hackers. Nationalist hackers were the culprits for the most part: 
Anouzla’s online accounts were accessed by the Royal Brigade of Dissuasion, Goud’s homepage 
taken over by the Electronic Islam Army and Febrayer suffered a spyware attack from Moroccan 
Repression Force. Whether centrally orchestrated by authorities, nationalist groups or individual 
hackers, the attacks are indicative of growing resistance to the use of the internet by independent 
media to shift norms of speech and articulate alternative modernities. 
 I spoke with Almiraat a few days after the press conference meant to be the official 
release of the Privacy International report in Morocco. “Very early in the morning there were 
four police vans blocking access to the venue,” he said, “and ADN is not the only one 
[experiencing this]” (Almiraat, personal communication, 2015). For Almiraat there is a general 
feeling that civil society has become the environment where ideas, like-minded people can come 
together to build alternative views of the future, a situation that makes it threatening to the status 
quo. And the authorities don’t have to do much to instill fear in people. “We still have memories 
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of 70s/80s/early 90s,” said Almiraat “so it’s not a big leap” (Almiraat, personal communication, 
2015). In many ways ADN is a response to a paradigm shift coming out of the Arab Spring in 
regard to official/authority attitudes toward the internet, but also activist attitudes. The 
democratic utopian vision of the internet as a tool capable of confronting authoritarianism gave 
way to an emphasis on building institutional frameworks to support more traditional forms of 
political struggle, as seen in the heavy involvement of AMDH and more traditional civil society 
organizations in ADN efforts. According to Almiraat “There was this realization that the internet 
is not enough” (Almiraat, personal communication, 2015).  
 ADN substitutes depth for the breadth of a collective like Mamfakinch that was more 
oriented toward public engagement than institution building inside existing political frameworks. 
But getting people to see the pressing nature of privacy policies and regulatory frameworks is a 
more difficult task than harnessing the energy of a popular movement. The PI report intended to 
put a human face on that struggle, and was meant to be the first in a series of three reports 
produced in collaboration with ADN. “It’s hard to make people realize that privacy doesn’t only 
concern people who have something to hide” said Almiraat. “People don’t see the direct link 
between privacy and freedom of expression.” Almiraat says ADN targets law students and young 
technologists who are familiar with things like WikiLeaks and the NSA. “In that way we’re 
elitist or selective and even then it’s a hard sell,” he said, “but journalists seem to understand that 
privacy is fundamentally linked to freedom of access and freedom of expression.” In this way 
Mamfakinch opened up conversations that had been happening in private, smaller circles to 
include broader publics, while ADN is about having more targeted conversations with specific 
publics. In many ways these specific publics are the ones that were brought to the fore by the 
Arab Spring moment/movement and demands for dignity, democracy and accountability from 
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authorities. At a time when Moroccan news organization were not really online and electronic 
journalism was in its infancy, Mamfakinch found its niche in curating online information, 
mobilizing around human rights/freedom of speech and privileging secular voices, especially 
those associated with civil society and the independent press. For Almiraat, Mamfakinch’s 
legacy as part of that moment is wrapped up in its combination of on- and off-line efforts, and of 
using technology to pursue public conversations about topics and issues off limits in mainstream 
media. “It was the epitome of what the internet can do best, that is bring together like-minded 
people to work together regardless of distance or geography. In 3-6 months we had something 
like a million unique visitors, which shows that people want to talk about sex, religion, the 
monarchy. Mamfakinch showed that the internet can achieve some sort of change and be a motor 
in some circles, provided that people also organize and do things offline” (Almiraat, personal 
communication, 2015). 
Judicial harassment  
On May 9, 2015 Morocco’s official state news agency, MAP, published a short news bulletin 
under the title “Accused of digital espionage, the Interior files complaint” (MAP, 2015). Barely 
two paragraphs, the bulletin states that the Interior Minister filed a lawsuit with the public 
prosecutor’s office against “certain persons who have prepared and distributed a report 
containing serious accusations” of espionage by its services, citing an unnamed source from the 
Interior Ministry (MAP, 2015). MAP gives no names, but the news bulletin appeared three days 
after Privacy International and ADN presented “Their Eyes on Me.” In an example of the opaque 
way in which the Moroccan judicial system works, Almiraat apparently learned about the lawsuit 
via media reports as he told Reuters “We suppose they are talking about us” (El Yaakoubi, 
2015). A statement from Privacy International confirms “Since the MAP dispatch, the Ministry 
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of Interior has not disclosed further information. Neither Privacy International nor our local 
Moroccan partner – the Association des Droits Numériques (ADN) – has been contacted by the 
Moroccan government” (PI, 2015). While the report didn’t really reveal anything that hadn’t 
been circulating on the internet for years in regard to the Moroccan government’s purchase of 
spyware or intimidation of journalists and activists, bringing those allegation out to circulate in 
the open was apparently a step too far.  
 Almiraat’s odyssey with lawsuits and court cases was just beginning. In September 
Almiraat and Karima Nadir (ADN VP) were interrogated by the Moroccan Judicial Police 
(BNPJ) in conjunction with the defamation suit filed by the interior ministry (Alami, 2015; 
FIDH, 2015). Besides the initial defamation charges associated with the Privacy International 
report, Almiraat was also charged in conjunction with 6 other journalists and human rights 
activists: historian and journalist Maati Monjib, journalists Hicham Mansouri, Abdessamad 
Iyach/Iach, Maria Moukrim, and Rashid Tarik, plus Mohamed Saber/Essabr president of the 
Moroccan Association of Youth Education (AMEJ). The five journalists were affiliated with the 
Association Marocaine du Journalism d’Investigation (AMJI) and all seven had worked with 
Dutch NGO Free Press Unlimited on training Moroccans to use the open source smartphone app 
StoryMaker, which allows for producing and publishing media from Android devices. Their 
work earned Almiraat, Monjib, Mansouri,30 Iyach and Saber accusations of “threatening the 
internal security of the state,” while Moukrim and Tarik are charged with accepting foreign 
funding without notifying the government (CIHRS, 2015). The accusations carry maximum 
penalties of five years in prison and hefty fines. The trial, initially set for November 19, 2015, 
has been postponed four times over more than a year and as of writing was scheduled to take 
                                                            
30 At the time of the charges, Mansouri was already in prison serving time on the pretext of adultery. 
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place on January 25, 2017 (FPU, 2016). Most of the defendants have been told not to leave the 
country or prevented from doing so at various points; all have the trial hanging over their heads.  
 Almiraat’s work on human rights and freedom of expression campaigns made him the 
subject of one himself. The Global Voices network, for whom Almiraat served as advocacy 
director from 2012-2014, has been instrumental in organizing the #Justice4Morocco campaign to 
draw attention to the ongoing proceedings against the free speech advocates. International 
observers and media have been present for trial dates thus far, while one Global Voices report 
noted “The local press was conspicuously absent” from a press conference organized prior to the 
March 23, 2016 hearing (Advox, 2016). In an interview posted on the online publishing platform 
Medium in December 2016, Almiraat is described as “currently in self-exile fighting some unjust 
charges that could land him up to five years of prison” (Nex, 2016). In terms of the trial he 
believes “we are being given the Oscar for our whole careers as activists. By that I mean that 
what happened to us is only part of a larger post-Arab Spring crackdown on civil society actors” 
(Nex, 2016). It’s hard not to believe that the trial of Almiraat and his peers is just another 
example of the Moroccan government pursuing charges against activists and civil society 
organizers that are unrelated to their real crimes of participating in and publicizing the pro-
democracy movement in the country.  
“They want to send a clear message that it’s the end of the party.” -Almiraat 
Mamfakinch became a key part of an information infrastructure in that the collective curated 
content and mediated between citizen journalists/activists and more mainstream media. The 
organization’s international reach and ability to move across boundaries through its transnational 
network and direct attention to abuses made it particularly threatening to a regime that goes to 
great lengths to cultivate its image among the international community. Mamfakinch and its 
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subsequent evolutions indicate that new information infrastructures and modes of cultural 
politics are emerging at the nexus of technological and symbolic networks. In the Moroccan 
context these are defined by flexible publics and a sort of nimble politics, where the ability to 
operate amorphously across multiple scales, to produce publics and address issues by harnessing 
popular culture, while responding quickly to the maneuverings of power, become particularly 
important. Mamfakinch constitutes an attempt to turn a powerful moment into a viable 
opposition by harnessing demands that span traditional political/ideological divisions and 
expanding the realm of relevant actors with a stake in reform - from youth shut out of the 
political process locally to international human rights organizations. By channeling digital tools 
toward the overcoming of mainstream media blackouts, Mamfakinch intervened/changed the 
conversation and expanded notions about who speaks for Morocco.  
 Official opposition to ADN and Almiraat’s trial are above all indicative of the shifting 
attitudes of authorities toward the internet in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. What began as a 
tool for business and economic development quickly came under the same restrictions as 
traditional media as it became more accessible to publics and understood as a tool for organizing 
and orchestrating opposition. Mamfakinch’s status as an intermediary and curator facilitated the 
formation of a double critique oriented toward both domestic power/politics and international 
interventions. The repression encountered by ADN since its beginning and the organization’s 
uphill battle in establishing interest in privacy raises questions about what this type of public 
formation means for everyday governance and more conventional forms of activism.  
Mamfakinch is just one site that contributed to the emergence of independent media and a 
new cultural politics in Morocco. The production of flexible publics that make claims directed to 
those in the highest echelons of power depended heavily on Mamfakinch’s ability to marshal 
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both technological and symbolic resources. Mamfakinch moved back and forth across the local 
and the global, working with local activists, media outlets, NGOs and supranational 
organizations to challenge official state discourse and narratives about the nation. Morocco’s 
history of suppressing dissent has made cultural spaces like a key site of contention over political 
visions that are more recently intersecting with newly networked and increasingly worldly youth 
digital cultures. This is restructuring of the norms of interaction between people and power, in 
that publics are increasingly accustomed to making demands of those in power and expecting a 
response. By acting as a public forum for the mediation of these claims, Mamfakinch was able to 
translate them into the language of universal rights and democratic norms, using its transnational 
activist networks to invoke a politics of shame that is particularly effective in claims against an 
externally oriented economy like Morocco’s. International attention, although not without its 
challenges and problems, can then provide additional resources for local campaigns, as well as 
increased security for activists. So we see that what began as an attempt to turn the Arab Spring 
moment in Morocco into a viable opposition using media, developed into a new mode of cultural 
politics defined by the formation of flexible publics and restructuring the norms of interaction 













Telquel has been sold, Nabil Ayouch’s latest film banned, and ADN is practically inactive 
awaiting the outcome of Almiraat’s charges. Many would say that there isn’t really an 
independent media in Morocco today, or what Ksikes referred to as “pure players.” But Telquel 
still finds some critical moments amidst its more commercial orientation, after Lakome.com was 
blocked in Morocco it became Lakome2.com and Ali Amar has launched Le Desk, an online 
investigative journalism outfit operating through investors and subscriptions, with several 
veteran journalists of other independent media ventures. Independent media in Morocco continue 
to be engaged in a constant process of reinvention and reimagining of business models in relation 
to challenges from authorities. But regardless of what the controversial news outlet, film or 
activist campaign of the moment is, the bottom line is that culture has become a wider field for 
contention and claim making under Mohammed VI and independent media have become a 
discursive force in terms of challenging the interpretive authority of the monarchy through the 
nexus of cosmopolitan cultural forms and everyday urban culture. 
 This dissertation looks at the shifting relationship between culture and politics associated 
the emergence of independent media, the conditions of possibility for which were produced by 
three decades of economic liberalization and a moment of political transition. Once the domain 
of the state and the monarchy, culture – understood as the conjunction of everyday lived 
experiences and symbolic systems – has been remediated through magazines, film and various 
digital media platforms and practices. As a result mediated publics have emerged that 
simultaneously decouple culture and politics from under state authority and blur the lines 
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between them, resulting in new modes of cultural politics whereby culture, and independent 
media in particular, becomes a space for the pressing of claims and political agendas in an 
increasingly mediated world. The increasing penetration of capital and transformations in the 
role of the state mean that to the extent that the goals of independent media intersect with state 
priorities – such as opposition to Islamism or portrayals of a Morocco open to the world – they 
are supported, while any challenge to the monarchy’s position above politics results in 
opposition or censure. The varied and often contradictory responses of authorities to discourses 
emanating from Telquel, the new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch make evident the extent to 
which independent media and the state operate in a dialectic of dependency and antagonism. 
 What emerges from this dialectic is a picture of independent media associated with a 
progressive counterpublic positioning itself in opposition to the impunity of the monarchy on one 
hand, and the rise of political Islam on the other, that can ultimately be understood as a response 
to the failings of political parties. The attempt of this counterpublic to reorient understandings of 
right and left on the political spectrum away from support (or lack thereof) for the monarchy 
toward respect for human rights and the rule of law is the latest in a long line of attempts over the 
last century to establish communicative spaces that revolve around civil liberties and dignity. 
What distinguishes the interventions of contemporary independent media like Telquel, the new 
Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch are their attempts to work within the forces of capital and 
technology to create new discursive spaces within a broader Moroccan media landscape. In the 
process we see a shift from state-sanctioned culture to more democratic conceptions of culture 
where the tools of media production and circulation are increasingly accessible to average people 
at the same time that global media corporations have “discovered” place and cultural specificity 
as an asset. By engaging with the lived realities of Moroccan society that exist outside nationalist 
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discourses about a homogenous Arabo-Islamic society and transnational constructions of Arabs 
and Muslims as the “others” of modernity, independent media produce texts that display a 
fundamental ambivalence about modernities caught somewhere between increasing global 
inequality and the newly neoliberal state.  
 Fundamentally what I am talking about is the increasing penetration of capital as part of 
globalization, and Morocco’s entry into global modernity. For Dirlik (2003) global modernity 
constitutes a shift from Euro-American domination of the 20th century to the relatively 
decentralized orchestrations – of power, capital, ideologies – of the 21st century. The shifting 
cultural geographies associated with my three sites of analysis are caught up in this process of 
decentralization and in the rise of regional centers, wherein increasingly networked forms of 
capital and communication intersect with geopolitical priorities, domestic policies, transnational 
cultural elites and local public culture. In the case of Telquel this manifests in the magazine’s 
mobilization of a secular Moroccan identity through Darija in order to foster opposition to the 
monarchy’s Islamic cultural hegemony and increasing fundamentalist challenges, highlighting 
Moroccans who are challenging social norms and bringing the traditionally marginalized into the 
center of the conversation. In the cinema it takes the shape of a shift in scale from taking the 
national as the assumed frame of reference to operating according to a wider regional and global 
framework, in part due to transnational influences in cultural policy and their interactions with 
globalization. In the process, filmmakers moving between translocal priorities and global media 
imperatives become important mediating forces among multiple modernities and for the 
production of alternative discourses. Finally, in the case of Mamfakinch the collective taps into 
newly networked and increasingly worldly youth digital cultures in order to act as a platform for 
publics disillusioned with institutional politics and unaccustomed to making direct demands of 
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power. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and Islamist electoral victories in Morocco and 
elsewhere, there is an overwhelming sense by progressive counterpublics that an even greater 
shift in mentalities is needed than previously imagined, and that creating spaces of engagement 
(mediated or otherwise) is a starting point for that in a highly stratified society. In many ways 
media capitalism and the rise of new platforms and practices adopted by a left in crisis coincided 
with an Islamic revival and the rise of political Islam, both of which are responses to 
globalization in their own ways and can be read as part of liberal visions of progress amidst 
growing populist resentment around the world.  
 This project is situated within the sub-field of global media studies that takes the local as 
its starting point for analyzing cultural geographies of media production across multiple scales. I 
focus on the reign of Morocco’s current king, Mohammed VI, beginning in 1999 with his ascent 
to power and reforms that resulted in the opening up for civil society via freedom of association 
and media liberalization, and ending in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and its significant 
challenges to his authority. However, I situate these relatively recent events within the larger 
context of 30 years of economic liberalization and broader histories of dissent in Moroccan 
media. In looking at localized practices and interrogating the strategic use of discourses about 
hybridity in relation to power, it becomes clear that multiple forms of Moroccan modernity are 
being advanced by various actors and competing for legitimacy among publics. My intervention 
involves integrating analyses across industry logics, technological platforms and cultural politics, 
so that it becomes clear how political economic shifts and technological affordances create the 
conditions of possibility for certain types of claim making, as well as how those mediated claims 
are then taken up in public culture. Additionally, in regard to the emergent field of digital 
studies, I make the case that the artificial separating out of the digital makes little sense and that 
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in order to really understand the digital we have to look at it as part of intermedia relationships 
and convergences. Given the way media systems have developed around the world, I adopt a 
comparative, cross-platform approach in order to situate the digital in relation to other media 
forms.  
 The combination of Telquel, new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch allows for analysis 
of shared histories, transmedia storytelling and the movement of discourses across platforms. 
Quite unexpectedly I discovered the extent to which overlaps in people and ideas exist among 
these three sites: Benchemsi’s inspiration for Telquel was a magazine started by Nabil Ayouch’s 
father in the 1980s, the cinema sector was both closely covered by Telquel (as one of the NMC’s 
most ardent supporters) and one of the earliest adopters of Darija, several Mamfakinch bloggers 
contributed to Benchemsi’s post-Telquel project Free Arabs, and one Mamfakinch blogger is 
now a journalist at Telquel. These interconnections paint a picture of a relatively small circle of 
journalistic, artistic and political affinities, defined by shared commitments to franker discourse 
about the challenges facing Moroccan society and to bringing symbolic systems into greater 
proximity with the realities of everyday life. In doing so, they deploy a high degree of cultural 
(and often economic) capital as part of diasporic networks linked to a transnational left, and 
challenge official narratives by bringing a wider array of cultural forms and perspectives into the 
arena of public culture. The majority of these cultural producers came of age in a post-Years of 
Lead Morocco in the process of liberalization and are part of a generation initially emboldened 
by policy changes under Mohammed VI to challenge the notions of national unanimity 
constructed by the monarchy. By taking up disjunctures associated with ethnicity, class, religion, 
gender, etc, independent media illuminate the vastly varied ways in which new forms of global 
interconnectedness are experienced even locally.  
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Hybrid texts and multiple modernities 
At the start of this study I announced the intention to analyze versions of modernity advanced by 
Moroccan independent media and their intersections with orchestrations of power in a global era. 
The reterritorialization of the nation in accordance with the logics of global capital, and the use 
of those logics by independent media to create new discursive spaces via media platforms 
advances a particular agenda that can be seen as simultaneously oriented toward 
democratization/human rights and continuing colonial affinities through culture. Meanwhile, the 
top down modernity through which the monarchy simultaneously cultivates the appearance of a 
primordial Moroccan nation, its role as mediator of multiculturalism and force for modernization 
through its commitment to the ever-receding horizon of a democratic transition, effectively 
obscures the unequal distribution of power among groups as well as outright oppression 
orchestrated in the name of national consensus. Independent media challenge this consensus and 
the notion of modernity on which it rests by remediating/positioning the nation as a historically 
contingent construction capable of being reconstructed or reimagined in a diversity of ways. 
Ultimately, increased openness to and availability of global capital and new mechanisms for 
cultural production and circulation have opened up avenues for alternative storytelling and 
depictions of Moroccan life and experiences that challenge hegemonic narratives about society 
and culture through media, making public culture into a site of contention over diverse societal 
projects. In my analysis of Telquel, the new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch, three themes 
emerge that crosscut the three case studies a part of a new mode of cultural politics: language 





One of the major overarching themes of this dissertation is the use of language by the 
independent media examined here. Telquel, the new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch all make 
use of Darija, or Moroccan Arabic, as part of multilingual media texts: as a francophone news 
magazine Telquel advocates for and includes some Darija, new Moroccan cinema 
unapologetically makes films in Darija, or moves between languages by social setting, relying on 
subtitling for the accessibility of diverse publics, and one of Mamfakinch’s primary markers as a 
digital information curator has been its movement between Arabic, French and English, with 
texts often appearing on the site in multiple languages. In this way independent media move 
away from Moroccan media’s reliance on classical Arabic and its associations with traditional 
top-down forms of knowledge production, toward closer proximity with the way language 
actually operates as part of the discursive terrain that is Morocco. We see language operating as 
both a practical tool for inclusion and a symbolic resource signaling political affiliations 
emphasizing secularism in public life. However, the perceived roots of secularism in French 
colonial politics makes arguments over language particularly controversial, as does the sense of 
Arabic being under attack that originates with colonialism and is reinforced by contemporary, 
post-9/11 Islamophobia and attacks on the Middle East. In this environment advocacy for Darija 
is seen as an attack on classical Arabic as the sacred and infallible language of the Qu’ran, as 
well as the religious foundations on which the legitimacy of the monarchy rests. Thus what 
francophone elites and Darija advocates might perceive as an emphasis on local or indigenous 
cultural specificity is interpreted as an attempt to re-orient Moroccan cultural geography away 
from Arab-Islamic socio-linguistic spaces and toward strengthening European, especially 
French, affiliations even further. Generally, it’s not Darija that publics oppose, but its 
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institutionalization as part of attempts to desacralize public discourse and knowledge production, 
which secular leftists say is a functional necessity given that certain topics can’t be discussed in 
Arabic. Pervasive references to langue du bois, or a refusal to engage or speak directly position 
Arabic as a tool of obscurantism that perpetuates a lack of transparency on the part of those in 
power in their dealings with publics. Independent media use Darija in an attempt to close the 
distance between symbolic systems and lived realities of everyday life as part of a broader 
democratization of culture that also contributes its political goals as part of a progressive 
counterpublic. 
Alternative Information Infrastructures 
Telquel, the new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch are all part of networks of cultural 
producers – journalists, artists, activists – acting as public intellectuals and negotiating new 
information infrastructures. We see infrastructure move from a way for colonial administration 
to visibly demonstrate technical expertise and efficiency as part of its civilizing mission, to part 
of the paternalistic function of the state under nationalist postcolonial elites, to a major 
justification for the existence of a new neoliberal state in a global era. The withdrawal, or in the 
Moroccan case, neoliberal reconfiguration, of the state’s role in media as part of a creative 
industries model means that there is an emergent information infrastructure that sits alongside 
(and sometimes intersects or challenges) that of the state. While the state and its partners invest 
in material infrastructure aimed at making Morocco a communications and technology hub of 
Africa, especially for former French colonies, cultural producers – including journalists, artists, 
and activists – acting as public intellectuals are making use these material resources to create 
new discursive spaces that act as a front for liberal social projects oriented toward human rights 
and freedom of expression that might also be personally and professionally profitable. These 
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efforts are built on the scaffolding of intellectual and student movements associated with 1965, 
moving from radical ideologies of revolution that separated that moment from nationalism’s 
earlier reformist orientation to human rights associations rooted in civil society. The exile of 
Arab intellectuals in Paris in the 1960s, as well as educational networks and an increasingly 
authoritarian monarchy, further strengthened intellectual connections to France and 
intermingling with transnational currents of leftist thought. Combined with colonial and Cold 
War histories of information infrastructures built around French capital and political agendas, 
independent media emerge as part of freedom of expression networks that are in many ways 
bound up with flows of capital, as seen in Telquel’s roots in financial journalism. Morocco’s 
continued alignment with the West in the “war on terror” is used to justify its purchase of 
repressive surveillance technologies that are then used to target dissent, as seen in the case of 
Mamfakinch. However, the rise of the digital and its institutionalization as a (more) open space 
for individual expression and entertainment meant that many underestimated its potential for 
organizing and shaping new practices and forms of publicness. By harnessing the cosmopolitan 
and creative energies of newly networked digital youth, independent media emphasize more 
fluid ideological commitments in conjunction with more individualist information production, 
circulation and consumption.  
Publics and public culture  
The remaking of the Moroccan public sphere by independent media has produced new kinds of 
mediated publics born of a renewed cultural dynamism and interest in changes taking place in 
Moroccan society. One of the ways independent media try to do this is by going beyond the texts 
themselves to event-making and constructs public culture as an arena for debates and encounters 
that are generative of political possibilities. Despite the opening of Moroccan public culture to 
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new forms of discourse and perspectives accompanying independent media, culture continues to 
be perceived as a relatively elite domain, and in the wake of the Arab Spring and an Islamist 
electoral victory, there is the sense that communication across split publics has become a social 
and political imperative. Constructing spaces for social mixing is difficult in a society where 
culture was long seen as subversive and freedom of association limited, and where deeply 
entrenched norms of sociability bisect around class and gender lines. In this environment, 
making rooms for a diversity of discourses, particularly underrepresented perspectives and 
publicizing marginalized forms of urban youth culture become a particularly important function 
for independent media. We see this in Telquel’s engagement with underground music scene, 
participating in the festivals, debates and cultural initiatives by filmmakers of the new Moroccan 
cinema and Mamfakinch’s participation in online (i.e. Live-tweeting, petitions) and offline 
(protests and press conferences) mobilizations. In the process, new types of mediated publics 
emerge that I am calling “flexible publics” due to their flexibility in moving across platforms and 
ideologies, while also establishing a set of nonnegotiable principles around freedom of 
expression and human rights. Fundamentally we can think of this as a form of cultural politics by 
a left in crisis and an attempt to build a viable opposition in the face of increasing consolidation 
of power under the monarchy and a populist Islamist government.  
Finally 
This dissertation deals with a specific set of closely intertwined independent media associated 
with a francophone elite/urban middle class, but with aspirations at speaking to and for broader 
publics and fundamentally challenging the cultural hegemony of the monarchy. But it’s 
important to underline the fact that the progressive counterpublic associated with Telquel, the 
new Moroccan cinema and Mamfakinch is only one response to the rise of global modernity and 
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the reterritorialization of the nation as an authoritarian neoliberal state, with the other major 
response coming from an Islamic revival that has become a populist force in Moroccan politics. 
In order to further understand things like Telquel’s sensationalist depictions of Islamists or 
popular outrage in response to challenging certain types of societal taboos, further analysis is 
needed of Islamist media and reactionary responses that are outside the scope of this project. 
This is particularly important given that there has been an attempt to reorient cultural 
geographies of Moroccan media production and consumption away from Europe and strengthen 
affiliations with the Middle East in a way that both supports the Moroccan monarchy and opens 
new markets. Given that the 2008 financial crisis in Europe and subsequent austerity measures 
have made money more scarce, the capital coming out of conservative gulf states like Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Kuwait has been playing a greater role in Morocco, as seen in Vivendi’s 
sale of its majority stake in Maroc Telecom to Etisalat. Overall, the emergence of independent 
media in Morocco can be seen as the product of shifting industry logics in Moroccan cultural 
industries to incorporate transnational flows of capital. The situation of this media within 
transnational civil society and activist networks allows for specific ideological interventions that 
push critical issues to the fore and challenge the cultural hegemony of the monarchy. 
Independent media then become a platform for the articulation of an alternative Moroccan 
modernity by a progressive counterculture and its contestation across public culture. 
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Telquel editorial meeting: Karim Boukhari (3rd from left) and Driss Ksikes (4th from left) 




Family tree of the publications produced by Telquel Média S.A., 2015 





Telquel #386, January 2007 
“The international press supports us” - graphic showing logos from press organizations 
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Appendix C: The Daily Press in the Alternance Era 
Going into the alternance era the partisan press remained dominant in the 1990s, with the 
socialist USFP’s al-Ittihad al-Ichtiraki (Socialist Union) and center-right nationalist Istiqlal’s Al-
Alam (The Banner) securing the highest circulations. The daily press consisted of newspapers 
almost exclusively sponsored by political parties, unions or the state, often with separate 
francophone and arabophone editions. Besides Al-Ittihad al-Ichtiraki and Al-Alam, other major 
papers included Al-Ittihad al-Ichtiraki’s francophone counterpart Libération, Al-Alam’s 
francophone counterpart L’Opinion, the royalist Le Matin, the communist PPS’s Al Bayane (The 
Dispatch), and later (1999) the moderate Islamic PJD’s Attajdid (Renewal).  Following the 
election of the Alternance government the first Moroccan independent daily newspaper appeared 
in October 1998, the arabophone al-Ahdath al-maghribiya (Moroccan Events) (Smolin, 2014; 
Vermeren, 2001). Smolin (2014) argues that Moroccan Events was the product of increasing 
sensationalism and commercialism in the Moroccan press, with its emphasis on crime and sex 
often encouraged by the state in order to increase its legitimacy as protector of the people. By 
2004 Moroccan Events reached its peak with the highest daily circulation of 93,000 copies and 
since then has declined to a circulation of 24,000 in 2014 (OJD). Despite the success of 
Moroccan Events, the daily press remained largely conservative and close to those in power – it 
wasn’t until several years later that other independent dailies really flourished, with al-Massae 
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Appendix D: The Politics of Nayda 
Nayda became a much-reported on phenomenon in both Moroccan and foreign media outlets – 
including articles such as Foreign Policy’s “Nayda: Morocco’s Musical Revolution” (Mekouar, 
2010) and CNN’s “Rappers in Casablanca rage against injustice” (Lakhani, 2012) – and  
subsequently received a great deal of scholarly attention. Many media and researchers tend to 
overstate Nayda’s political dimensions, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring. Caubet 
(whose Nayda article in Telquel is cited above) was one of the first scholars to publish 
extensively on the movement, frequently describing it as a “Moroccan Movida,” comparing it to 
the Movida madrileña, an artistic and political awakening associated with the Spanish transition 
to democracy following Franco’s death in 1975. Some of the more nuanced and convincing 
commentary on Nayda include sociologist Zakia Salime’s (2011) claims that hip hop and the 
Nayda movement in Morocco played a key role in establishing “the cultural frames and political 
claims” used by the M20 movement during the Arab Spring. Almeida (2013) argues that the 
Moroccan rap scene can be seen as a nonmovement (referencing Bayat, 2011) that constitutes a 
web of solidarities between individual actors who do not necessarily share ideologies, and that 
the cultural scene is more complex than revolutionary or cooptation accounts might suggest. In 
Hip Hop Highways, Bhat (2014) describes “a larger trend that has emerged since the Arab 
Spring to fetishize the revolutionary character of youth” and finds in her interviews with rappers 
their “desire to portray Moroccan youth as dynamic human beings with lives and concerns that 
exist outside of the Western obsession with democratic upheaval in Arab countries” (p. 31). 
Many young Moroccans associate Nayda with partying, moving and dancing rather than 
anything explicitly political, as Bhat (2013) confirms in her interviews. In this sense decorum 
and its disruption involves the throwing off of social conventions about being in public and the 
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refusal of a public to remain immobile, and whether that movement involves pleasure or politics, 
it undeniably involves new (often hybrid) cultural forms, experiences and ways of producing 
meaning. 
 In fact, some of the cultural production is not revolutionary at all. In a section titled “La 
Nayda, ‘movida’ ou coup de communication?” Veremeren (2009) questions who these new 
festivals1 are for – Elites? Tourists? Investment? – and whether the Nayda movement is simply a 
communications strategy for a regime interested in perpetuating a less-authoritarian vision of 
itself both to its own publics and those abroad. In particular Vermeren (2009) questions Nayda’s 
characterization as progressive, noting the presence of patriotic lyrics that could be seen as quite 
conservative when compared with leftist groups of the 1970s. Popular rappers such as Don Bigg 
(2006) produced songs such as Mgharba tal Mout or “Moroccan until death,” a type of 
patriotism often seen as a response to the May 2003 suicide bombings in Casa, increases in 
security and the perception of Islam being targeted by the “war on terror.” In an Telquel editorial 
following the 2005 edition of L’Boulevard, Benchemsi describes a scene where gospel-gnawa 
fusion band Midnight Shems (midnight sun) extolled the virtues of Allah, al watan, al malik 
(God, country, king - Morocco’s national motto) and was joined by the crowd in singing the 
national anthem in an impromptu and enthusiastic expression of patriotism (Benchemsi, 2005, 
#180). Benchemsi cites an older man in his fifties as responding “It is well worth having suffered 
and been an activist for 30 years so these little shits can get excited about the king and country,” 
then goes on to portray the man as “closer to the unconditional of the mouqaddassat (the 
sacrosanct beliefs of Islam) than the young public of Midnight Shems”…who are living in a 
society where “the state, political parties and the ‘old’ in general are downright irrelevant” 
                                                
1 Following the success of L’Boulevard, the Moroccan government invested heavily in what has been called 
“festivalization,” or programming major cultural festivals in many cities around the country. 
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(Benchemsi, 2005, #180). Benchemsi’s near fetishization of youth is understandable in the light 
of widespread disillusionment with the unyielding ideological arguments of earlier generations, 
particularly those of the left, yet his comparison with the sacrosanct ideas of Islam doesn’t seem 
to hold in a geopolitical arena rife with an identity politics where young Moroccans see 
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